THE JOURNAL OF OROMO STUDIES
Volume 27, Number 1&2
2020

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JOURNAL OF OROMO STUDIES

Publication of the Oromo Studies Association

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ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION RATES
Individual $35
Institutional $55
Single Issue $20
Add $20 annually for shipping.
Send in US currency payments and subscription requests to:
Oromo Studies Association
P O Box 5152
Salisbury MD 21802
Make checks or money orders out to the Oromo Studies Association.

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Table of Contents

Voice of Resistance: An Analysis of Hacalu Hundessa's Songs
Asebe Regassa Debelo
1

A Voice from the Minority Majority: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Lyrics of the Songs Ani Hinjiru and Jirra Jirraa
Adugna Barkessa
25

Development without Democracy? The Myth of Economic Miracle and Protests in Ethiopia
Guluma Gemeda
71

The Coup Plot of Brigadier General Taddasa Birru: Oromo Attempt to Take Political Power in November 1966
Biratu Kenei Aga
101

Gender Constructs in the Gadaa System and a Discussion of Symbolic Oromo Women in Pre-20th Century Historical Accounts
Ginbar Nagara Kumsa
125

Some Oral Insights into the Arsi Oromo Cultural Values:
The Power of Words as Indicators in Conflict
Gemechu Kedir
153

Negative Impact of Globalization on Indigenous Cultures: The Case of Salale Oromo, Ethiopia
Zewde Getahun
189

Ethiopian Nationalism, Oromo Exclusion and the Rise of Abiy Ahmed (2018-2020): The Uses and Abuses of being First
Zakia Posey
205

Voice of Resistance: An Analysis of Hacalu Hundessa's Songs

Asebe Regassa Debelo

On the 29th of June 2020 (around 9:30pm), Hacalu Hundessa, a young Oromo activist-musician characterized as an icon of resistance songwriting and an artist who revolutionized modern Oromo music through his poetically eloquent songs and recitative heroic poems (*Geerarsa*), was murdered in Finfinne/Addis Ababa. News of his death dominated the media, and the following day, hundreds of thousands of youth in and around the capital city flocked *en masse* to the city to escort his body in an impromptu procession to his hometown. As the news spread, the youth across Oromia demonstrated in anger, demanding justice for the prominent singer. Although the culprit(s), at the time of time of publication, have not been apprehended, an analysis of his inspirational artistic works that unpacked historically controversial, politically sensitive, emotionally poignant and educative subject matter may enable us to comprehend what it means to destroy the body that embodies the power of resistance. Killing, as a technology of exercising power over life, is part of punishment that "must be understood as a political strategy alongside other political strategies of knowledge and control" (Downing 2008: 77). As a body is constitutive of knowledge, which itself generates power, destroying the body entails the exercise of power with the aim of rescinding the institution of knowledge production (Smart 2002). Building on Michel Foucault's notion of power, Mills (2003) argues that the exercise of power – whether disciplinary or coercive – operates in the context of resistance. Accordingly, as both the power of domination and power of resistance are mutually entangled, the existence of one generates, nurtures and reproduces the other (Sharp et al. 2000). In this regard, music is a tool of identity construction that informs collective action (Hess 2019). An exercise of power –including murder – over the life of a musician entails the destruction of an institution of knowledge.

By employing Critical Discourse Analysis as a methodological framework and positioning the debates within notions of power and resistance, this paper analyzes two songs and one recitative heroic poem (*Geerarsa*) performed by the late Hacalu Hundessa, who has garnered the reputation of being the most iconic Oromo resistance singer within a short period of time. The paper is organized into three parts. Following this introduction, the first section highlights the transformative power of music and sheds some light on the place of art, particularly music, in the Oromo struggle for freedom and equality. In the second section, three recent works of Hacalu Hundessa, namely *Maalan Jira* (What existence is mine!), *Jirra* (We are still here/alive.) and *Jirtuu* (Are you there?) are contextually analyzed. In the third section, an analysis on the exercise of power over the life of the singer through murder and the implication of such an act of vengeance on the Oromo struggle is made. Finally, a brief conclusion is made conceptualizing the murder as an attempt to destroy an institution of knowledge and the power of resistance.

The Transformative Power of Music

Music is a medium through which people express their emotions, stories, gains, losses, pains, achievements, agonies, glories, aspirations, challenges and resilience – individually as well as collectively. It serves as a communication channel whereby people transcend time and space connecting temporal/historical and spatial/geographical, religious, and extended family divides. Music also plays a paramount role in bridging intergenerational gaps – children are connected to adults, the living are connected to the deceased, the past is connected to the present and future. Music reconstructs historical, political and social relations. Through music, individuals and group members come to know themselves, their commonalities, their oppression, their history, their pride, their achievements and aspirations leading to what Anderson (1991) describes as the formation of "imagined communities." As scholars in the field of identity construction would argue, identity markers are built on the basis of subjectively constructed historical memories, perceived or experienced elements of oppression, and objective markers of difference, such as language and material culture (Barth 1969). In this regard, through reverberating memories and unearthing historical injustices, music serves as a unifying link in the

process of building communities (Firth 1998). Building communities entails developing sense of collective identity, which "resides in a shared sense of "one-ness" or "we-ness" anchored in real or imagined shared attributes and experiences among those who comprise the collectivity and in relation or contrast to one or more actual or imagined sets of "others." (Snow 2001:3). In this regard, it is imperative to note that collective identity, complemented by collective agency – the capability of and knowledgeability of maneuvering existing resources, systems and contexts into one's own advantage – empowers social groups to take collective action.

In this venture, by horizontally bridging intra-group divisions and vertically linking members of a social group at different positions in social structures, music creates shared perceptions and feelings of a common cause, threat, or fate of the collective group (Snow 2001: 4). By resurfacing historical oppression and connecting that with present experiences of the society, music becomes a powerful catalyst in inventing, creating, reconstituting and reconstructing a sense of collective identity among communities. Scholars on identity formation argue that identity is not a thing, rather it is mobile, a process and a becoming; not a being, and thus it is contingent on changing circumstances. Although there are many catalysts/agents contributing to identity construction, music, or more generally art, connects past memories to present experiences and instills a sense of shared identity.

The Place of Music in Oromo Resistance Struggles

Oromo artists have played a key role in articulating Oromo identity, artistically revealing a history of domination, marginalization, dispossession and exploitation, as well as the colonial-type Ethiopian state formation processes that subjugated the Oromo from the late 19th century. Oromo musicians, in particular, have revitalized Oromo wisdom, culture, history, struggle and aspirations of the people to equality, development, democracy and the search for and claim of entitlement to "home" and a "homeland" – *abbaa Biyyummaa*. Through music, while some – such as the legend Ali Birra – expressed the people's longing for historical and cultural revival in the 1970s and 1980s, many others focused on resistance songs echoing the Ethiopian conquest of Oromo land (Oromia), the people's right to self-determination and the aspirations and resolve

for freedom and equality. More specifically, Ali Bira's song in 1970s, "*Karaan Manni Abbaa Gadaa Eessaa, dhaqeen galma isaa jajjabeessaa, taa'een seenaa isaa babareessaa*" – Where is the road to Abbaa Gadaa's home, I go there to rebuild its palace, and would sit there and write its history". The artist reminds us about the decline of the Oromo Gadaa system due to the imposition of an imperial system of governance and the relegation of Oromo history and culture to a subjugated position. The song also sends a message that the artist and his generation have forgotten where the sacred *Galma Abbaa Gadaa* (Palace) is located. Ethiopian historiography's exclusionist approach was also implied in this song in that the artist was determined to re-write the history of the Gadaa system and of its leaders.

Among dozens of Oromo resistance singers, Hacalu Hundessa is a leading icon who revolutionized modern Oromo music through his powerful work. Hacalu's works transcend beyond the time, space and context in which he lived. His imagination of liberty, freedom and equality was not bounded by his lived experience of the repressive system with its military and security powers, which many would perceive difficult to topple. In contrast, Hacalu saw the resilience of his people, their determination and thirst for self emancipation and the fact that the power of resistance inevitably overwhelms the power of domination. Hacalu's deftness in eloquently venting suppressed voices through culturally and socially embedded and politically meaningful musical works has not only unmasked mysteries of freedom and liberty, but they also deconstructed hegemonic discourses of nation-building in the country. In fact, Oromo artists, scholars and politicians have long been challenging the spurious narratives about Ethiopian unity and the nation-building project that was founded on the notion of "Great Tradition" promoting supremacy of certain group over others. For example, Ibsa Gutema's poem, titled "*Who is an Ethiopian?*" was a powerful blow to such this hegemonic narrative as it questioned the assimilationist policies of the imperial regime.

Although Hacalu's work deserves an entire volume dedicated to the analysis of his work, this piece attempts to explore only a small portion from the ocean of knowledge he has produced within a short period of his life in art up to the time of his recent assassination. The analysis focuses on three of Hacalu's recent songs namely *Maalan*

Jira (What existence is mine!), *Jirra* (We are still here/alive.) and *Jirtuu* (Are you there?) produced in 2015, October 2017 and December 2017 respectively.

2. Maalan Jira! (What existence is mine!): Navigating through a History of Dispossession and the Occupation of Finfinne

Hacalu released this single expressive song in October 2015 amidst the nation-wide Oromo Protest against the TPLF-dominated system in Ethiopia that had politically oppressed and economically marginalized the Oromo and others since 1991. Although the protest was a response to a long history of inequality, underrepresentation, exploitation and dispossession of the Oromo under the regime for over two decades, the triggering factor was the announcement of the Addis Ababa Integrated Development Master Plan for Addis Ababa (usually referred to as "*the Master Plan*"). In early 2014, the federal government and the Addis Ababa city administration announced a plan to expand Addis Ababa to the surrounding Oromia towns and rural villages that would apparently increase the city to over 20 times its present size. Following the announcement of the Master Plan, the Oromo youth – referred to as *Qeerroo*, meaning unmarried young person – staged a peaceful protest against what they considered to be the continuation of the dispossession of Oromo peasants that had taken place under successive regimes. Likewise, Hacalu's representation of Oromo clans in and around Finfinne, referred to the way they were disconnected following the establishment of Finfinne/Addis Ababa as the capital city of the imperial Ethiopian state in 1880s. These references reconnected the past to the present, resuscitated memories bridging historical disconnections through his romantically expressed lyrics in *Maalan Jira*!

An exerpt from Maalan Jira:
Laal Galoo too…Gullalleen kan Tufaa
Laal Galoo too,
Gaara Abbichuu Turii, laal Galoo too,
Galaan Finfinnee marsee,
Laal Galoo too, Silaa akka jaalalaa….

Walirraa hinfagaannuu….
Jarati nu fageesse.
Diigani gara sana gaara diigamuu hinmalle
Nu baasani addaan bane, nu addaan bahuu hinmalle.
Maalan jira
maalan jira,
maalan jira ya Galaane
maalan jira caccabsee na nyaatee jira
Ani hinjiru ya Galaane ani hinjiru
Ani hinjiru, kukkutee na nyaate tiru,

Look, my Galoo [Galoo/Galaanee symbolized by a beautiful Oromo girl adorned with cultural costume] Gullalle belongs to Tufa [a clan leader before the 1880s conquest],

Look, my Galoo,
The Hills of Abbichu Turi,
Look my Galoo,
Galan [one of the clans] surrounded Finfinne,
Look, my Galoo,
If things go as per our love, we would have never been apart,
Look, my Galoo,
They disconnected us, we should have not been disconnected,
my Galoo,
They demolished that Mountain, the Mountain that should have not been demolished,
They separated us, we should have not been separated…

What existence is mine!
What existence is mine!
What existence is mine, Galaane,
It has smashed and eaten me,

I don't exist, Galaane, I don't exist,
It has chopped and eaten my liver.

In this song, Hacalu navigates through history and brings to the surface the occupation of Finfinne that dispossessed the Tulama Oromo clans, displaced them from their ancestral home and sacred

spaces, and also dismantled their social institutions. Through his heartrending expressions and imaginative poetry, he provides the listener a mental map of a historical phenomenon without being constraint by temporal limits; Hacalu explicates the historical root to Oromo's claim to Finfinne as their ancestral homeland. With regard to disconnection and disintegration of social unity of the Tulama clans in and surrounding Finfinne, other historical sources (Bessa 2019) also reveal that the establishment of the city of Addis Ababa in the form of settler colonialism and displacement of native Oromo inhabitants led to effects that amount to cultural genocide, ecocide and the breakdown of well-established socio-political organizations.

From the phrase, "*They demolished that Mountain, the Mountain that should have not been demolished, they separated us, we should have not been separated*", three core interpretations can be drawn. First, the establishment of Addis Ababa caused the demolition of Oromo sacred (*ulfoo*) spaces including hills, mountains, rivers and lakes that were used for the well-known *Irreecha* thanksgiving festival. In this context, Hacalu reminds us about the ecological destruction that was tantamount to disconnection from home, spiritual attachment and livelihood and sustenance of the Oromo. Oromo sacred spaces have been destroyed owing to expansion of the city, the influence of foreign religions (particularly Ethiopian Orthodox Church which was granted hilltop spaces for buildings and compounds), the diffusion of cultural practices and the political economy that enhanced commodification of land. Second, he used mountains as a symbol to refer to the Oromo Gadaa system and the power of the Gadaa leaders. He attributes the decline of the power and unity of the Gadaa system of the Tulama Oromo to the occupation of Finfinne. Third, Hacalu's song unveils both the physical disconnection between the Oromos, particularly members of the Tulama clan who lived in and around Finfinne, and their inability of holding joint Gadaa Assemblies at *Caffee Tumaa* (6 kilo) and *Caffee Araaraa* (4 kilo) for law enactment and conflict resolution respectively. Displacement and frontier expansion from Addis Ababa pushed the indigenous inhabitants not only to the outskirts of the city, but also led to the migration of many of their members to as far as Bale and Arsi (hundreds of kilometers away from their original home).

Moreover, the *Irreecha* celebration at *Hora Finfinne* was also disbanded and moved to *Hora Arsadi* in Bishoftu due to state influence under the imperial regime. The following quote summarizes the above ecological, socio-economic and political crises perpetuated upon the Oromo following the occupation of Finfinne in 1880s, and the eventual frontier expansion under successive regimes. For example, the Oromo expressed their protest and opposition to the conquest through the following song (Bitima 1983, cited in Bessa 2019: 212):

Inxooxxoo daabatani	No more standing on Ixooxxo mountain,
Caffee gadlaaluun hafe	To look down at the pasture below,
Finfinnee loon geessani	No more taking cattle to Finfinnee
Hora obaasuun hafe	To water at the mineral spring
Tulluu Daalattirratti	No more gathering on Tulluu Daalatti
Yaa'iin Gullallee hafe	Where the Gullallee assembly used to meet,
Gafarsatti dabrani	No more going beyond Gafarsa
Qoraan cabsuunis hafe	To chop firewood
Hurufa Bombirratti	To the meadow of 'Hurufa Bombi
Jabbilee yaasuun hafe	No more taking calves
Bara jarri dufani	The year the enemy came,
Loon teennas nidhumanii	Our cattle were consumed
Edda Mashashaan dhufe	Since Mashashaa [Menelik's war leader] came
Birmadummaanis hafe	Freedom has been taken away

The above folksong underpins Oromo's regretful expression about the removal of their freedom, dispossession of their territories and the disintegration of their indigenous practices of governance. Although "*Maalan Jira*" (What existence is mine!) may seemingly hint on sense of hopelessness, a critical content analysis and a follow-up interview with the singer rather reveals his determination for regaining what has been lost due to the conquest and occupation. Contextually, Hacalu's song came out amidst nation-wide Oromo Protests against the Master Plan, which many consider as a continuation of dispossessing Oromo peasants from their ancestral land. That is how he links history with the contemporary development saying, "*Nama garaan dhaane dirmammuu hinargani*" (literally to mean, "Nobody can see the scars of a person who is hit in the stomach"). This can be further interpreted as a reaffirmation that the Oromo people live with historical injustices, political oppression, cultural marginalization and economic inequalities,

which cumulatively provoked the Oromo youth to rise against the regime though "others" cannot see the scars and feel the pain. The stomach is also a person's center. Addis Ababa is at the center of the Oromo's traditional territory.

2. *Jirra!* (We are still here/alive): Affirmation of Resilience and Determination

Hacalu released the lyric; "*Jirra*!" in October 2017 exactly a year after the October 2016 massacre on Irreecha festival on which hundreds of participants were killed. In October 2017, every corner of Oromia was hit by the protests; a broad military crackdown on civilians escalated; the government declared State of Emergency and prominent Oromo opposition party leaders, artists and activists were put in jail. Audaciously, Hacalu produced and released this apparently sarcastic, but subtly expressive song to disclose the political oppression inflicted upon the Oromo, and resilience of the people in the struggle. As the following few clauses from his song elucidate, Hacalu exposed the heavy political and economic burden the Oromo shouldered under the successive regimes; and at the same time champions the resilience and determination of the people in struggling to see the dawn of liberty, equality and freedom.

Jirra jirra jirra jirraa (x2)	We are still here (x8)
Jirra bullee barii arguuf,	We are still here, tolerant to see a next dawn,
garaa nu bal'ise yaa nuyii	
Yaa waa irraanfachuuf	
yaa nuyii (x3)	We are noted for forgetting everything (x3)
Kennaa maaltuu dida,	Who else refuses to bear a 'gift'!
Jirra hunda baachaaa	We are still here, bearing everything,
Jirra! Jirra!…	We are still here (x2)
Kunoo har'allee jirra	Here today, we are still here!

As Hess (2019) contends, music has the power of exposing structures of oppression and injustice by creating a sense of common identity among members who have collectively experienced injustice. In this context, the lyric drives listeners through imaginative memories and perceptions of historical injustices, the burden that they and their forefathers carried and the continuity of unresolved societal crises. Jauregiondo (2019: 1281) succinctly argues that songs become political and mobilize people to collective

action "not just because of their lyrics, but rather due to the readiness of politically committed audiences to interpret them politically". Hacalu's songs are not politically provocative for an ordinary listener who does not have experiences and consciousness of oppression. Rather, while the song movingly educates those with a low level of historical knowledge; it also reinforces the courage and determination of the conscious elites, activists and youth to struggle for emancipation. In this context, music can trigger emotions by elucidating abstract phenomenon through culturally and socially understandable approaches.

In addition to connecting the past to the present and underscoring the continuity of domination, marginalization and exploitation, the artist takes his listeners to the "*Maalan Jira*!" song, particularly on the politics of divide and rule policy of successive Ethiopian regimes. However, unlike in "*Maalan Jira*!" where disconnection and separation of Oromo were emphasized, in "*Jirra!*", Hacalu focused on Oromo's determination for sustaining *Oromummaa* (Oromoness) despite prolonged plots to divide its unity. Here, a short except from his song further affirms this argument:

Shirani shiranii	they plotted and plotted,
Garaaf qalbii kiyya hatani	to coopt my heart and mind,
Akkan sirraa cituuf yaadani,	they planned to cut me from you,
Maal godheen ani sirraa cita,	how can I be cut from you!
Sifudheen Gincii koo lixa,	rather, I will take you to my Ginci [the birth place of Oromo Protest]
Sifudheen Gullisoo lixa	I take you to Gulliso,
Sifudheen Dadar koo lixa	I take you to My Dadar
Sifudheen Shaallaa koo lixa….	I take you to my Shalla…
….sifudheen Oromiyaa lixa	…I take you to My Oromia
Biyya abbaa kootiin sii lixa.	I take you to my Fatherland!

By rejecting strategies of those he blames for plotting against the unity of the people, the artist embodies Oromia and *Oromumma* as building blocks of Oromo collective identity and unity. It affirms the resilience of the people in sustaining its unity despite systemic and structurally designed strategies of the hegemonic forces to disintegrate its unity and dismember the part from the whole. In the

first few lines of his song, Hacalu signals a bemoaning message of Oromo's adaptation to oppression, domination and shouldering the burden imposed upon it. However, as he further goes through the next few lines, he shifts to the people's resilience and determination to liberty and unity.

3. *Jirtuu*? (Are you there?): Reaffirming the struggle against oppression

Hacalu performed this *geerarsa* on December 17, 2017 on an event organized for fundraising to rehabilitate Oromos who were displaced as a result of border conflict with the Somali regional state early in the same year. The Live televised program was held at the Millennium Hall in the capital, Finfinne, where top officials of Oromia Regional State including the current PM, Abiy Ahmed, attended together with tens of thousands. This performance was different both in terms of style and presentation. It overwhelmed the stage with poignant and heroic tones embedded in Oromo recitative heroic poetry (*geerarsa*). Unlike the two previous songs that were covertly expressed, the artist overtly declared his emotions covering a wide range of issues including Oromo's tolerance of injustice for the sake of co-existence, the bravery and heroic deeds of Oromo at the battle of Adwa and more importantly the resolve for assuming political power at that critical juncture in the country's political context.

In Oromo culture, *geerarsa*, a recitative oral poetry, is performed as a medium of expressing emotions, aspirations, pains and bravery whereby the content, tones and styles vary depending on the context and messages to be transmitted. *Geerarsa* can be performed focusing on the subjective self (as a tool of self expression) or to express about one's own family, group, society and nation. As Edward Said (1993) argues, artists unveil the tension between imperialism and its resistors through music, literature, theatre and other artistic works and performances. Likewise, *geerarsa* serves as a poetic expression of resistance against all sorts of injustices, and it is powerful in illuminating the pains, emotions and determination of the people to undo power asymmetries. In this regard, Ruud (1997) rightly argues that the interpretive capacity of the viewers and listeners gives art strong political and identity

impetus beyond the contents/images described/displayed. Similarly, by navigating through the depth and length of history, and transcending temporal and spatial limits of imagination and understanding, Hacalu poetically elevated Oromo heroes and heroines including their role in defending Ethiopia from foreign aggression. He began his performance by paying tribute to the Oromo heroes and heroines in Ethiopian prison centers. He remarked; "*Geerar geerar naan jettu, ani maalan geerara, anoo yaadan yeelala, gootni geeraree hinquufne hidhaa Qilinxoo jira, hidhaa Qaallittii jira, hidhaa Karchallee jira, Karchalle Ambo jira*", loosely translated, "You ask me to perform *geerarsa*, but what do I perform! Mine is only an attempt; the heroes [and heroines] who could demonstrate their heroic deeds through geerarsa are in Kilinto prison, they are in Qaliti prison, they are in Karchalle prison…"

By publicly declaring Oromo political prisoners as heroes and heroines, the artist rejected and conquered the atmospheres of fear, subjugation, and submission the authoritarian regime tries to impose upon Oromo youth, artists, activists, opposition politicians and generally upon each and every citizen to create a docile subject. During the protests, and as common before, the government employed coercive power in the form of killings, detention and torture against protesters as a mechanism of governing what it considered "unruly" and "violent" subjects. Scholars in the field of domination and resistance argue that wherever the power of domination prevails whether in the form of sovereign or disciplinary power, subjects resort to different forms of resistance (Agrawal 2005; Sharp et al. 2000; Scott 1990). Oromo protest against the authoritarian regime predominantly adopted non-violent struggle in the form of market boycott, roadblocks and peaceful demonstrations. Despite restrictions on freedom of expression and lack of media, Oromo artists also contributed to the resistance movement through songs, theater, drama, geerarsa, poems and novels, which altogether enlightened the youth – called the *Qubee* generation – the generation born and raised after 1991 adoption of *Afaan* Oromo as a medium of instruction at schools in Oromia.

Once he invaded the stage with his powerful and emotive declaration of Oromo political prisoners as heroes, Hacalu conquered the scene with his poetically eloquent acclamation about Oromo's commitment and dedication to national integrity in

Ethiopia, yet being pushed to the margins of power and economy. Hacalu courageously affirmed Oromo's bravery at the battles of Adwa and Mekelle (during 1890s and 1930s Italian invasion) and sent a strong message to its foes that the Qeerro would repeat similar victory over the authoritarian regime. He asserted, "*Nun miti farda keenya, ni beeku bareechani, gaafa gaarreen Aduwaa, gaafa Maqalee sani*" (They know well to let us alone, even our horses, on that moment at the mountains of Adwa, on that moment at Mekelle), sending two core messages. Firstly, he reiterated Oromo's dedication in defending Ethiopia's sovereignty from foreign aggression, and in doing so, the artist refuted those who claim Oromo protest was to disintegrate Ethiopia. Secondly, Hacalu iterated Oromo's defiance to military crackdown and brutality during that critical time after three years of resistance informing the foes that Oromo never bows down to its enemies.

As a continuation to his song, "*Jirra!*", through which he underlined Oromo's resilience to oppression and determination to liberty, freedom and unity, Hacalu netted the hearts and emotions of the participants with his affirmative question, "Jirtuu?" (Are you there?). By asking the audience about how and where they were, the artist elevated the question beyond literal meaning of "are you there?" Hacalu continued asking, "Jirtuu? Eessa jirtuu?" (Are you there? Where are you?) and invited the audience to affirm what he says. Jirtuu? Eessa jirtu? Boolee jirra jedhaa! Are you there? Where are you? Say, we are at Bole! In Addis Ababa, Bole is one of the areas recently incorporated into the city administration through dispossession of Oromo farmers, and it is now a new residential place and business hub for those of high-class/elites. Thus, Hacalu's statement in reminding the audiences to declare they were in Bole, was not to indicate the physical location of the Millennium Hall, but it was a signal that they were already occupying the economic hub, which was traditionally considered impossible. It hinted upon the determination of regaining what has been lost through the city's unending frontier expansion, to which the Master Plan was a part. By bringing Bole in focus, Hacalu further revealed to his audiences through what Escobar (2001) calls the "politics of place", the political economy of frontier expansion that enhanced "*accumulation by dispossession*" (Harvey 2003). The politics of place, in this context, is at the core of Oromo's claim to Finfinne and

also the triggering factor for the 2015 Oromo protest leading to major political shake-up in the country in early 2018.

Hacalu's recitative heroic poems (*geerarsa*) and affirmative questions of *Jirtuu* converged all corners of Oromia to the stage and refreshed a sense of "communitas" among the Oromo. In this regard, Ruud (1997) succinctly argues that musical performances on cultural and identity markers resuscitate a person from a sense of "rootlessness" to a feeling of embeddedness, connectedness leading to an imagination of commonness – imagined community (Anderson 1991). It can be argued that through cultural expressions and a focus on identity markers, music contributes to the construction of communities – communities who feel and share the pains, gains, losses, glories and agonies of their individual members and collectivity. Hacalu's narration of Oromo's oppression within Ethiopia and the continuation of such a systemic and structurally oppressive system, partly manifested in the form of dispossession of Oromo farmers from their ancestral land, calls to Oromo from all corners of the country across religious, geographic and familial boundaries.

Killing as exercise of power over knowledge

The transformative and educative power of music, and its role in identity construction leading to collective consciousness and collective action, is unquestionable. As music serves as a medium that transforms the minds and emotions of listeners, and of those who view a performance, a musician embodies an institution of knowledge production in the process of enlightening a society. Thus, authoritarian regimes and groups holding onto conservative and authoritarian political cultures – where differences in ideas are not tolerated, where there is no developed mechanism for dialogue and negotiation is not developed as a means of conflict resolution – resort to killing as a mechanism of removing the power of resistance. In Spain, for example, Basque musicians have been killed, persecuted and their music was banned from public consumption only because the regimes fear the power musicians and music generate in public mobilization (Jauregiondo 2019). Over the last thirty years alone, dozens of Oromo artists have been killed, disappeared, persecuted and pushed away from their country into exile and their music banned. For example, a prominent resistance singer and guitarist,

Ebbisa Adugna was murdered by the regime in early 1990s. Others, such as Usmayo Musa, Yosef Gamachu and Dadhi Galan were also killed by the regime's security forces. Artist Jirenya Ayana was among those whose whereabouts have not been known for decades.

Based on the analysis of his politically profound, historically deconstructionist and socio-culturally and economically emancipatory songs, Hacalu represented an emerging force that challenged the dominant, hegemonic and mainstream narrative of "Ethiopianism" and the place of the Oromo in the country. As post-colonial scholars argue, for the colonized to be fully liberated, it requires dismantling the discursive, epistemological, pedagogical and day-to-day practices of colonial establishments (Freire 1993). The works of Hacalu and other Oromo resistance singers are key in deconstructing Ethiopian historiography and illuminating the Oromo version of historical interpretations that often turns the dominant discourses and narratives about Ethiopianism upside down. For example, by exposing the heroic deeds of the Oromo at the Battle of Adwa, Hacalu unpacked Ethiopian history, which often obscured the role of the Oromo and other nations in the conquered regions. Moreover, Hacalu succinctly expressed Oromo's claim to Finfinne from ontological point of view as an embodied space. He relates destruction of the hills and mountains with disconnections of human bodies and kin members through displacement and death. It also entails the disconnection of humans from the other-than human nature, which also implies spiritual detachment. Oromo's attachment to Finfinne as a space where their cultural, political and spiritual experiences and engagements were entangled with the physical environment fits to what Low (2017) calls *embodied space*. Historically, Finfinne was a seat of Oromo spiritual father, the Abbaa Muudaa and also the annual thanksgiving festival, the Irreecha, was celebrated at Hora Finfinne making it spiritually important space for the Oromo. By connecting the hitherto Master Plan that would dispossess Oromo farmers to the historical phenomenon of late 19th century and early 20th century displacement of Oromo inhabitants of Finfinne, Hacalu hit at the heart of settler colonialism against which Oromo resisted for over a century.

As Sara Marzagora (2017) eloquently argues, while narratives and established knowledge about the notion of "Great Tradition" dominated Ethiopian historiography and public discourses, counter-

historiography/counter-narratives about Ethiopian history, historical phenomenon and state-society relations have been systematically marginalized and suppressed. She further notes that the "Great Tradition" saga attributes all glories to the Christian *Habesha* groups and conceals national failure including economic stagnation and political backwardness. However, the post-1991 political order in the country, to some extent, suppressed the official glorification of the "Great Tradition" narrative and the government only selectively used some aspects of it, such as during the celebration of Ethiopian Millennium in 2007/8. On the other hand, the notions of the "Great Tradition" remained salient within political discourses of some opposition parties and were boldly resurfaced during election rallies (e.g. during the 2005 election).

Officially, however, the coming to power of Abiy Ahmed in April 2018 and his strong inclination to glorification of Ethiopia's past – despite highly polarized views on the history of the country (Gudina 2003) – has resurrected the "Great Tradition" with its exclusionist tendencies. Like the Euro-American orthodoxy that denigrates other forms of knowledge, the "Great Tradition" and its scholarly offshoots are resistant to counter-histories (Marzagora 2017). Oromo scholars, politicians and artists are working hard in not only challenging the dominant discourse of Ethiopian historical narrative, but also in rewriting/ instituting a new way of understanding Ethiopian history and the place of Oromo within that polity. Thus, a fierce contestation and conflict is evolving between the two antagonistic forces in every sphere – politics, economy, culture, art, education, language policy and so on. Given such evolving contentious relations over history – including national glories, agonies, claims of entitlement to a space, state-society relations, conquest vs. unification etc. – the assassination of artist Hacalu Hundessa symbolizes a violent approach of silencing counter-narratives to the "Great Tradition" saga.

Conclusion

Among societies where oppressive political systems use coercive power in silencing dissent, people resort to everyday forms of resistance, to not only reject the power of domination, but also to deconstruct the discursive foundations upon which hegemonic power is established. In this regard, resisting groups may employ

activating forces such as cultural repertoires and literary works (music, poems and folktales) in order to enlighten their members about the history of oppression, domination, marginalization and exploitation, which they are prepared to defy. Art, in its many forms, served as an avenue where the Oromo expressed their grievances, resistance against oppression, determination, resilience and collective identity. It is also the avenue where they demonstrated their rejection of oppressive Ethiopian regimes. Many Oromo artists produced profound works that refuted the mainstream discourses of national unity on the one hand, and Oromo's quest for equality, self-rule and resilience, on the other hand. Hacalu Hundessa particularly represents the determination and relentless struggle of Oromo youth for self-determination, democracy and human rights through principles of peaceful resistance. His songs and recitative poems have been so powerful that it not only mobilized Oromo youth for the struggle, particularly from 2015-2018, but also unsettled those adhering to the notion of "Great Tradition".

Therefore, it can be concluded that the killing of the artist is tantamount to an exercise of power to quash the power of resistance by destroying the institution – the body – of knowledge production. Nevertheless, since the power of domination is entangled with and thus gives fuel to the power of resistance, rather than quelling resistance, such acts of suppression only prompt the suppressed to create new forms of defiance. This process nurtures further dichotomies between discourses of "Great Tradition" and counter-histories.

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A VOICE FROM THE MINORITIZED MAJORITY: A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF LYRICS OF THE SONGS *ANI HINJIRU* AND *JIRRA JIRRAA*

Adugna Barkessa*

Introduction

This paper analyzes the lyrics Hachalu employed to compose his songs entitled *Ani hinjiru* and *Jirra jirra* literary meaning 'I am not here' and 'We are here' released in 2015 and 2017 respectively. Songs are one of the many indirect means of talking to those in power. According to Finnegan (2012), indirect means of communication can be used to influence and at the same time avoid the risk of speaking directly to those in power. Finnegan argues that singers use songs to comment on current affairs, to put pressure on those with or aspiring to positions of power, and to reflect and mound public opinion through their lyrics. Lyrics, sets of words that make up songs or short poems which will be sung, have a lion's share in achieving these political roles of songs. According to Fang (2016), singers select lyrics carefully and pattern them systematically in songs to communicate their own feeling and perceptions about the sociopolitical and economic circumstances of the society with whom they live. Risdianto (2016) states that song lyrics are one of the tools singers employ to provoke public emotions and intensions and ultimately to communicate the audiences' deep feelings about the circumstances.

According to Yanik *(*2016), the efficacy of a song to win attention and address contextual meaning is largely dependent on the song writer's lyrical skills. A good lyrical skill makes the form of the song attractive, its contents meaningful and its contexts timely. It empowers the singer to communicate culturally untouchable and unspeakable taboos, politically contested and intended issues, and historically glossed over facts and events in a given society. It is also a vehicle to get into a political ideology which defines power

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relations between groups and individuals (Wood, 2000). Explaining political ideology of a group embedded in song lyrics invites a Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) approach. According to Wodak and Meyer (2001), CDA aims to investigate social inequality, dominance and discrimination as they are expressed, signaled and constituted in and through language in use, in our case, songs. The approach advocates change and plays emancipatory roles by disclosing practices of a powerful group and voices of the powerless one (Van Dijk, 2001). This paper is informed by the orientations of CDA to describe and explain the lyrics Hachalu Hundessa used to compose the songs *Ani hinjiru* and *Jirra Jirra* released in 2015 and 2017, and became viral on both on the main media and social media platforms for the last 5 years.

Contexts, Rationales and Objectives

Ethiopia is one of the most multilingual, multicultural and multiethnic states of the world. However, political systems of the country have denied this down-to-earth truth for more than a century. For instance, the political system of the imperial (1930-1974) and the military (1974-1991) regimes had constitutionally limited the use of more than one language, culture and flag in formal state of affairs (education, administration and politics). The regimes considered the use of linguistic, cultural and ethnic diversities as a threat to the national unity and deterrent of development. Consequently, assailing diversified cultural, religious, linguistic values, and disabling social networks of the ethnic groups other than those in power, became a systemic agenda of the regimes and tools of the state machinery. As a result, the regimes imposed the "One size- fits - all" ideology on the ethnic groups in Ethiopia, raising identity questions, human, democratic and ownership rights claims (Aberra, 2019; Yosef, 2016).

After a bitter struggle and great sacrifice of the marginalized majority and minority groups in Ethiopia who fought against the assimilation programs of both the imperial and the military regimes, the federal system of Ethiopian People Republic Democratic Front (EPRDF) was established in 1991 with a promise to answer the questions silenced and respect the human and democratic rights. In the first few years of the transition period following the coming to power of the EPRDF (Ethiopian people's revolutionary and

democratic front), the system permitted ethnic groups to be proud of their identities and promote multi-party political system in the country. However, not long after the transition period, the EPRDF systemically started to violate the human and democratic rights of the citizens, and force opposition parties to withdraw from the system (Smith, 2007). The EPRDF violated the constitutional rights of the citizen by quickly changing the "holding together federation" to the "putting together pattern" and imposing federalism from top down on the people of Ethiopia, making the country a centralized unitary state with power residing at the center (Bach, 2014, Keller, 2003 and Aalen, 2002).

The Oromo, the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, are targeted by the human and democratic rights violation practices of the imperial, the military and the federal systems of Ethiopia. Kuwe (2000) asserts that the Oromo people were victimized by the human and people's rights violations of the Abyssinian colonialists and Western imperialists. Consistent with this argument, Asafa (2018) states that the Oromo people were enslaved and their knowledge production and dissemination were controlled by the settler colonialist who occupied the Oromo land by military force. Asafa further argues that victimization of the people by the agents continued to the contemporary Ethiopian political system. In a relatively specific sense, Aberra (2018) states that the Oromo have felt victim to the ethnic cleansing (social and cultural distractions) of the colonizers. Likewise, the EPRDF established federal system of Ethiopia greatly politicized the national identities, values and customary practices of the people. According to Kumsa (2019), while the imperial and the military systems of the country overtly humiliated, the federal system established by the EPRDF covertly disgraced the Oromo.

The cumulative effects of the overt and covert malpractices of the successive regimes against the Oromo people escalated grievances and led to a series of mass protests resulting in the lives of many Oromo protestors being lost. Holcomb and Klemm (2018, p. 65) underline that Oromo protests (#OromoProtests) were fueled by longstanding grievances at being marginalized, repressed and displaced from their land by the current and previous governments of Ethiopia. For example, in 2014, a protest erupted against the Addis Ababa Integrated Master Plan, the immediate case if not the underlying cases of the protest. As of 2015, the resistance evolved to

include a peaceful bottom-up move (Kumsa 2019) creating an antagonistic top-down move from the government. The top-down move was targeted at suppressing and eliminating the bottom-up struggle and agents of the struggle forcibly in a more similar ways of having a back slashing face to the imperial and the military systems to stay on power. The bottom-up movement weakened the suppressive move of the government resulting in a negative peace[1]. Asafa (2018, p. 55) puts this outcome as "…the Oromo national struggle has achieved an ideological and moral victory over the particular form of Ethiopian colonialism designed by the TPLF-led government."

In the #OromoProtests, Oromia Media Network (OMN), Oromo activists, artists and elites inside and outside of Ethiopia maintain the lion's share in fighting the corrupted governance system of EPRDF by mobilizing and strengthening the social movement, especially the youths. The media, i.e., OMN, motivated the Oromo in particular, and the Ethiopian people in general, by disclosing the abuse of power by the EPRDF state apparatus in its daily reports. Unveiling the injustice of the state apparatus against the civilians and their resources with vivid evidence, the OMN won the attention and trust of Oromo and other ethnic groups in the country. Oromo activists used the media to give clear directions and orientations for QEERROO and QARREE[2] 'Oromo male and female youths'. Oromo artists played monumental roles in the protest for justice. Their songs' lyrics uncovered the systemic suppressions and oppressions of the government against the Oromo voice. The paramount roles played by the OMN, Oromo activists, youth and artists catapulted the participants to the status of ICONS of the Oromo straggle, leading to the disabling and eventual demise of the governance and political systems in Oromia in 2015-18. It is in the contexts of the hostile relationships between the Oromo and the

1 Negative peace shows the psychological concord people have at the resolution of the tempting situation.

2 QEERROO and QARREE are engine of the current transition in the Ethiopian politics. They became ideological to include all the Oromo regardless of age, clan, status, gender, religion, etc. to be involved in the straggle of the Oromo for independency (Mulualem, 2019).

Ethiopian state that Hachalu Hundessa released the songs selected and analyzed in this study.

Hachalu, the iconic artist, has paramount contribution in tuning the silenced voice of the marginalized majority – the Oromo, through his song lyrics. Based on his immense contributions, the Oromo people call him and his work "the soundtrack of Oromo music and a towering musician" (Awol, 2020). This paper examines the lyrics Hachalu used in the songs *Ani hinjiru* and *Jirra jirra* in connection with the unresolved Oromo problems in the political systems of Ethiopia. The rationale for the selection includes the popularity, provocative and evocative nature of the songs in line with the past and the present political injustices facing the Oromo struggle. For instance, the Oromo widely use the songs on their cell phones as a signal of the incoming call. They are extensively broadcasted on the short and long-distance land transportations means to entertain passengers. They are regularly used the as a means of reflecting feelings, intentions and contentions about the political practices in Ethiopia, and at the same time, as a strategy for creating social cohesion to stand together. They are commonly deployed by both small-scale business such as coffee and tea venders sitting on the roadsides and large-scale businesses such as hotel, restaurant, supermarket, etc. They are regularly heard on both state and private Medias in Ethiopia for entertaining their audience in their daily programs. Government officials sometimes invite the singer to motivate attendants about their meetings even if the agenda has nothing to do with what Hachalu's songs are about. These personal observations also gave rise to the impetus to critically analyze the lyrics. The main objectives of the study are to interpret the linguistic devices and discursive strategies employed in the lyrics, describe the message characteristics of the lyrics used in the songs, and explain how language is linked to the diachronic and synchronic experiences of the Oromo people about political power and ideology in Ethiopia, and the resistance of the people against those in power.

Studies related the work are scarce. To this effect Awol's (2020) reviews an article that presents who Hachalu was, the ups and downs he went through, his contributions to the Oromo struggle, his assassination by unidentified shooter and the mishandling of his funeral by the Abiy Ahmed's administration who come to power in part, by the sacrifice of iconslike Hachalu. Chala (2019) conducts

research on Hachalu's song *Jirra jirra*. He describes figurative languages (metaphor; personification, simile, paradox, etc.) employed in the song. Holcomb and Klemm's (2018) examines the cultural meanings of Oromo protest song entitled *Ka'I Qeerroo', presenting, among others,* the messages conveyed by the song as the violation of a core principle of Oromo cosmology by the Abyssinian rulers through military force, the continuity of the violation by the current Ethiopian government and the preponderance of Oromo resistance songs against the violations. Kuwe's (2000) states that the Oromo people use songs against political oppression, economic exploitation and ethnic cleansing that started in the late 19th century continuing in the contemporary situation. she argues that songs used in the Oromo nationalist discourses mainly convey victimization of the Oromo people in the Ethiopian empire . Nearly one and half decades ago, Triulzi (1980) analyzes the role of *geerarsa*, a genre of Oromo oral art used by the peasants of Kellem Wellega by unmasking the hostile relationship between the Oromo people and the state during the era, in their resistance to the oppressive system of the imperial regime.

While most of the related works reviewed mainly focus on describing the linguistic aspects of society, i.e., what language does for its users, this paper describes, interprets and explains what the language used in the lyrics does for the Oromo, and what the Oromo do with their language using a CDA approach. It is in this endeavor that we describe the linguistic forms used in the songs, interpret the context in which they were produced and regulated, and explain the ideology, power relations and inequalities embedded in the song lyrics.

Language as a Social Practice

Following a paradigm shift from objective to subjective view in language studies in the 1970s, considering language as a cultural product of sociopolitical practice has become more prominent than viewing language as a formal system and a neutral medium of communication reflecting the social world. More than half a century ago, one of the pioneers of language as a social practice, Austin (1962, p. 148) stated that *"*Language is an activity that we do in myriad situations and circumstances," Austin argues that words do not merely 'say' something, but they 'do' something. This shows

that language is a context specific activity that users do, and which does certain activities for the users. In this context, the argument focuses on what people do with their language, and what language does to its users in their social, economic and political contexts as opposed to the disconnected and decontextualized view of language as a system (Janks, 2010). Naturally, language has its context of use. The difference in the context of language use determines the way people employ language to perform their own, and the way language constitutes and legitimizes activities. To this discursive end, language can be seen as a part of the society; a form of social practice, and a socially conditioned process which is entirely tied up with identity. Hence, in the context of use language is neither innocent nor neutral; it is ideologically charged and recharged. It is inseparably interrelated with power: the power to positively and negatively position, to include and exclude, and to resonate and silence in- and out-group, respectively (Van Diik, 2009 and Fairclough, 1992).

Language in the context of use can be categorized into macro - and micro-genres. The macro genre includes oral arts/traditions such as songs, myths, narratives (De Fana e al, 2006 and Finnegan, 2012). According to Groenewald (2005, p. 123), song, the main focus of this paper, is "…short texts composed orally within a performance situation and sung in a call and response style". Finnegan (2012: 236) defines songs as "Way of exerting pressure on others… of suggesting certain values and interests that cannot be expressed in other ways, particularly when there is no direct access to political activity." In these definitions oral text, performance and style are the key terms characterizing mutually inclusive activities a song actually contains to convey messages demanded by a given context. Song texts give fuel to performance; performance visualizes song texts using different styles. Styles, in turn, nourish both texts and performance. By and large, for performance of a song to be in pace, there should be context, performer, text and audience. A song, as one of the macro-language in use, comprises micro-language in use, i.e., linguistic devices. According to Wodak (2001), linguistic devices are systematic ways of using language in both spoken and written at different levels of linguistic organizations. The linguistic devices often employed in the texts of any kind include lexical, grammatical and rhetorical devices (Wodak, Rudolf, Martin and Karin, 2009 and

Bloomaert, 2005). The micro-and micro-language in use constitute and reflect their dichromic and synchronic sociopolitical contexts.

Functionally language in use does many things for oral societies of developing nations like the Oromo people. Songs are not merely the sounds which we hear and/or the artistic styles and performances which entertain us. They challenge the status quo, stimulate change and constitute and regulate transformation. To achieve these macro functions, songs and the linguistic devices used to produce and consume them can easily manipulate people's minds towards the desired socio-political and economic circumstances of a given country or region (Van Vuuren, 2003 and Groenewald, 2005). Based on their functions and the contexts of the situation in which they are produced and used, we can have resistance, love, praise, etc. songs. Resistance songs are produced and sung based on the political contexts of a given nation. In liberal political context, gifted individuals can be encouraged to produce scripts or lyrics that construct bridges between people and the existing political system. Individuals can also have full rights to produce songs which flash back on common memories of a group about what happened in their lives in the past to relate to what is going on at present (Wodak, et al.2009).

However, hegemonic political contexts trigger artists to produce and use songs that challenge the system in general. For instance, during the struggle against Apartheid where the governance system is hierarchically designed for the legitimization of white supremacy and black inferiority in South Africa, people produced and used political songs which challenge the system (Wood (2000 and Groenewald, 2005). Wood and Groenewald state that the inequality to exercise both human and democratic rights between the white and the black people in the country caused resistance songs to mushroom. They displayed that the black people's protest against every step and measure taken by the government using context specific songs of gifted people to forage democracy from below. For example, the black people used songs to criticize and condemn the suppressive law legitimizing segregation. They employed songs to encourage each other to bus boycott and, castigate owners of the bus service. They used songs to stop the government from enforcing racial segregation with forced removal of communities. The black people also employed songs to mobilize freedom charter, to call for

releasing political prisoners such as Mandela. They used songs to clearly show the consequences of their struggle for freedom, to condemn disguised privatization in the country and to uncover the historical injustices made by the White people against the black people (Neuman, 2008). In a similar fashion, the present study examines the discursive roles of the songs Ani *hinjiru and Jirra jirra* as macro- and the linguistic devices employed in the songs as micro-language in use in the contexts of the Ethiopian sociopolitical practices the singer intended to address in connection with the Oromo people.

Discourse, Discursive Strategies and Critical Discourse Analysis

Discourse is mostly defined based on its form and function. Formally, discourse is defined as a unit of language above a sentence or clause (Stubbs, 1983 and Leech, 1983). Stubbs and Leech's view of discourse disregards the functions of verbal discourse, and the non-verbal discourse as a whole. Functionally, discourse is seen as utterances which are inherently contextualized (Schiffrin, 1994). This view, in turn, excludes the non-verbal discourse which is decisive in meaning-making processes in visual communication. However, the form and function oriented definitions of discourse, if taken separately, are not comprehensive enough to make the meaning of discourse clear. Gee (2008, p. 3) defines discourse as "…the way of behaving, interacting, valuing, believing, speaking, reading and writing that are accepted as instantiations of particular identities by individuals or groups." Gee argues that discourse is both the form and the function of our textual and non-textual practices. This definition accommodates the verbal (written and oral discourse), and non-verbal (graphs, pictures, photos, etc.) modes of discourse that people use to communicate their sociological and cosmological needs (Van Leeuwen, 2008). In this context, the present study takes discourse as the verbal and non-verbal strategies of constructing, comprehending and reflecting realities to examine song lyrics.

In the vast body of literature on discourse analysis, discursive strategy is defined as a more or less intentional plan designed in harmony with the macro- and micro socio-political functions and ideologies that a given context demands (Kwon, et al., 2013). Discursive strategy is context specific to achieve certain

sociopolitical goals. Wodak et al. (2009) identifies constructive, justifying, destructive, etc. strategies used in the discursive construction of Austrian national identity. In the opinion of these authors, constructive strategy promotes unification to establish certain national mark; justifying strategy aims at legitimizing past actions and events to perpetuate the status quo. Both strategies keep national unity and restore the threatened similarity of the Austrian people. Destructive strategy aims at dismantling parts of the national identity. Wodak and Reisgl (2001) discuss discursive strategies such as predication, perspectivation, and argumentation. They note that predication strategy replaces members of an out-group with the objects they use, the place where they live, and the types of occupation they have. Perspectivation helps participants to position their point of views in their descriptions, narrations or quotations of relevant events or utterances. Argumentative strategy enables participants to compare and contrast views and select the one that is relevant to their context. In a more specific sense, Wodak (2011) identifies encouraging, directing, modulating strategies used by leaders in their texts based on a liberal administrative context. Encouraging strategy enables them to engage members of their team contribute to achieve institutional goals. Leaders direct their team members to contribute to their institutional decision making. Similarly, modulating strategy of leaders enables team members to actively participate in the decisions expected to be made for the success of their institutional goals. Therefore, discursive strategies used in a given discourse can produce and be produced by the ideology embedded in texts and contexts of a given milieu.

Ideology establishes and is established by social relations of power, domination and exploitation (Van Dijk, 2006 and Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012). Ideologically oriented texts sustain claimed and stipulated perspectives of social groups with reference to relations of power (Gee, 2008 and Van Dijk, 1997). The power of any discourse can be seen as power in discourse, and power behind discourse. Power in discourse is seen as a place where relations of power are actually exercised and enacted based on the status of the discourse participants. Usually, powerful participants are expected to use dominant discourses that influence the powerless one (Wodak, 2001). Power beyond discourse focuses on how orders of discourse are shaped and constituted by relations of power. A difference in

power results in inequality between groups which emanates from the ideology embedded in a given tenet ((Fairclough, 1995 and Van Dijk, 1997). Explaining the ideology and power inequality which frame the discursive strategies used in a given milieu is the tenet of CDA approach. This approach evolved from Critical Linguistics due to the paradigm shift from viewing language as a system to viewing language as a social practice.

From the perspective of language as a social practice, CDA is seen as a problem-oriented approach which enables analysts to use information from verbal and non-verbal resources to systematically explore social problems, such as power abuse, dominance and inequalities. It uncovers the opaque as well as transparent relationships of dominance, discrimination and power produced and used through discourses (Wodak, 2001and Fairclough, 1995). According to Van Dijk, (2001, p. 352), "CDA is a type of discourse analytical research that studies the way ideology, identity and inequality are produced and (re)enacted in social and political contexts." The analysis of songs as macro-language in use invites CDA to explain the embedded social, political or economic ideologies and power relations masked in the lyrics of songs.

Arbain and Sandi (2016) analyzes the song entitled "Love the Way You Lie Part II" using CDA. Result of the study depicts that informal words and expressions, and American slang were used in the song lyrics to create a new identity of the singer. Risdianto (2016) also examines the lexical, grammatical and situational aspects of the song lyric titled "We will not go down" using the CDA approach. The analysis showed that the Palestinian people were strong enough to challenge their enemies and maintain their sociocultural and historical values. It warns that whatsoever, the Palestinian people will not surrender to any force, nation or people that wants to colonialize them. Marhamah (2014) examines interpersonal meanings in the lyrics of Muse's songs called "Black Holes and Revelations" using Halliday's (1994) Systemic Functional Linguistics. The analyses show that the songs employed declarative, imperative, interrogative modes in which the singer wants to state or declare something to the listeners, provides information and asks them something to do respectively. Tsauti (2007) describes the lexical meanings employed in the Muse's song lyrics using descriptive qualitative method showing that denotative, connotative,

antonyms, synonyms hyponyms are the main word level meanings demonstrated in the lyrics. Thompson (2002) explains the ideology embedded in the binary opposition employed in music education. The analysis reveals that an ideology of difference is framing a number of binary oppositions constructed between world music and European music in relation to their surrounding cultures, musical functions, pedagogies and placements in the curriculum.

Thus, the perspective of CDA informs the present study in examining the songs *Ani hinjiru* and *Jirra jirraa* as a macro-language in use, the linguistic devices employed to compose the songs as micro-language in use to interpret and explain the political contexts in Ethiopia in connection with the Oromo, and to unveil the ideology and power relations fixed in the lyrics of the songs.

Theoretical and Methodological Frames

The main theoretical frame adapted in this study is Halliday's (1994) Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) and Brown and Strega's (2005) Social Identity Theories. Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) frames analysis of the social aspect of language and the linguistic aspect of society. Eggins (2004) states that SFL enables us to explore both how people use language in different context and how language is structured for use as one of semiotic resources. The theory encompasses Austin's (1962) speech act theory which focuses on what people do with their words and what words do for their users. The theories present that language use is not a neutral medium of communication; it is neither neutral nor innocent as it is ideologically (re)charged. Social Identity Theory mainly helps to situate the analysis within the deference-based anti-oppressive and emancipatory research. The theories, thus, frame the formal description, the contextual interpretations and the social explanations of the songs made in this study.

To this end, the present study employs qualitative method in conjunction with Fairclough's (1992) tri-dimensional (description, interpretation and explanation) and Wodak's (2001) discourse-historical models of CDA to frame the data collection and analysis. The models open rooms to capture the difference-based sociopolitical issues and to incorporate the historical information to the contemporary systemic problems in Ethiopia which the singer tries to address through the songs. The songs *Ani hinjiru* and *Jirra*

jirraa released in 2015 and 2017 respectively, retrieved on 22 October, 2019 from YouTube, were obtained using a purposive sampling technique. The rationale for selecting the video clip rests on understanding the popularity, provocative and evocative nature of the songs in conjunction with the past and the present political situations in Ethiopia against the Oromo struggle for freedom. The retrieved video data were transcribed following Gee's (2008) line-based transcription method which allows us to put the data in clausal or sentential form. The data was translated from *Afaan Oromoo* into English language, thematically categorized and analyzed under the themes identified in connection with the objectives of the study. The analysis begins with describing the forms and functions of the linguistic devices collected from the two songs. The description is conjoined to the context in which the devices were produced and regulated for interpretation. Finally, the nexus between ideology and power in framing the songs was explained. These levels of CDA were employed to systematically investigate the obscured and transparent meanings and power relations imbedded in the lyrics.

Result and Discussion

This section presents and discusses findings of the study under three major themes: the linguistic devices used in the songs, the discursive strategies employed, and the nexus between discourse, ideology and power in the discursive representations of the Ethiopian political systems from the Oromo people perspective. These themes are based on the basic questions the article is designed to address. The findings are discussed under the following topics and subtopics.

Linguistic Devices Used in the Songs

Linguistic devices are concrete manifestations of assumptions that guide practices. They constitute and realize both assumptions and their corresponding practices. They also (de)legitimize practices and the strategies they involve, and represent actors of the practices positively and/or negatively (Kwon et al., 2013 and Van Leeuween (2008). The songs *Ani hijiru* and *Jirra jirraa* were composed of various linguistic devices which show systemic political practices in Ethiopia in connection with the Oromo people. The linguistic

devices identified from the songs are *lexical items, grammatical features* and *rhetorical devices*.

Lexical Items

Lexical items are the building blocks for both the structural and discursive constructions of song lyrics. Structurally, lexical items build phrases and clauses to compose songs. They consist of words combined with other words in collocations and fixed expressions to communicate certain meanings (McCarthy, and McCarten, 2018). Discursively, lexical items are seen from what users do with them and what they do for their users. Lexical items realize, maintain and transform the non-discursive practices and the strategies used in the construction of realities in a given context (Halliday, 1994). The lexical items used in *Ani hinjiru* and *Jirra Jirra* include *wording, toponymys, ethnonyms, synonyms, antonyms and collocation*, discussed below using illustrative examples taken from the songs.

Wordings

Wording refers to the words chosen and their patterns of use employed in the lyrics of the songs. A writer or a singer chooses words and a given pattern of use over the other is largely dependent on the context in which the words are produced and consumed. This, in turn determines the forms and meanings of the words chosen. Accordingly, a lexical item can have various meanings, and a meaning can be worded in various lexical items. For instance, Ho (2013) puts that in public discourse, a noun can be used to signify many referents and a referent can be signified by more than one nouns. In what follows, the key words and phrases and their corresponding meanings (semantic and discursive) employed in the songs are described and interpreted.

(1)

from Ani Hinjiru				*from Jirra Jirraa*	
(1)	*Gullallee, Tufaa*	'Gulale, Tufa'	*(2)*	*jirra*	'we are here'
(2)	gaara, Abbichuu	'hill', Abbichu'	*(5)*	*bal'ise*	'widened'
(3)	*Galaan, Finfinnee*	'Galan, Finfine'	(7)	*irraanfachuu*	'forgetting'
(7)	*fageessan*	*'distanced'*	(17)	*loon tiksuu'*	Tending cattle'
(8)	*diigan*	'destroyed'	(61)	*rakkoon, furmaata,*	'problem, solution'

(9)	*addaan baasan*	'divided,	(63)	*harree didaa, ba'aa*	'untapped donkey, load'
(14)	*qotiyyoo didaa, harqoota*	'un manageable ox, yoke'	(65)	*qotiyyoo, gafarsa,*	'ox, buffalo'
(15)	*qorra baraa*	'frost of the era'	(66)	*hammenya, ulee, mataa*	'meanness, head, stick'
(22)	*caccabse, lafee*	'crushed', bone'	(74)	*dukkana,*	'dark,
(23)	*hinjiruu*	'not here'	(78)	*dhaala, ilmoo*	'inheritance, offspring'
(24)	*kukkute, tiruu*	'disintegrate, liver'	(79)	*shiran*	'conspired'
(39)	*shiran*	'conspired'	(80)	*garaa, qalbii,*	'sense, consciousness'
(41)	*farda*	'horse	(91)	*doorsisan*	'threatened'
(42)	*dangessan*	'limited'	(104)	*Finfinnee*	'Finfine'
			(106)	*Oromiyaa*	'Oromia'
			(107)	*Biyya abbaa*	'father's land'

As shown in *(1)*, simple nouns are one of the key lexical items employed in the songs. The nouns refer to clan, leaders, relation, place, livelihood and labels against the Oromo people. The clan names (*Gullallee*, *Abbichuu* and *Galaan* (1, 2, 3)), leaders of the clans (*Tufaa* and *Abbichuu* (1 and 2)), and the names of the places where the clan and the leaders dwell (*gaara*, *Finfinnee* and *Oromiyaa* (2, 104 and 106)). The phrase *Biyya abbaa* 'father land' (107) is a generic name used to refer to their ancestral home. The nouns *dhaala* 'inheritance' and *ilmoo* 'offspring' (78) depict decedents of the ancestral home from their forefather, Tufa Muna (1) to the current Oromo. The blood relation between the Oromo and their ancestor, and their strong attachment to their ancestral home, Finfinnee are denoted by the nouns *tiruu* 'liver' (22) and *lafee* 'bone' (24). The basic livelihood source of the clan is agriculture which is basically based on land. The use of the nouns *qotiyyoo 'ox'* (17) and *harqota* 'yoke' (14) show that the clans accustomed to tilling their land to produce crops, vegetables and fruits for their subsistence. The use of the noun *loon* 'cattle' (14) also demonstrates that animal rearing husbandry from which they get milk and meat constitute the clans' livelihood. The use of *farda* 'horse' in the song indicates that the clans use of pack animals for transportation and defense. It is public knowledge in Ethiopia that a horse is the heroic symbol of the Oromo in general and the clans mentioned above in particular. The

clans defended themselves from Menelik II who displaced them from *Finfine* and renamed their homeland 'Addis Ababa' by force using their horse. Other nouns used in the songs include *harree didaa* 'literary to mean 'unmanageable donkey' (63) and *gafarsa* 'buffalo' (65). These nouns represent labels employed in the political systems of Ethiopia against the Oromo who refused to obey the system and chose to fight it.

Apart from their denotative meanings described above, the nouns 'ox, yoke and yoked ox' together with *ba'aa* 'load' (63) used in the lyrics portray the extent to which the oppression or burden by the Ethiopia political leaders, idiomatically represented by the phrase *qorra baraa* 'frost of the era (15)' and *hammeenya ulee mataa* 'meanness of the head', weighed down on the Oromo The phrase *unmanageable donkey* refers to the label the leaders used against the Oromo who foght for their freedom to deny them their human rights and people's right (Kuwe, 2000), were present in the song with the expression *seera uumaa dabse* to mean 'denying the natural law' (*72).* These nouns parlay the political system in Ethiopia designed to influence the mind set and psychological spaces of the Oromo as generalized by the expression *garaafi qalbii hatanii* 'by stealing the sense and consciousness' in a tone employed by Asafa's (2018) to described the 'mental genocide' perpetrated by the Abyssinians on the Oromo people. These discursive roles of the nouns are consistent with Van Vlirtor's (2008) observation in which proper nouns and their referents trace historical, geographical and demographical practices and malpractices of both majority and minority groups in a given temporal and special contexts.

The lexical item presented in text *(1)* is action verbs. Action verbs used in the song *Ani Hinjiru* include *fageessan* 'distanced', *addaan baasan* 'divided', *daangessan* 'limited', *diigan* 'demolished', *kukkutan* 'disintegrated', *caccabsan* 'crushed', *doorsisan 'threatened',* and *shiran 'conspired'.* These verbs have similar forms and functions. Formally, the verbs are presented in a simple past tense form with an indefinite third person plural pronoun 'they' denoting the agent or doer of the actions reflected by the verbs. Functionally, the verbs reflect ecologically disturbing, socially disintegrating, psychologically threatening and culturally destructing practices of the rulers against the Oromo people. For instance, the verb *distanced (7)* shows the systemic dislodging

practices of the rulers against Abbichu, Galan, Gulale and Eka of the Oromo clans from Fifinne.a critical element of the project to disempower the Oromo people as demonstrated by the use the verbs *addaan baasan*, *kukkutan*, *caccabsan* and *daangessan* presented in text *(1)*. Overtly, the verbs show the systemic segregation, destruction, land grabbing and confinement by the agents against the people. The words *shiran* 'conspired' and *doorsian* 'threatened' communicate the means temployed by the system to achieve the goal of the project against the Oromo people.

More importantly, the verb *diigan* 'demolished' in combination with the noun *gaara'hill'* connotes the dismantled sociopolitical and religious institutions of the Oromo people - *Gadaa* and *Waqeffannaa* by the Ethiopian political systems. The phrase *gaara sana* literary to mean 'that hill' reiteratively used in the song flashes back on the presupposed pre-colonial situation of the 16^{th}-18^{th} centuries where the Oromo people had strong unity maintained by *Gada* system analogously compared to *gaara* 'hill / higher' in the song. The action verbs employed in the songs blame the political systems of Ethiopia for destroying the egalitarian and democratic institutions of the Oromo using the phrase *diiganii gaara sana* literary to mean 'demolished that hill'.

The nouns and verbs discussed thus far reveal the victimization of the Oromo by the enmity attitudes of the Ethiopian empire to the Oromo people in the past. Different scholars have tried to reveal the hostile relationship between the Oromo people and the Ethiopian state which prioritizes in the hierarchical systems of life. Asafa (2018), for instance, states that Ethiopian colonialism has kept the Oromo people in the darkness of ignorance and poverty for more than a century denying them freedom for the production and dissemination of knowledge, and preventing them from building their own independent institutions and leadership. Aberra (2019) states that the settler colonialism which promoted structural genocide destroyed the essential foundations of lifeforthe Oromo people (their culture, values, religion, dignity, etc.). Aberra maintains that the settler colonialists occupied the Oromo land, deconstructed the Oromo collective and egalitarian values and sovereignty, and at the same time inculcated their own individualistic and hierarchical beliefs which eroded the indigenous values of the Oromo using the state machinery. Thus, the settlers

have committed ethnic cleansings for destroying cultural, social and religious values of the people. More specifically, Kumsa (2019) asserts that the Abyssinian colonizers of the late 19th century humiliated the three pillars of the Oromo national identity: *Orommumaa* (Oromoness) - Oromo-nation, *Afaan Oromoo* - Oromo language, and *Oromiyaa* - their ancestral territory. The lexical choices used in the song *Ani hinjiru* unveil these historical and political burdens loaded on the Oromo people and escalation of their grievance against the Ethiopian empire. They also show the state of hopelessness and helplessness experienced by the Oromo by using the word *hinjiru* 'I am not here'.

The lexical items used in the song *Jirra jirraa* attempt to sow the seed of hope in the minds of the Oromo people. For instance, the word *Jirra* 'we are here' metaphorically meaning 'we are alive' is used in the song, direct the attention and emotion of the people to their abilities, skills and courage so that they challenge and change the systemic problems snowballed onto their contemporary situations rather than focusing on the ill-practices perpetuated on their identities by the Ethiopian political hegemony. The words *bal'ise* 'widen' used in the expression *gara nu bal'ise* (5) idiomatically refers to patience in a very difficult political environment . The word *irranfachuu* 'to forget' (7) envisions the hope for a better future to enlighten the darkeness of the past (74). The harsh realities the Oromo experienced in the murky past is oxymoronically presented in the song as both tempting and auspicious using the expression *rakkonis furmata* meaning 'the problem by itself could be a solution' for a given problem in a similar tone of the observation by Wood's (2000)iterating the more a problem is common to a given society, the more it unifies them to find the solution. How the hostile attitudes of the Ethiopian rulers resulting in the political marginalization and economic exploitation of the Oromo pushes the people to stand together to claim and assert their human and democratic rights are idiomatically represented by the word *hammeenya mataa* 'meanness of the head'. Together, the nouns and verbs used in the songs promise a bright future to the people when they would live peacefully in their own land using their resources (7 and 13).

Ethnonyms and Toponyms

Ethnonyms and toponyms are the lexical items employed in the songs' to refer to the Oromo clans and the names of places where they are accustomed to live. The names indicate the clan-place attachment to refer to their ancestral home. They are also essential features of the feelings, experiences, and the collective knowledge the Oromo as an ethnic group have developed over years about their physical and social environments. According to Weigert (2008), the use of ethnonyms and toponyms constrict and maintain ecological identity of a pre-existing ethnic group and/or a late comer to a given ecology. Duszak (2002) states that the feelings we develop based on our local values, beliefs, experiences and expectations though names determine who we are in relation to where we live. The table below presents the text of the place and clan names widely employed in the songs *Ani hinjiru* and *Jirra jirraa.*

(2)

(32)	*.... Gincii koo…*	(84)	*... Horroo koo ...*
(35)	*... Shaallaa koo ...*	(85)	*... Walisoo koo ...*
(36)	*... Shukutee koo ...*	(89)	*... Sulultaa koo ...*
(44)	*... Ajjee koo ...*	(100)	*... Gindoo koo ...*
(46)	*Bulee horaa koo ....*	(101)	*Dambi Doolloo koo*
(47)	*... Naqamtee koo ...*	(102)	*... Amboo koo ...*
(49)	*... Shaashee koo ...*	(106)	*... Oromiyaa koo*
(83)	*... Meettaa koo ...*	(107)	*...Biyya abbaa koo*

The names of the places presented in text *(2)* are from a relatively local or specific to a relatively national or general one. The names demonstrate part-whole relationship. For instance, the place names *Gincii, Shukute, Meettaa,Gind.* are specific parts of Ambo which, in turn, is relatively specific part of *Oromiyaa*- the region which can be taken as a whole. The specific names of these localities and the general name which encompasses them have hyponym and co-hyponymy relationships in which the parts are included in a given whole Sankaravelayuthan (2018). The part-whole relationships of the place names used in the song implies that parts are as important as their inclusive whole. It depicts that dwellers of the specific and

general areas have equally fell victim to the systemic oppressions present in Ethiopian politics. The part-whole relationships intended to be addressed by the use of toponyms in the songs seem to inspire the Oromo, the ethnonym, to restore the ownership right of the parts and the entire nation-Oromia and their democratic governance system – *Gada.* The singer also informs the people to make use of the resources generated from the nation using the possessive pronoun {*koo*} which is linguistically accompanies specific place names and the dwellers. He subsumed this ownership rights of the place names with the phrase *biyya abba koo* 'my father land' (107) in the song *Jirra Jirraa,* which, in fact, the singer appears to be less confidant to use in *Ani hinjiru.* Hachalu did so probably to inspire the Oromo to be conscious of the climax of the oppression, exploitation and marginalization imposed on them by Ethiopia's political systems.

Synonyms and Antonyms

Hachalu's songs also contain lexical items which are synonyms and antonyms to each other. Sankaravelayuthan (2018) states that synonym refers to lexical items which are close enough in their meaning to allow a choice to be made by the users. McCarthy, McCarten and Sandiford (2012) write that antonyms are the sense relation used to show the engagement of words in opposite meanings with other words, and disagreement in context meaning. In the songs *Ani hinjiru and Jirra Jirraa,* words with similar and opposite meanings were used as an alternative way of portraying the hostile relationship between the assertive Oromo and the oppressive political system in Ethiopia. The text below demonstrates the unfriendly situation between the people and the system.

(3)

(9)	*addaan baasuu*	'separating'
(13)	*gargar baasuu*	'dividing'
(14)	*qotiyyoo… qotiyyoo didaa*	'ox, vs. unmanageable ox'
28	*garaafi qalbii*	'sense and consciousness'
(43)	*ture, bubbule*	'stayed for a long time
(63)	*harreen , harree diidaa*	'donkey vs. unmanageable donkey'
(65)	*qotiyyoo, gafarsa,*	'ox vs. buffalo'

As can be seen in text *(3)*, the paired phrases and words in (9) and (13, (28), and (43) are near synonyms for they have related meanings. The synonymous words disclose the disuniting practices and duration of the practices employed by Ethiopian rulers against the Oromo, and the effects of the practices on their values. For instance, the words similar in meaning presented in *(9), (13)* and (43) show the extensive threat practice made against unity of the Oromo. The opposite words such as *qotiyyoo vs. qotiyyoo didaa* 'ox and unmanageable ox' (14) and *harree* vs. *harree didaa* 'donkey vs. unmanageable donkey' (63) portray the labels as one of the disuniting and distancing practice used against the people. The paired antonyms demonstrate the character assassination and branding used against the Oromo who refuse to obey the political practices of the rulers. Thus, the use of opposite entities (donkey and Zebra) and (ox and buffalo) disclose loyalty and disloyalty of individuals and groups among the Oromo people to the dividing and rule political strategy in Ethiopia. This has profoundly affected their psychology as reflected in the synonymous words *garaafi qalbii (28) meaning* 'sense and consciousness'.

Collocation

Collocations are the co-occurrence of two and more words and phrases in a text to convey both implicit and explicit meanings in discursive context (Gantar and Kosem, 2014). Baker (2006) points out that collocation serves as a vehicle for discursive construction of a group's identity. Thus it can be taken that collocation is an alternative way of combining words and phrases which help the users to attain their planned objectives of certain sociopolitical issues. Both the textual and contextual meanings of the collocations employed in Hacalu's song lyrics are summarized below.

(4)

	from Ani Hinjiru	
(7)	*gaara diiguu*	'demolishing hill'
(31)	*walirraa fageessuu*	'making apart'
(35)	*addaan baasuu*	'dividing'
	from Jirra Jirra	
(8)	*Tafkiidhaaf utaalchoo*	'jumping for flea'

(12)	*Allaattiidhaaf kochoo*	'Wing for hawk'
(13)	*Qochaadhaaf dhagachaa*	'stone for tortoise'

Syntactically, co-occurred words preferably used over the other words in the songs are nouns, verbs and prepositions serving both as base and collocates of the combinations. Prepositional phrases such as *Tafkiidhaaf, allatiidhaaf and qocaadhaaf* are collocates of the nominal bases *utaalchoo, koochoo and dhagachaa presented* (8, 12 and 13) in text *(4)*.The noun *gaara* and the preposition *walirra* are collocates of the verbal bases *diiguu, fageessuu* and *baasuu*. Semantically, the nominal and verbal collocations taken from *Ani hinjiru* refer to destructing hill and separating two things. The prepositional collocations are more analogous to refering to something naturally given to animate entities such as flea, hawk and tortoise. Pragmatically, all the collocations are familiar to the everyday verbal interactions of the Oromo people. The nominal and verbal collocations used in the song *Ani hinjiruu* aim at activating collective memories of the Oromo people referring to their demolished ecology, destroyed institutions and dismantled unity by the Ethiopian political systems. The singer chose to use the collocations over other stocks of collocations in *Afaan Oromoo,* because they are powerful to expose the destruction and distortion of the national identities of the Oromo by the system. The collocations *walirraa fageessuu* (31) and *addaan baasuu* (35) reveal the purpose and product of the ethnic cleansing idiomatically represented with the collocation *gaara diiguu.*

On the contrary, the prepositional collocations employed in the song *Jirra Jirraa* attempt to shift the audience's emotions and intentions from condemning the malpractices and blaming agents of the practices to appreciation of the Oromo, the victims, for their patience and tolerance in tolerating the historical burden loaded on them and their existence as a people today. The prepositional collocations employed in the song analogously condemn the oppression naturalized by the system on one hand and appreciate the patience of the people in an oppressive station. Naturally, the flea jumps; the hawk has wings, and the tortoise has scales. The use of these collocates in the song indicate the tolerance of the Oromo to carry all the sociopolitical burdens as natural as these familiar

animate entities. The word *kennaa* 'gift' (16) and the line *Jirra hundaa baachaa* 'We are alive carrying all the loads' (17) disclose the naturalized and almost normalized practices as well as the systemic oppressions imposed on the Oromo faced across the various regimes that rued the country.

In sum, as one of the key lexical items employed in the two songs, wording shows the use of simple noun that denote concrete referents, and verbs that refer to actions. Both the concrete nouns and the action verbs analyzed use various forms to refer to one central ethos: dismantling, the meaning of which was conveyed using words such as demolish, destroy, divided, etc. Ethnonyms and toponyms as lexical items employed in the songs depict name of the Oromo clans, Abbichu, Galan, Gullale, and the place where they were accustomed to live, their ancestral home-Finfinnee and Oromia. The synonyms and antonyms refer to displacement of the clans from their home and the destruction of their cultural, ecological and religious identities as a strategy to dismantle them. Finally, the collocation analyzed in the section also focuses on uncovering destruction of the fundamental features of the Oromo identity by the Abyssinian rulers, demonstrating victimization of the Oromo people under the Ethiopian empire. .

Grammatical Features

Grammatical features are one of the linguistic devices employed to compose lyrics of the songs. Certain features of grammar and their patterns of use are chosen over the other features and patterns based on their significances in the objectives the users intend to achieve. The grammatical features often used in written and spoken texts include activation, passivation, cohesion, etc. (Halliday, 1994). According to Gee (2005), these grammatical devices are indicatives of social, cultural, and political inequalities in a given milieu. The grammatical elements mainly employed in the songs *Ani hinjiru* and *Jirra jirraa* are pronouns and activation.

Pronouns

Apart from their syntactic and semantic meanings, pronouns show the similarity and differences between groups. The similarity of relationship indicates inclusion into a given social group, whereas the difference in group relation demonstrates exclusion polarizing

the out –group members from the center owner in a given context. Duszak (2002) states that pronouns show affective polarization based on polarized ideological schema of the in-and out-groups members. Rogowski and Sutherland (2015) also argue that ideological schema is the source of affective polarization that defines desired and undesired states (that is, realization of group values, and the counter-values of the other group). The pronouns in the texts presented below portray the polarized relationships between the Oromo and the Ethiopian political systems across various regimes.

(5)

	from Ani hinjiru	*gloss*
(6)	*... **jaran nu** fageeessanii*	'…**they** distanced **us** from …'
(9)	***Nu** baasan aaddaan…*	'**they** separated **us**…'
(13)	*.... kan gargaaar **nu** baasani jara*	'It was **they** who separated **us**'
(22)	*... maalan jiraa caccabsee **na** nyaatee…*	'what existence of **me; he** crushed and ate **me**'
	from Jirra jirraa	
(6)	*Yaa **nuhii**!*	'Oh ***we***!'
(7)	*Yaa waa irraanfachuuf yaa **nuhii**!*	'Oh ***we***! May ***we*** forget that situations!'
(43)	*Maalgodheen **ani** **si**rraa citaa*	'How can ***I*** dare to be detached from ***you***'
(46)	***Si** fudheen Sarboo **koo** lixaa*	'***I*** will go to ***my*** Sarboo with ***you***'
(50)	***Si** fudheen Shaashee **koo** lixaa*	'***I*** will go to ***my*** Shashe with ***you'***
(53)	***Si** fudheen Najjoo koo lixaa*	'***I*** will go to ***my*** Najjoo with ***you***'
(103)	***Si** fudheen Amboo **koo** lixaa*	'***I*** will go to ***my*** Ambo with ***you***'
(105)	***Si** fudheen Finfinnee lixaa*	'***I*** will go to Finfine with ***you***'
(107)	***Si** fudheen Oromiyaa lixaa*	'***I*** will go to ***my*** Oromia with ***you***'
(108)	***Si** fudheen Biyya abbaa koo lixaa*	'***I*** will go to ***my*** father's state with ***you***'

The bold words (***nu*** 'us', ***na*** 'me' ***jara*** 'they' and ***inni*** 'he') presented in the texts from the song *Ani hinjiru* are first and third person pronouns. The first-person pronouns ***nu*** and ***na*** refer to receivers of the actions presented in the words *fageeessuu 'distancing'* and *addaan/gargar baasuu 'separating' (6, 9* and *13)* performed by the referent pronoun ***jara*** and ***inni*** refers to. Thus, ***nu***

and ***na*** refer to receiver/ patient and ***jara*** refers to doer/agent of these actions. These polarized pronouns represent the in-group, the Oromo who fall victim to the systemic actions of the out-group, the Ethiopia rulers. However, the pronoun ***na*** and ***inni*** (22) seem to refer to the in-and out-groups inclusion and exclusion deviating from their normal functions i.e., referring to the first and third person singular nouns, in *Afaan Oromo*. In this context, ***na*** substitutes the collective pronouns '*nuyi* and *nu* 'we/us' to refer to the Oromo and *Oromummaa* 'Oromoness'- the threatened ethnic identity in the political system of Ethiopia. The pronoun ***inni*** substitutes the pronoun ***it*** to refer to the inanimate entity - the suppressive political system of country backed up by agents of the actions mentioned in the text. Therefore, the pronouns *we/us* and *they/them* used in the song disclose the historical inclusion and exclusion of the Oromo and agents of the Ethiopian political systems. Duszak (2002, p.7) asserts that "the in-group *us* and out-group *them* portray the discursive construction, management and manipulation of social identity inclusion and exclusion."

The pronouns (***nuhii*** 'we', ***ani*** 'I', ***koo*** 'my' and ***si*** 'you') presented in the song *Jirra jirraa* refer to the Oromo and their national identity. The first-person plural and singular pronouns ***nuhii*** *and* ***ani*** refer to the people directly and indirectly, respectively. The pronoun *nuyii* has direct reference because it agrees with the referent, the Oromo, in number. Whereas, *ani* has indirect reference to the people because it does not agree with number but has equivalent meaning to the preceding pronoun. As reflected in the text, the possessive pronouns *koo* 'my' refers to the specific place names such as Sarbo, Shashe, Najjo. Ambo, Finfine, etc. together called *Oromiyaa (105)* – the national identity of the Oromo. The pronoun is repeatedly employed in the song to serve for the function of *keenya* 'ours' which directly refers to resources of the social self. That is, *koo* plays the role of *keenya* in the song. Similarly, *si 'you'* shifts its reference from second person singular pronoun to *Oromummaa* - the ethnic identity of the group. This pronoun is repeatedly employed in the song to emphasize the part-whole relationship with Oromia which is metaphorically shown as the crushed identity of the people in the song *I am not here.*

Lastly, the pronouns in the songs *I am not here* and *we are here* have been used in ways that shift their primary syntactic functions.

The first-person singular pronouns *ani* and *na* serve as first person plural pronoun *nuhii* and *nu* to refer to the Oromo, while *si* refers to *Oromummaa*, *inni* refers to the oppressive political system of Ethiopia, and *koo* refers to the ownership right of the Oromo (i.e., the land/state-Oromia).

Activation

Activation is a grammatical feature identified from the songs. Activation emphasizes agent as opposed to passivation which emphasizes the patient of an action (Fairclough, 2003 and Van Leeuwen, 2008). As cited in Hailu (2015), Fowler (1991) argues that activation is an essential tool in the analysis of representation through clauses. It contains predicates, participants and circumstances of discourse. The motivation behind using activation, therefore, is to make agents accountable and responsible for their actions as in the texts presented below.

(6)

(7)	*gaara sana diigan*	*'they demolished that hill'*
(10)	*addaan nu baasan*	*'they separated us'*
(30)	*shiran nu shiran*	*'they conspired us'*
(31)	*garaaf qalbii kiyya hatan*	*' they stole my sense and consciousness'*
(34)	*... nu fageeessan*	*'...they distanced us'*
(91)	*...nu doorsisan*	*'...they threatend us'*

All the expressions presented in text (6) have active forms. In this form, the expressions portray agents of the destructive actions reflected in the words demolishing, separating, distancing, conspire, stealing and terrifying as third person plural "they", and singular "it". As agents of the actions mentioned in the words, the pronouns represent the ideological state apparatus (church, education, military, court, administration, etc.) and the ideology that frames them, respectively. The singer used activation to reveal the agents and make them accountable for the demolished ecological identities of the people.

Rhetorical Devices

Various rhetorical devices were identified from the songs analyzed in this study. The rhetorical devices identified appeal to emotions by addressing the values and desires of the Oromo people. They also appeal to intentions of the people in connection with the general and specific details of the historical injustices perpetrated by Ethiopian rulers against the national identities of the people. According to Gee (2011) and Al-faki, (2014), rhetorical devices steer people's thoughts, emotions and beliefs towards a given context. Higgins and Walker (2012) argue that rhetorical devices constitute and reflect our practices of social connections and divisions. Hachalu employs rhetorical devices to unravel the disuniting practices of the various Ethiopian regimes against the Oromo people. The devices used in his songs include analogy, repetition, idioms and metonymy. These devices are discussed below using illustrative examples from the songs.

Disclose Analogy

Analogy tends to suggest the existing similarities i and draws parallelism between two unlike things that have common qualities of resemblance. It compares two things in which the more complex one is explained in terms of the simpler one (Chang, 2012 and Robert, 2010). Sankaravelayuthan (2018, p. 148) states that "Analogy involves the similarity between some concrete object or process and some abstract concept or process.… By analogy there can be a transfer or extension of meaning from one to the other." All the sources consulted here show that analogy is the comparison of two things with the main focus on their similarities to transfer intended meanings. The analogous expressions used in the lyrics of the songs *Ani hinjiru* and *jirra jirraa* presented in (6) below demonstrate the point.

(7)

From Ani hinjiru		
(7)	*diiganii gaara sanaa*	'they demolished the hill'
(24)	*... kukkutee <u>na</u> nyaate turuu*	'…has hewed and eaten my liver'

(47)	*...caccabsee <u>na</u> nyaate lafee*	'…has crushed and eaten my bone'
(77)	*boolla keessa teessee boolla qottii* *dhaala abbaa ishe ilmoon rirmaa*	'being in the hole, an ant digs hole inherited from its parent'
	From Jirra jirraa	
(8)	*tafkiidhaaf utaalchoo*	*'jumping for flea'*
(12)	*allaattiidhaaf kochoo*	*'wing for a large bird'*
(13)	*qochaadhaaf dhagachaa*	*'stone for tortoise'*
(63)	*harreen ba'aa diddee taate harree diidaa*	'the disobedient donkey became zebra'
(66)	*hammeenyi ulee mataas* *Injiraan ajjeessaa*	'malice of a stick on a head kills louse'

As shown in *(7)* the hill demolished, the body parts crushed, the ant digs hole being in a hole, the instinctual behaviors of flea, bird and tortoise, the disobedient donkey and the meanness of stick that kills louse are analogously employed in the lyrics of Hachalu's songs. The word *gaara* 'hill' (7) is analogous to the glorious sociopolitical and religious institutions the Oromo the Gada System before the 19th century. The analogy depictsthat the strong indigenous institutions they had at the time enabled to strengthen unity of the people. *Diiganii gaara sanaa* 'demolishing that hill' is analogous to the institutions dismantled, the broken unity and the weakened strength the Oromo. The body parts crushed (24 and 47) analogous to such the disempowering strategies of the regimes in the country. Liver and bone, as parts of a body, are analogous to family and clans tied through blood relations. Analogy of the body parts crushed, therefore, represents the Oromo unity dismantled by the empire. The ant digs hole being in a hole (77) analogy condemns the Oromo who cooperate with the oppressive regimes to work against the Oromo unity. The analogy represents those that are psychologically enslaved and participating in the enslavement of others. Thus, the analogy employed in the song *Ani hinjiru* 'I am not here' portray the widespread hopelessness among the Oromo as a result of the dismantled unity resulting in the economic, political and social disempowerments of the people.

Analogy of the intuitive behaviors of flea and bird were seemingly used in the song *Jirra jirraa* to represent the rights people have to defend themselves from their enemies just like a flea which relies on its ability to jump and a bird which employs flying to escape from their enemies. On the contrary, tortoise, the animal enclaved in a shell throughout its life, is an analogy referring to the Oromo people who have been oppressed and denied their freedom. The expressions *jirra hundaa baachaa* 'we are here carrying all the loads' demonstrates the impositions naturalized by the system on the people. However, the expressions *harreen ba'aa didde taate harree didaa* 'the donkey that refused to carry the load became a disobedient donkey' (63) seems to analogously present the deviation from such a naturalized situation of the master-servant relations in Ethiopia. In our experiential knowledge, donkey is analogue to servant and obedience to carry any baggage that any person can load on it. The accepted saying among the Oromo *akka harree kan waan itti fe'an baattu* 'just like a donkey which carries any luggage loaded on to it' represents the unnatural obedience to carry load. The analogy of the disobedient donkey depicts the label and character assassination used by the system against the people who challenge the oppressive systemsfor their human and democratic rights. Thus, the expression in (66) indicates that sticks of a head, idiomatic reference to the ideology the leader follows, matters for survival of individuals in the state. It points out that if leaders are mean as in Ethiopia, it will be difficult for individuals to have freedom of life.

Repetition

Songs are naturally characterized by repetition. Repetition links forms and meanings of song lyrics. According to Cook (1989, p. 19), "repetitions establish chains of connected words running through discourse." Cook further argues that the lexical chains made by repetition could be created by words or phrases that mean the same, and that associate to each other in meaning. Halliday and Hasan (1989) also indicate that repetition gives emphasis to the presented and/ or intended meanings. This shows that repetition contributes to organization of forms and meanings and depicts contextual intensions. In both the songs *Ani* h*injiru and Jirra jiraa*, the singer used repetitions of words, phrases, sentences and stanzas in connection with the systemic oppressions and suppression of the

Ethiopia political system against the Oromo. The representations used in the songs and intentions of the singer are discussed in the following texts.

(8)

from Ani Hinjiru	*frequency*	*gloss*
Galgalee /Galaanee	X28	*'my Galgale/Galane/'*
ani hinjiru	X12	*'I am not here'*
maalan jiraa	X8	*'what existence of me'*
diiganii gaara sanaa	X4	*'demolishing that hill'*
from Jirra Jirraa		
si fudheen … koo lixaa	X3*8*	*'I'll take you to my… localities*
jirraa.	X33	*'we are here'*
yaa nuhii	X12	*'oh we!'*
akkan sirraa citu yaadanii	X4	*'they conspired to detach me from you'*

The key expressions iteratively used in the songs presented in text (8) range from consonant and vowel sounds to sentences. The maximal to minimal repetitions of the expressions in both songs are meant to hold the audiences' attention to the themes that appeal to their emotions, address values and desires the singer intends to communicate. The main themes repetitions of lithe linguistic are used to focus are disclosing the destruction of the Oromo national identity and the struggle against it. The singer repeatedly employs the female names *Galgalee* and *Galaanee* at the beginning of the song *Ani hinjiru* to render more emphasis to national identity of the people. Repetition of the words at the beginning of the successive clauses makes the idea more coherent to help the audience understand the identity of the group demolished by the Ethiopian political systems, seemingly related to the Oromo's cultural perceptions of the words *galgala* 'evening' and *galaa* 'provision' from which *Galgalee* and *Galaanee*.

The figurative meaning of the noun *galgala* is eve of life. This coincides with the blessing in the Oromo culture which says *Galgalli kee haatolu* 'May you have a happy eve of life' and agrees with the saying *deemaa oolan galgalli manuma* 'metaphorically to mean that you are your own foundation'. Hence, *galgala* refers to one's foundations of life which keeps generational link. It matches with the word *galaa* from which the name *Galaanee* is coined, and agrees

with the saying *gala dhalootaa* 'the provision of generation'. The use of *Galgalee* and *Galaanee,* therefore, analogously refer to *Oromummaa* 'Oromoness'-, the ethnic identity, Gada- and Oromiyaa- the territorial identity. Repetitions of the clauses *Ani hinjiru, maalan jiraa* and *maalan hafee* 'I am not here, what existence of me, and what remains of me' emphasize on the destructions of these essential features of Oromo identities which are analogously portrayed by the expressions *diiganii gaara sanaa* 'demolishing that hill' by the Ethiopian empire.

However, the expressions employed in the song *Jirra Jirraa* appeals to the attention of the people about the survival of essential features of Oromo identities. For example, the expression *si fudheen … koo lixaa* most frequently employed in the song capitalizes on restoration of the local and national identities of the group. The words substituted by the dots in the expression refer to place and clan names (34-56) of the Oromo. Similarly, repetition of the word *jirraa* 'we are here' focuses on the current consciousness of the people about their identity, despite the long standing effort to weaken and eradicate it by various regimes in Ethiopia. This is represented in the song by the expressions *akkan sirraa citu yaadanii* 'they conspired to detach me from you', with the pronoun *me* representing the Oromo, and *you* representing their identity which the singer chose to depict by *Galgalee* and *Galaanee.*

Idioms

The lyrics analyzed contain idiomatic expressions which contribute to the meaning intended to be communicated through the songs. According to McCarthy and Odell (2010), idioms are words whose meanings are often difficult to guess from the meanings of each individual word that composes it. With more emphasis on context of use, Colston (2015) points out that the meaning of an idiom cannot be fully comprehended without having exposure to cultural context in which it is produced and used. This view shows that idioms are culture-specific knowledge and experiences which the users acquire in their integration with each other. Thus, we analyzthe idioms used in Hachalu's songs based on the contextual meanings they convey in connection with the Oromo and the Ethiopian state. The following idioms are taken from the songs.

(9)

	Idioms from Ani hinjiru	
(15)	*qorra baraa dadhabuu*	'unable to resist frost of the era'
(22)	*rafee hinbulu ....*	'doesn't sleep all the nights'
(52)	*...garaan dhaanuu ....*	'being beaten by own sense'
	Ideoms from Jirra jirraa	
(4)	*...barii arguu*	*...to see dawn'*
(15)	*...hunda baachuu*	*'carrying all the loads'*
(31)	*garaaf qalbii hatuu*	'stealing sense and thought'
(57)	*garaa bal'isuu*	'widening sense'
(66)	*hammenyi ulee mataa*	'meanness of head's stick'
(74)	*dukkana dukkanatti ibsuu*	'lightening dark at dark'

The forms and meanings of these idiomatic expressions are familiar to everyday language use of the Oromo people. Formally, all the expressions in text (9) consist of phrasal verbs, noun phrase, prepositional phrase and verbs. The meanings of the expressions given in the gloss are denotative which may not be the intension of the singer to covey. Contextual meanings of the expressions include challenge or hardship, brutality, confusion, patience, and wish of freedom. The expressions *qorra baraa dadhabuu* (15) and *rafee hinbulu* (22) idiomatically represent the overbearing political situations in Ethiopia which have threatened the essential foundations of the Oromo people and made them restless. The tyrannical actions of the political leader against the people are idiomatically portrayed using the words *hammeenya* 'cruel' and *ulee mataa* 'state apparatus'. The songs also employ the phrase *garaan dhaane* 'defeated by his/her personal benefits' to criticize the political agents who run after the benefits they get from the oppressive political system rather than benefiting the people. The phrase *garaafi qalbii hatan* 'pilfered sense and consciousness' refers to the moral and psychological impacts of the oppression on the Oromo people. The malpractices have darkened the lives of the Oromo people by denying them access to resources, information and political power, and placed them in a state of confusion as portrayed by the expression *dukkana dukkanatti ibsuu*. This bodes well with the observation Asafa (2018) makes on how the Ethiopian politics incarcerated the Oromo and controlled their knowledge production

and dissemination by force. The intention behind revealing the malpractices using these idiomatic expressions in the song seems to rest on mobilizing people against the contemporary political system of Ethiopia.

The singer also appreciates the patience of the Oromo using the expressions *hundaa baachaa* 'carrying all the loads' and *garaa bali'suu* 'widening stomach' despite all the dehumanizing practices of the Ethiopian government. The expressions demonstrate the extent to which the Oromo have tolerated a magnified oppressive political system in the country. In all instance, the people didn't quite struggling against the system. The idiomatic expression *barii arguu* 'seeing the dawn' depicts the better future the people are looking for despite the dark situations they have experienced for more than a century.

Metonymy

Metonymy is one of the rhetorical devices employed in the songs under investigation. Reisigl and Wodak (2001) state that metonymy replaces a person with a place, an abstract idea with something concrete, events with their time of occurrence, users of an object with the object they use. According to Mayr and Machin (2012, p. 170), "Metonymy is substitution of one thing for another with which it is closely associated.… In both definitions, metonymy is substitutions of referents/ ideas by other referents or ideas. The metonyms used in the songs refer to the glossed over territorial identity of the Oromo clans with the place where and the time when they live, and with the objects they use. The following are examples taken from the songs.

(10)

(1)	*…Gulgalleen kan Tufaa*	*'Gulalle that of Tufa'*
(2)	*… gaara Abbichuu durii*	*'Abbichu's hill'*
(3)	… Galaan Finfinnee maarse	*'Galan surrounded Finfinnee'*
(43)	*farda Siidaa hatanii*	*'by stealing Sida Dabali's horse'*

This text presents names of Oromo clans metonymically substituted by the place names where they used to live (1, 2 and 3) are *Gullallee, Galaan, gaara,* etc. associated by the local administrators of the area during the pre-colonial era. For instance,

Gullallee is a palce named based on the names of the Oromo clan, *Gullallee*, and metonymically associated with the local administrator of the clan, *Tufaa Munaa*. *Gaara Abbichuu* 'Entoto hill' is also named after *Abbichuu*- name of the clan and the person who was administrating the clan. Likewise, *Finfinnee* is the name of a place metonymically associated with *Galaan* - administrator of the clan in the past. Thus, the metonymical expressions used in the songs associate the significant geographies of ancestral home with their particular clan names and known individuals both **wi**th in space and time, transferring referents of the relations between the home and the clan. The song also associates a person named *Siidaa Dabali* (43) who represented his clan *Abbichuu* at the time, known by his horse, the non-human entity that define the clan as a whole. The lyrics blame Menelik, the Ethiopian ruler of the time, for confiscating *Siidaa Dabalii*'s horse, the king of the other horses of the clan. The use of this metonymical association seems to reveal as one of the projects of identity destruction for which the Oromo accuse the king, while blaming the current Ethiopian government for erecting amemorial sculpture of the king on the stolen horse at *Birbirsa Gooroo*, using the word *hatani* 'by stealing' (43).

Discursive Strategies

The various linguistic devices analyzed in the preceding topics realize different discursive strategies employed in the songs *Ani hinjiru* and *Jirra jirra*. The macro-discursive strategies realized through the devices include disclosing, emphasizing and describing. These macro-strategies contain micro-discursive strategies. Both the macro - and micro - strategies correspond with major sociopolitical functions such as systemic disempowerment, means and outcomes of the disempowerment, and the struggle against the system. The next subtopics discuss the strategies and these corresponding functions.

Disclosing

Disclosing, as one of the macro-strategy, exposes the power abuse and malpractices of the state authority against the Oromo in their essential foundations of life. The strategy flashes back on the political systems of the imperial, the socialist and the federalist regimes of the country to uncover the strategies they designed and

employed against the Oromo people. The songs expose the thematic environment around which malpractices of the regimes revolve are the strength declined, the ecological identity demolished and dismantled. In accordance with these themes, *minoritizating*, from the side of the oppressor- the government, and *victimization* from the side of the oppressed- the Oromo, are the two strategies disclosed by the songs. According to Atkinson (2016), minoritizing strategy aims at making the group find itself in a position of political, social, economic, etc., inferiority. From its very nature, minoritizing is a reductionist strategy that focuses on reducing the number, size, wealth, power, resources of a group in order to easily manipulate it. This strategy has been applied to the Oromo people who have been labeled by the Ethiopian rulers as a threat to the national unity they have planned to achieve during the various regimes. As reflected in the lyrics of the songs analyzed, the rationales for minoritizing the people are their numbers and resources. The ultimate goal of using the strategy against the Oromo is to disempower them. Flagrantly, minoritizing the people began from reducing their population size estimated to be between 50 and 60 million or more than half of the population size of Ethiopia.

Some of the micro-strategies included in the minoritizing strategy are *dismantling, distancing, disuniting, and limiting*. Dismantling is a strategy employed by the Ethiopian rulers to destroy social, cultural, religious, ecological and national identities of the Oromo people in a similar way to Wodak et al. (2009) in which the strategy employed to distort the Austrian national identity. The strategy is disclosed by the lyric *Diiganii gaara sanaa gaara diigamuu hinmalle (7)* and (8) 'demolished that hill, the hill that was not meant to be demolished'. Distancing is the other strategy employed by Ethiopian rulers to alienate the Oromo who are assertive about their national identity (Oromoness, Afaan Oromoo and Oromia), and pushed them to the periphery of the political and economic center of the country. The expression *jaran nu fageeessani* (6) 'they distanced us' exclusively refers to the agents (the Ethiopia governments) and patients (the Oromo people) of the systemic distancing. This situation of the Oromo agrees bodes well with Hall (1996) and Van Leeuwen (2008) arguments in which distancing through discourse is a strategy the powerful group design and use to exclude the powerless social group from the centers of resource and

power. The disuniting and limiting strategies used to minoritize the Oromo as disclosed by the songs are reflected in the following text.

(11)

(35)	*Nu baasan aaddaanbaanee*	*'they separated us; We were separated'*
(39)	*...gargar nu baasan…*	*'they separated us'*
45	*...nu daangessan*	'they limited as'
(50)	*...caccabsee na nyaate lafee*	*'…it ate me by crushing my bones'*
(52)	*...kukkutee na nyaate tiruu*	*...it ate me by cutting my liver into pieces'*

The actions verbs *separate*, *crush* and *cut* (see *text 1* for further descriptions of the verbs) used in text *(11*) demonstrate the disuniting strategy of minoritizing the Oromo both in size and power (economic, political and military). Using these verbs, the first two lines of the text literally show the dividing and rule system employed by the rulers against the people. The last two lines analogously demonstrate the strategic malpractices used against the people (see text *7* for detail descriptions of the analogy). Thus, the phrase *tiruu kukkutuu* and *lafee caccabsuu* (52 and 50) show the disuniting strategy applied to the family and clans. Limiting mobility of the Oromo not to have mutual understanding about access to power and resources they were denied is the other strategy identified from descriptions made in the song lyrics. The expression*…nu daangessani (45)* shows mental, physical and discursive restrictions which severely affect the development of the people.

Emphasizing

As one of the macro-strategies, emphasizing traps the attention of listeners to the themes of the songs. The themes in the songs *Ani hinjiru* and *Jirra jirra* which were emphasized are the absolute bad political practices in Ethiopia and the relatively good awareness of the Oromo at present and their readiness to combat the practices. The political practice in the country that victimizes the Oromo is monorititization. This is portrayed as a nucleus of the problem to which the singer tries to attract the attentions of the people for change. The use of the expression *Ani hinjiru* metaphorically capitalizes on the significant absence or exclusion of the Oromo

people from the center of power that enables them to make decision about the political and economic issues of the country in general and that of their own in particular. However, with the song *Jirra jirra* the singer tries to shift the emphasis mostly from blaming the system for excluding the people from the center of power to claiming ownership right that they have been denied for lomg. With this shift, the song aims to bring the attention of audience from the state of non-existence to existence based on a relatively less harmful political context created for a few months (See this under the Context of the Study). The song also tries to refresh the focus of the audience to appreciate strength of the Oromo, to have patience and to survive as a people despite all the attempts to vanquish them. By and large, the shift in the central focus of the struggle from the non-existence to existence seems an effort to shift from talking truth to those who are in power, who do not have an interest other than their desire to stay in power as their predecessors, to talking to self - the Oromo people, so that they remain committed to reclaim their freedom.

Describing

The songs *Ani hinjiru* and *Jirra jirraa* describe two consecutive political contexts the Oromo have experienced. The first song, which present the Oromo people using *ani* 'I' (equivalent to *nuyi 'we')* describes the people with the state of hopelessness and helplessness as a result of the political and economic minoritization and marginalization perpetrated by the Ethiopian rulers across regimes. It describes both the people and the regimes as the oppressed and the oppressor respectively. This description agrees with Kuwe's (2000) observation of the Oromo nationalist discourse. The song also describes that the Oromo, in the pre-colonial era of the 16th - 18th centuries have strong and democratic sociopolitical organization which was not meant to be destroyed as depicted by the expression *gaara diigamuu hinmalle*. It describes that the people and their strong institutions have been gradually reduced by the governance systems of the country. This, in turn, describes the ecologically, socially, religiously and culturally destructive verbal and non-verbal practices of the oppressor, the Ethiopian political systems.

The second song (*Jirra jirraa*) describes the people's patience and resistance enabling them to survive from the malpractices and injustices of the political systems using the expression *kuno*

har'allee jirraa 'still we are alive'. It describes actors and actions of the oppressed, the people, almost positively, presenting the actors and actions of the oppressor, the rulers, negatively as in Van Dijk (2006) who arguesthat political actors and their actions can be described either in a negative or positive way based on their roles in a system. Both songs present the Oromo as victims of the hostile attitudes accompanied by the minoritizing discursive and non-discursive practices and strategies of the state of Ethiopia. It is a public discourse that successive Ethiopian governments produce and use bad stories such as *Warra biyya diiguu* 'those who dismantle the country' *warra fottoquu barbaadu* 'those who claim secession' against the Oromo and inculcating it into the minds of Ethiopian people to control the discursive, mental and physical spaces of the Oromo. This observation is in line with Van Dijk (1997) and Van Leeuwen (2008) who describe victimization is the consequence of telling bad stories about and taking harmful actions that disempower a group.

Summing up, disclosing, emphasizing and describing are the macro-discursive strategies employed in the songs analyzed. Disclosing exposes the political malpractices of the imperial, the socialist and the federalist regimes of Ethiopia. It comprises micro strategies such as *dismantling, distancing, disuniting* and *limiting* mainly used by agents of the regimes to disempower the Oromo people. As reflected in the songs, dismantling strategy destroys the sociopolitical and religious institutions of the Oromo. Distancing excludes the people from the center of political and economic power. The disuniting strategy employed against the people has profoundly weakened the power of the Oromo to challenge the systemic political malpractices, and limited their access to information, resources and participation in the system. The song also describes actors and actions of the political systems of Ethiopia negatively and the people that fell victim to the actions positively. Thus, it can be argued that the singer has tried to draw the attention of his audience to these core political problems using emphasizing strategy in songs.

Discourse, Power and Ideology in Songs

The linguistic devices and discursive strategies employed in the songs *Ani hinjiru* and *Jirra jirraa* conferred so far disclose that discourse, ideology and power are inextricably linked to each other.

Discourse gives substance to ideology. It constitutes and reflects the ideological positions of the times. In the interlocking nature of discourse, ideology and power played a lion's share in dismantling and distracting the democratic and egalitarian sociopolitical and religious institutions of the Oromo people, put ting in place the assimilative, hierarchical and hegemonic political systems of various Ethiopian regimes. This has created antagonistic relationship between the Oromo nationalism and the Ethiopian state. The songs remind historical memories of the glorious past of the Oromo distracted by the one-size- fits all assimilative ideology of the state, and the hostile relations which began right from the foundation of the empire. The unfriendly relations between the state and the Oromo nationalism were presented in the songs in binary oppositions. The binary oppositions include oppressor vs. oppressed, powerful vs. powerless, inclusion vs. exclusion, minoritizing vs. minoritized and superior vs. inferior. These paired descriptors of the hierarchical relationships between the parties theoretically and practically represent dominant and dominated viewpoints, respectively. The viewpoints are based on asymmetrical power relations which cause the difference between the parties. Following Althusser (1971), it can be argued that power relations, by their very character, are always asymmetrical and negotiated through discursive representations. Therefore, it is argued that the study of the song lyric is tantamount to studying its ideologies, and the ways through which they disclose the power relations between successive Ethiopian governments-the oppressors, and the Oromo people- the oppressed. Analysis of the songs also reveals the way they shape the directions of the Oromo struggle for independency as observed by Nkoala's (2013) on the roles of songs in leading the Black people's struggle against Apartheid.

Conclusion

The songs analyzed in this study disclosed the systemic disempowerment of the Ethiopian political systems, and the Oromo struggle against the systems. These top-down impositions and bottom-up resistance are realized in through the linguistic devices and discursive strategies employed in the songs. Linguistic devices such as lexical units, grammatical features and rhetorical devices analyzed reveal the socially and ecologically destructive verbal and

non-verbal practices of the Ethiopian political systems and their negative effects on essential foundations of the Oromo people. The songs employ macro-discursive strategies(disclosing, describing and emphasizing) for addressing the malpractices of the systems. These discursive strategies unmask the hidden agenda of the system, describe the practical textual and contextual practices of the system, and draw attentions of the Oromo to stand together for changing their systemic disempowerment. Thus, analysis of the devices and the strategies identified from the songs unveil that the ideology of building a nation based on one language, one culture and one flag to which the ethnic group the rulers belong consider dis hindrance for national unity and a deterrent of development. The ideology predisposes asymmetrical power relations between the Oromo and the state legitimizing the domination of minority group to which the rulers define themselves to, and the subordination of the majority groups like the Oromo.

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Development without Democracy? The Myth of Economic Miracle and Protests in Ethiopia

Guluma Gemeda

During the last two decades, contradictory stories alternatively dominated the news cycle coming out of Ethiopia. The first of these stories is a fast-growing economic development publicized by the ruling party, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) (Malone and Cawthorne 2009). The other major story is the widespread anti-government protests, particularly in the Oromia regional state. The protests clearly contradicted the Ethiopian regime's efforts to portray the country as a beacon of stability, safe for capital investment and tourism, and a reliable ally of the West in the war against global terrorism (*The Washington Post*, August 10, 2016; *NPR*, August 9, 2016; *Reuters*, August 8, 2016). This paper examines the contradictory developments in Ethiopia under the EPRDF rule. First, the paper briefly reviews the nature of Ethiopia's economic development and recent fast-growing economic narrative. Second, it analyzes the mass protests which gained momentum between April 2014 and early 2018, particularly in the Oromia regional state. Third, the essay examines the impact of the Oromo protests on economic growth and the sustainability of the EPRDF developmental state project. Finally, throughout, the paper raises three questions: (1) Does Ethiopia have the essential features that make a developmental state successful? (2) What is the impact of the recent protests on the developmental state policies? And (3) can the economy recover from the state of emergencies and persistent mass resistance?

The developmental state: definition

What is a developmental state? Before we proceed, it is necessary to define and describe the essential features of a developmental state

and compare it to the Ethiopian situation. Since the publication of C. Johnson's *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* (1982), the developmental state is understood as a state that guided and facilitated economic growth and industrialization of a country (Johnson 1982). This paper follows Doner, Ritchie and Slater, who define developmental state as a state with complex institutional structure "in which expert and coherent bureaucratic agencies collaborate with organized private sectors to spur national economic transformation." (Doner, Ritchie, and Slater 2005: 329). A developmental state requires leaders who are committed to rapid growth and play a prominent role in planning and executing programs and speed up economic transformation. Developmental state also requires highly trained professional experts who are motivated and committed to national objectives and equity. The bureaucratic elite must be enthusiastic and willing to collaborate with private businesses to implement the national economic policies.

In the case of the most successful developmental states, technocrats were not directly involved in contentious and divisive politics, but they were shielded away by the political elite which sets the agenda. Recruitment, retention and promotion of competent technocrats are based on fair competition and merit system. With long-term secure employment and compensations in par with the private sector, technocrats had the opportunity to focus on national interests of the country. Their freedom of action and confidence cultivated good working relationship and collaboration with private businesses.

Doner, Ritchie and Slater further argue that a developmental state may not be "highly autonomous" or unconstrained by coalition forces. It emerges when "political leaders confront extraordinarily constrained political environment;" when ruling political party faces a threat of "unmanageable mass unrest, heightened need for exchange and military hardware for national security, scarce revenue causing severe budget constraints." Doner, Ritchie, and Slater 2005: 329). Because of "systemic vulnerability," the ruling elite faces three distinct constraints-(1) broad coalitional opposition, (2) scarce resources, and (3) severe security threat. Instead of autonomy, therefore, "systemic vulnerability" is a necessary condition for the origin of a developmental state (Doner, Ritchie, and Slater 2005: 329).

On the other hand, other scholars argue that the political elite should feel secure and the state should be autonomous to allow the developmental state to flourish. Adrian Leftwich (2000) identified the following major factors for the emergence of a developmental state—the presence of a political elite dedicated to growth; availability of highly competent and protected technocrats; weak civil society; repressive, autocratic regime with capacity for the effective management of public and private economic interests; and performance-based legitimacy for the ruling regime (Leftwich 1995:400). Similarly, in its 2011 report, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) defines developmental state as a state which "has the capacity to deploy its authority, credibility and legitimacy in a binding manner to design and implement development policies and programmes for promoting transformation and growth, as well as for expanding human capabilities." ECA 2011: 7). The Commission report encouraged African countries to follow the Malaysian developmental state model (*ibid*; Mkandawire 2001).

Ethiopia as a Developmentalist State

Inspired by the successes of 'Asian Tigers' during the Cold War and, recently, by the Chinese model, Ethiopia adopted a 'developmentalist state' approach for an accelerated economic growth (Yeibyio 2015). But does the Ethiopian developmental state meet the definitions outlined above? First, the state under the EPRDF appears to meet some of the criteria for a developmental state. For example, a few of Ethiopia's ruling party elite seem to be committed to development and want to use the narrative of economic growth to consolidate their rule. They also believe that the ruling party—EPRDF—should lead not only the political, but also the economic sector. Also, like China, the Ethiopian regime has not given priority to building democratic institutions.[1] The state controls the means of coercion and aspires to be autonomous; yet it is also threatened by protests. Ideologically, it is guided by *abyotawi* (revolutionary) democracy, which Jean-Nicolas Bach characterized

1. Apparently, the Ethiopian version of developmental state relies more on the Chines model which strives to achieve fast economic transformation without democracy. But as Pei (2006) argues, such development is "trapped" in an autocratic rule.

as "neither revolutionary nor democratic." (Bach 2011). For this reason, from the outset, they retained control of key economic sectors. Although they agreed to sell some of the *Derg*-era manufacturing plants and to dismantle the unprofitable state farms, they kept the Ethiopian Airlines, banking, telecommunications and other profitable corporations under state control.[2] Both in urban and rural areas, they retained land as state property, and initially justified it as a 'pro-peasant' policy intended to protect small farmers from eviction and displacement by greedy capital owners. Thus, during the first decade of EPRDF rule (1991-2002), liberalization and free market economy were mixed with state ownership of key economic resources. Third, EPRDF faced financial constraints and budget shortfalls and continued to rely on foreign aid and bilateral loans. Fourth, as in the monarchical regime of Emperor Haile Selassie (d. 1975), Meles Zenawi capitalized on the war on terrorism to partner with Western powers and received diplomatic, economic, military and security assistance.

But the Ethiopian state lacked some of the essential features of a developmental state such as competent and autonomous technocrats who are not deeply entangled in partisan politics. Although there are well trained professionals in Ethiopia, they are deeply implicated in the political rancor which undermines their autonomy and professionalism. Ethiopia also lacks an independent business class that can collaborate with the regime to implement the national economic plan.

There are also other missing factors in Ethiopia to make the state 'developmental' and to assure the level of growth and sustainable success that the 'Asian Tigers' had achieved in the 1970s and 1980s. For example, unlike the populations of the most successful developmentalist states, Ethiopia has a diverse ethnic composition.[3]

2. Henze, "Reflections on Development in Ethiopia." Banking is now open to private Ethiopian investors, but not to foreigners. Lately, After Dr. Abiy Ahmed came to power, the regime has announced a plan to privatize some major corporations such the Ethiopian Airlines and the Telecommunications. But the details are still not released.
3. The role of ethnicity and the ethnic composition of the most successful developmental states are often ignored in the discussion on developmental state. But both in Africa and Asia—for example,

As a multi-ethnic polity with complex histories, Ethiopia is confronted with more complicated political challenges in setting a unified national agenda. Currently, the state is dominated by the Tigrayan elite who come from a minority ethnic group in Ethiopia.[4] Finally, there is still some doubt whether the Ethiopian state is truly developmental, and whether its striving towards democratic ideals can be successful (Desta 2005).[5]

When and Why the EPRDF Adopted Developmental State Policy?

It is not clear when the EPRDF leaders embraced the developmental state policy. But it appears that the decision was made under unique local and global political and economic circumstances in the 1990s.[6] During the war of insurgency against the *Derg* (1975-91), TPLF leaders were committed to a Marxist ideology and intended to implement it when they took power.[7] But before they seized power,

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Botswana, Mauritius, China, Malaysia, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan—successful developmental states have more homogenous or a single majority ethnic group. The leaders relied on the support of such majority ethnic groups in designing and executing developmental state policies. For ethnic composition of developmental states, see "People> Ethnic Groups: Countries Compared." http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/People/Ethnic-groups. Accessed on October 30, 2017.

4. In Ethiopia, despite its dominance in ruling party, the TPLF comes from a minority Tigrayan ethnic group that constitutes only 6.1% of the Ethiopian population of 100 million.
5. Desta, *From economic dependency to democratic developmental state,* 227.
6. In a careful analysis, Sarah Vaughan divides the evolution of the TPLF rule up to 2010 into five stages. She argues the shift to developmental state became clear after a crisis within the party in 2001. See Sarah Vaughan, "Revolutionary democratic nation building." Instead, S.G. Abebe (2014) argues that developmental state doctrine was introduced after the 2005 contested elections. As argued below, I believe the shift developmental state began before the 2001 TPLF party crisis.
7. Ironically, the *Derg*, a military regime that ruled Ethiopia between 1974 and 1991, also claimed communist credentials and fully allied with Soviet Union and the Communist Block.

the Soviet Union collapsed and communism was discredited as viable economic and political system. In the meantime, an opportunity opened for the TPLF leaders to shed their communist identity and align themselves with Western democracies. In the late 1980s, when the United States government, as part of the Cold War strategy, offered some assistance to Ethiopian insurgency groups fighting the *Derg* regime, TPLF leaders grabbed the opportunity enthusiastically. The changing world order after 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist block encouraged Meles Zenawi (d. 2012), EPRDF leader and chief ideologue, to abandon socialism and embrace liberal democracy (Fourie 2015**)**. In spring 1990, Meles Zenawi visited the United States to seek assistance from the West. Summarizing his conversation with Meles during his visit to Washington, DC, Paul Henze observed: "They [TPLF leaders] show a major evolution in thinking about the nature of government and society and abandonment (at least rhetorically) of Marxist/populist formulas that up until recently seem to have prevailed in TPLF thinking." (Henze 2003).

Thus, upon winning the war against the *Derg*, in May 1991, TPLF leaders quickly exchanged their socialist garbs for liberal democratic diplomatic suits and started negotiating for financial aid and economic support from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Western powers (Lewis, *The New York Times*, May 29, 1991). But their conversion to liberal democracy did not mean total rejection of all aspects of Marxist principles. In this context, adopting a developmental state approach seemed a way out of the dilemma of commitment to an ideology they espoused for many years and their association with liberal democracies. Developmental state offered an opportunity of nominal acceptance of democracy while retaining authoritarian control of state apparatus.

Meles Zenawi's interest in a developmental state is reflected in his conversation with American academics at a meeting held at the Ethiopian Embassy in the United States, on October 20, 1995. At this meeting, he revealed a little bit of his plan to rule Ethiopia during the following years through what later became a developmental state policy. This was his first official visit to the United States after taking power, and he used his charm offensive with the US audience, particularly with American academics. In his response to questions raised by professors who attended the breakfast meeting, Meles said

his government was working 'with the villagers' [the peasants], and they were loyal to the regime because his party, the EPRDF, was addressing their concerns. He suggested that his government's policies were working well for the poor, including the "Oromo [who] had proved as reliable as had the peasants of Tigray and Shewa" during the war with the *Derg*. He challenged the professors to talk to the peasants, instead of "the best and the brightest" in Addis Ababa and the diaspora (Marcus 1995).[8]

Meles Zenawi's response was indeed reveling regarding TPLF's plan to rule a multiethnic country which was economically devastated by the long period of civil war in the 1980s. To overcome the history of ethnic oppression and repressive political system of the past, Ethiopia desperately needed economic liberalization and democracy. But Meles' plan for success was governing through state control of key economic institutions and resources. He believed economic development could be achieved faster without democracy; and good economic performance will ultimately solve the question of land and ethnicity. He suggested, as economic growth kicks-off political contradictions will disappear. In a nutshell, this was an early indication of what later became the cornerstone of the EPRDF's governing doctrine—developmental state.

Although Meles was aware of the fact, that the developmental state could not be "sustained by coercion alone," he later elaborated on what he wanted the state to be. In an unpublished thesis and a book chapter, he argued, the state should tower over society "like a colossus," and should be able to "effectively implement policy [of developmental state] regardless of the views of the private sector on the issue." (Zenawi 2012: 167-8). Thus, Meles Zenawi, who fought the war of insurgency as a Marxist guerrilla leader, became a pragmatic statesman in the 1990s.

However, the shift from Marxist orthodoxy to developmentalist state was not very difficult for him and his colleagues. The transition to the new policy did not require them to totally abandon the socialist-oriented economic approach. As the leading ideologue of the group, Meles attempted to salvage some of the socialist ideas of

8. Professor Harold G. Marcus was one of the American professors who attended the meeting and recorded the conversation and posted the report on the H-Net discussion site for African history.

his youth by outwardly accepting liberal democracy and adopting developmental state approach as a statesman. He and the TPLF leadership figured out that they could defend their authoritarian rule and control the state while appearing as liberal politicians. That is how the EPRDF regime pursued an economic policy with some key socialist features intact.

Initially, it was critical for TPLF leaders not to overtly defend the discredited and dying socialist ideology and jeopardize the opportunity to receive economic and diplomatic support from the World Bank, IMF and western powers. Negotiating with the World Bank and the IMF, TPLF leaders resisted giving up state control of certain key economic resources such land, the airlines, telecommunications, banking and other financial institutions. The World Bank and the IMF, on their part, endorsed the regime's economic policies and showered it with aid and loans without demanding the end of repression and the implementation of democratic system of administration. They supported the regime, but occasionally criticized its political excesses (Feyissa 2011). Thus, regarding politics, the TPLF retained some features of the socialist system—authoritarianism, dominant/single party leadership; and conspiratorial top-down mobilization and control of government apparatus.

By the end of the 1990s, other factors favored the TPLF leaders to expand the developmental state policies. After 911, Ethiopia was considered as an 'important regional security partner of the United States and other western powers and, for this reason, it continued to receive very generous financial and military assistance. In the context of the 'global war on terror', the United States and the European Union have offered Ethiopia their blessings supplying billions of dollars annually, particularly after 2002. They supported Ethiopia in economic, defense and diplomatic areas, while the EPRDF regime committed undeniable human rights violations (Furman 2012). The narrative of the 'war on terror' became a useful tool for the regime to consolidate power. Internally, 'fighting terrorism', imaginary or real, served the EPRDF as a means for suppressing dissent and intimidating citizens. The regime routinely labelled its opponents as terrorists. But. from the outset, the EPRDF itself was a terrorist regime (jalata 2005). After controlling key government apparatus in 1991, the EPRDF elite used coercion and

intimidation to drive out coalition partners such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) out of the Transitional Government (1991-1995). Contrary to their public pronouncements, TPLF leaders followed a governing policy that excluded respect for human rights and nurturing democratic institutions. After all, they are products of an Abyssinian political culture which lacked democratic traditions. Ethiopian society had not experienced liberal political reforms and modern democratic practices in its transition to modernity. For this reason, repression came naturally to TPLF leaders, instead of compromise and toleration of dissent (Abbink 2006; Hagmann 2006). They use the federal state structures and citizens' rights enshrined in the 1995 constitution as tools to 'deceive' foreign backers while ruling the country through traditional Ethiopian authoritarianism. In reality, "Ethiopian 'democracy' . . . continues to be strictly controlled by the EPRDF-led government and its old-time elite," (Hagmann and Abbnik 2010) [9] and Meles Zenawi's governing approach differed very little from his monarchist and socialist predecessors—Haile Selassie and Mengistu Haile Mariam, respectively.

Since they came to power, TPLF officials engaged in repression—harassment, surveillance, arrests and torture of citizens with impunity. In suppressing dissent, they used excessive force to disperse peaceful protesters, and unusual and cruel punishment tactics. For example, students and political prisoners in detention were forced to walk on their knees on rough graveled ground. Parents and relatives of those who were accused of supporting the OLF were intimidated, and some of them were arrested several times. The *Derg* era surveillance methods were perfected under the EPRDF rule. In the rural areas, a system of surveillance called *gott* and *garree* were instituted. Under this kind of state supervision, neighborhoods were organized into a group of five members with a party member or an affiliate among them to report on their daily activities (*Human Rights Watch*, May 2005; Freytas-Tamura, *New York Times*, November 5, 2017).

9. Hagmann and Abbnik, "Twenty years of revolutionary democratic Ethiopia." This article is also included in *Reconfiguring Ethiopia: The Politics of Authoritarian Reform*.

In some cases, the practice also led to orchestrated killings. In a document, reveled by Wikileaks, for example, the US Embassy in Addis Ababa filed the following report to the State Department in October 2006.

> "A series of explosions were reported in Addis Ababa on September 16, killing three individuals. The GoE [Government of Ethiopia] announced that the bombs went off while being assembled, and that the three dead were terrorists from the outlawed Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) with links to the Oromo National Congress (ONC). [But] [a]n embassy source, as well as clandestine reporting, suggests that the bombing may have in fact been the work of Government of Ethiopian security forces. . . . [A respected source said that the accused victims were actually detained a week earlier, tortured and left in a house where the explosions occurred] (Wikileaks).

In 1997, just two years after the establishment of a new Ethiopian constitution, the EPRDF carried out another round of arrests of Oromo professionals and leaders of civic organizations. Those arrested included editors and contributors of *Urjii,* an independent weekly newspaper that published articles critical of the government; director of the Oromo Relief Association (ORA); musicians, civic leaders and entrepreneurs. The offices of *Urji* and ORA were closed and those who were arrested remained in detention for the next two to four years. After they were released, many former detainees went to exile to escape continued surveillance, rearrests, repression and torture. As it happened many times, there were no clear incidents that triggered the detentions in 1997. But it was rumored that the incident followed failed talks with the OLF. The surveillance, arrests and killings were intended to spread suspicion and fear among the people. But overtime, the tactics back-fired and protests continued.

Externally, despite its gross human rights violations at home, the narrative of fighting terrorism allowed the EPRDF regime to receive foreign aid and diplomatic support. The Ethiopian regime under Meles Zenawi and his successor, Prime Minster Haile Mariam Dessalegn, posed as a reliable partner of western powers in the war against global terrorism. For this reason, Ethiopia enjoyed full diplomatic backing and generous financial support from the

European Union, the governments of the United States and Canada over the last two decades. The World Bank and the IMF continued to supply credits and loans to the government without many restrictions, even when there were clear evidences of misuse of such funds outside the lender institutions' guidelines. Western powers rarely criticized Ethiopia's domestic human rights' abuses. The explanations for such neglect are: (1) the EPRDF leaders are skillful manipulators of the narrative of international terrorism, and (2) the willingness of Western powers and financial institutions to sacrifice human rights for the sake of security cooperation. EPRDF/TPLF leaders and their cohorts positioned themselves as bulwark against international terrorists such as Al-QAEDA and Al-Shabab in Somalia. But the irony is that their domestic actions contributed to violence and destabilization in the Horn of Africa and created favorable conditions for the recruitment of terrorists. So far, Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia did not stabilize the chaotic situation in that country, and it did not eliminate the threat of Al-Shabab. On the other, the narrative of fighting terrorists has served the regime well as a source of highly needed international aid and western diplomatic support. Lately, financial aid has also started to pour in from the east (China). Now, as far as Ethiopia is concerned, the dilemma for the western democracies is how to conduct the 'war on terror' in partnership with a government which violates human rights, terrorizes its citizens, and is allied with China, a strategic economic and political rival of the United States in Africa.

Developmental State and Ethiopia's 'Economic Miracle': Myth or realty?

For more than a decade, the EPRDF regime claimed double digit economic growth—an 'economic miracle' (Deliotte [2014]; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2011)—even when the rest of the world has experienced one of the worst recessions in recent years. Ethiopia's 'economic miracle' is attributed to the developmentalist state policies implemented by the regime. In the absence of significant direct foreign investment (DFI), and with no major progress in peasant food production and persistent famine threats during the first decade of its rule, it was necessary for the regime to survive, earn more foreign currency and boost food production. Thus, after 2002, EPRDF leaders gradually made minor

adjustments to the land administration laws to allow private investment in agriculture.

This shift in land administration policy, initially attracted few flower farmers to the land around Addis Ababa (Finfinee). The investors in floriculture included a small group of domestic and foreign capitalists. The spectacular success in this area encouraged the government to offer vast agricultural lands in central Oromia and other southern regions. Spurred by soaring global food prices, foreign investors rushed to Ethiopia after 2007 to lease land for large commercial farms (Rahmato 2011; Abbnik 2011; The Oakland Institute 2011). Investors from India, China, Israel, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia and the United States received land lease contracts for several decades and promised to produce flowers, grains, fruits and vegetables. Karuturi Global, an Indian company, alone leased over 12,000 hectares in Oromia and 300,000 hectares in Gambela region to produce grains (The Oakland Institute, February 2013). The Saudi Star, owned by Sheikh Muhammad Al-Amoudi also leased extensive land to produce cereals and coffee (The World Bank, December 28, 2011). These investments apparently led to double digit GDP growth between 2004 and 2015 that observers considered an economic miracle. Based on these achievements, the government also claimed to put Ethiopia among middle income countries by 2025 (FDRE 2016; The World bank June 18, 2013).

However, there were several problems with Ethiopia's economic miracle. First, although accepted by the World Bank and the IMF with minor adjustments (The World bank 2016; Moller 2015), some observers doubt the veracity of the data that the Ethiopian government uses to measure its economic growth. Well-informed analysts believe that Ethiopian's widely publicized double-digit economic growth is a mirage rather than a miracle (Oakland Institute 2016; Desta; Geda 2016; Haylemariam 2015). Second, even if faster GDP growth may have occurred, there is a serious problem in the distribution of income among the country's populations. For example, the farmers faced eviction while the government used land grab to award to investors to achieve double digit growth. While disrupting rural life and displacing many farmers and pastoralists, land grab failed to produce surplus grain to end the chronic food shortage in Ethiopia (Endeshaw 2016). Some of the investors did not even develop the land they received. One of the largest investors,

Karuturi Global, is now bankrupt and had left Ethiopia without producing anything (Fekade 2017). So far, even with the highly publicized economic miracle, Ethiopia remains dependent on foreign food aid (Siyoum, Hilhorst, and Van Uffelen 2012; USAID, August 15, 2017).[10] Third, land grab is feared to have caused huge environmental damage in very fragile ecosystems such as the lower Omo Valley.[11]

Thus, when carefully examined, Ethiopia's economic miracle is achieved at a high risk or did not produce enough to alleviate poverty. Because of its shaky foundations, the highly touted economic growth did not meet its target; and it is unlikely to be sustainable. At this moment, its negative effects have caused huge social and political upheaval that threatens the survival of the EPRDF regime. The recent mass protests partly emanated from the pain that the repressive and corrupt EPRDF regime used to deliver an economic growth that benefitted a well-connected elite and left the masses in anxiety and poverty.

The Developmental State and Oromo Protests

While claiming double digit economic growth, the governance approach of the TPLF-dominated Ethiopian state remained repressive. The current widespread protests clearly expose the contradictory realities in Ethiopia—the narrative of fast growing economy but highly dissatisfied citizens protesting on the streets. Concurrently, while reporting an economic miracle, Ethiopia is beset by persistent threat of famine and chronic dependency on foreign food aid. The dependence on foreign food assistance has not diminished even when the economic growth is reported to have taken a faster pace. Ethiopia is also characterized by human rights abuses and violent crackdown on protesters. Food shortages, high rates of youth unemployment and protests are the result of an authoritarian,

10. In 2017-18, over 16.5 million people needed food aid in Ethiopia (USAID, August 15, 2017).
11. Although Ethiopia's laws require environmental impact assessment before investment licensing and approval of new projects, in practice, decisions are made hastily without appropriate due diligence by the approving authorities (Geleta 2016:287; Kamski 2016: 575).

top-down governance approach of the EPRDF regime as well as a sign of a failed economic policy. Moreover, despite the making of a federal constitution, the regime has failed to solve the national question of the major ethnic groups—Oromo, Sidama, Ogandeni Somalis—whose members still feel alienated and subjugated and ruled by a minority Tigrayan elite. Thus, all these cast doubt on the narrative of stability and economic prosperity registered under EPRDF rule since 1991.

The protests in the Oromia region reveal the simmering crises behind the rosy economic data and double-digit growth narrative. The Oromo, the largest ethnic block in Ethiopia, have also unresolved historical grievances of ethnic subjugation and political repression under successive regimes. In the 1960s, their attempt to create a self-help civic organization such as the Macha-Tulama Association (MTA) was met with brutal suppression. MTA was disbanded and its leaders were killed or received long-term imprisonment only three years after the establishment of the organization in 1963 (Jalata and Hassen 2014). At the same time, resistance against taxation and land alienation led to major uprising in Bale province, in the southeast, under the leadership of Waaqoo Guutu from 1963 to 1970. In 1976, Oromo nationalists formed the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) which still struggles to redress the historic grievances of the Oromo people.

Despite issuing federal constitution and ethnic-based federal system, the EPRDF regime has failed to resolve the chronic national question in Ethiopia and the demands of the Oromo people. Instead, the ruling party used the federal system as a façade behind which it exercises tight control of the economic and political institutions through satellite, dependent ethnic organizations such as the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO). The state controls and allocates land to domestic and foreign investors without adequate compensation to local farmers. Over the last two decades, thousands of farmers in Oromia and other regions were displaced to open-up land for investors. This practice partly aggravated the protests.

Since 2000, Oromo students have been protesting EPRDF eviction policies and demanding changes. In 2000, widespread forest fires throughout Oromia, especially in Bale and Borana regions, galvanized students to protest the government. Although forest fires occasionally occur during dry seasons in the lowlands of Ethiopia,

the 2000 fires started in January and raged for three months. These fires were unusually larger than the previous incidents and suspicious because they took place in the highlands as well. They were "certainly different from previous fires and constituted a serious disaster due to both the scale and type of land they affected." (Lemessa and Perault 2000). Geographically, these fires were also widespread and covered almost all parts of Oromia. Over 100,000 hectares of land in the highlands of Bale alone were destroyed in 2000. Curiously, initially, the government did very little to stop the fires. It was silent for several weeks, until Global Fire Monitoring Center (GFMC), an international fire research organization in Freiburg, Germany, alerted and publicized the incident. Unfortunately, by then the fires were already out of control and heavy damages were done to the forests. When the effort to end the fire started, many wild animals and livelihoods of pastoralists and farmers were lost because the government devoted a lot of resources detaining protesters, instead of fighting the raging fires earnestly.

The causes of the 2000 fires were not fully investigated. Activists suspected the regime may have started it to 'flush out' OLF fighters. Oromo farmers and diaspora communities were angered by the government's slow and inadequate response in fighting the fires. College and high school students protested for several weeks until the fires ended. The government, however, blamed the causes of the forest fires on the farmers and dry season. Alleged suspects whom the government claimed may have started the fires were detained. The incident created an excuse for the regime to target students and community leaders. Those who were targeted were very often accused of sympathizing or supporting the OLF, which, as mentioned above, was banned in 1992 when its leaders left the Transitional Government (Bulcha 2015). When he left office in 2001, the former Ethiopian President, Dr. Nagasso Gidada, admitted that there were no less than 25,000 Oromos in prison accused of supporting the OLF (Human Rights Watch, May 2005).

In March 2002, college and high school students in Oromia came out again to protest government policies that affected their lives. The protests involved a broad range of issues—corruption and repression, unemployment, food shortages, low or high food prices in different regions. While members of the ruling party were guaranteed job security and other privileges, non-party members

who worked hard and completed their studies were harassed and mistreated. Students also expressed the hardships that their parents faced—rising prices of chemical fertilizers, increased taxes, falling prices of coffee, food shortage and famine threats. For the Oromo and other non-Tigrayans, the TPLF-dominated federal government was a machine of repression, and the regional government was run by incompetent and powerless elite who were coopted, not to protect the people from tranny, but to serve the regime loyally. As the protest continued in April and May 2002, several students were killed, and many others were detained. Some student leaders were dismissed from colleges permanently, while others went to prison for more than a year or went into exile (Human Rights Watch, May 2002). During the protests, students focused on education and land issues.

In 2003-04, the immediate triggering factors for protests were: the beginning of the government's aggressive plan to expand the capital city, Addis Ababa, by incorporating at least 17 farmers' *qaballes* (associations). According to the 2003 revised charter of Addis Ababa, the boundary of the city could be changed by a joint agreement of the municipal administration and the Oromia regional government or by "the decision of the Federal Government." (FDRE 2003). The revised charter also allowed the federal government to incorporate the rural farmlands in the vicinity of the capital city. The renewed urban expansion threatened to evict many Oromo farmers from their ancestral lands around the capital city. In the meantime, the EPRDF also wanted to remove the seat of the State of Oromia from Addis Ababa to Adama, 60 miles to the southeast of the capital city. These changes obviously violated the "special interest" clause of the 1995 Ethiopian constitution regarding the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa.[12]

Student leaders protested the eviction of farmers from their lands and the illegal expansion of the federal authority. Students from

12. Article 49.5 of the 1995 Ethiopian constitution states "The special interest of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa, regarding the provision of social services or the utilization of natural resources and other similar matters, as well as joint administrative matters arising from the location of Addis Ababa within the State of Oromia, shall be respected." (FDRE, "Proclamation 1/1995) Ethiopian Constitution)."

Addis Ababa University and civic organizations requested a meeting with officials of the Oromia regional government, but were denied appointment. The federal government declared the protests were illegal and ordered the students to stop. But the protests spread to high schools in several towns in Oromia where the youth clashed with state police. In the town of Shambu, in eastern Wallaga, for example, "the police opened fire using live ammunition" to disperse student protesters. In 2004, more than 350 Oromo students were expelled from Addis Ababa University for protesting peacefully (Human Rights Watch , May 2005). Many of these students were followed to their villages and harassed by security forces. In the same year, the vanguard Oromo civic organization, Macha-Tulama Association, was disbanded. Its entire leadership and numerous Oromo students and journalists were jailed and kept in prison without trial for a long time. In the meantime, the offices of the Oromia regional state were quickly transferred to Adama. It is not clear how many arrests were made at hidden, unidentified, secret detention centers. These types of tragedies are far too familiar to the Oromo people in Ethiopia (International Oromo Youth Association (IOYA), November 9, 2006).

These and other grievances against the EPRDF regime favored some opposition parties during the 2005 elections. In fact, the ruling party allegedly stayed in power through voting irregularities in opposition stronghold areas and by throwing some of the legitimate winners in prison during the post-election violence. Realizing his party's vulnerability, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi quickly reversed the decision to remove the Oromia State headquarters from Addis Ababa to Adama. But Oromia's special interests in the capital city were not implemented. Instead, the expansion of the capital city into the surrounding areas continued systematically. This led to more evictions of farmers from their lands, and to harassment, surveillance, arrests and 'disappearances' of young Oromo men and women.

After 2005 elections, tensions spread among college students. For example, a series of clashes between Oromo, Amhara, and Tigrayan students took place in Addis Ababa, Adama, Bahir Dar, Gondar, Jimma, Harro Maya and Meqele Universities between 2006 and 2010. In almost all cases, Oromo students were either attacked or provoked to act in self-defense. After these incidents, they were

blamed for instigating violence and harshly punished. Some were immediately arrested while others were dismissed from colleges and universities. Upon dismissal, they were subsequently detained. These so-called student ethnic clashes were used as an opportunity by the government to target suspected student leaders and to disrupt their education. Tensions were apparently fostered by the government to discourage solidarity among various ethnic groups and to weaken anti-government protests. But these tactics also failed to end the protests.

In 2005, Oromo youth (*Qeerroo*) declared *Fincila Diddaa Gabrummaa (FDG) or* 'Protest Against Subjugation. The youth decided to fight for the Oromo quest for self-determination and sovereignty—*gaaffii sabummaa, gaaffii abbaa biyyummaa, gaaffi eenyummaa, gaaffii kabajamuu mirga dimokiraasi fi dhala namaa fi gaaffii mirga hiree ofii ofiin murteeffachuu' (*G*adaa.Com.* October 15, 2010). This initiated the development of the Youth Movement rocked the government a decade later with the intensification of state land grab after 2007. Although less visible at the beginning, the youth revolt focused on networking, organization and coordination of actions. Due to the heightened government surveillance, the leadership of the *Qeerroo* movement was diffused and secret. Its leadership and group affiliation were officially unknown. For this reason, some doubted the actual existence of *Qeerroo* leadership. The EPRDF government underestimated its networks and potential appeal to the Oromo people. But by 2011, the *Qeerroo* Movement started to take shape. By 2014, it had become one of the most effective forces behind the recent Oromo protests.

While the EPRDF regime boasted double-digit economic growth using developmental state policies, Oromo protests exploded throughout the region over the four years. After spring 2014, the Oromo *Qeerroo* Movement gained momentum. The educated urban population, largely unemployed or underemployed, swelled over the last two decades. But marred by corruption and political repression, the EPRDF government has failed to accommodate the youth or address their historic and persistent grievances. The lack of democracy obviously hurt the economy. In this context, the youth movement has built its networks carefully and systematically challenged the EPRDF regime, while the latter continued its effort

to achieve faster economic growth through developmental state policy.

In spring 2014, utilizing secret organizational networks, *Qeerroo* members organized protests and marched throughout Oromia. Renewed youth protests—characterized as *Fincila Xumura Gabrumma (FXG)/* 'Protest to end subjugation'—initially focused on the so-called Addis Ababa Master Plan (AAMP) and on blocking the government's decision to expand the boundaries of the capital city at the expense of the farming communities around Addis Ababa (Finfinnee) (Qeerroo Bilisumma Oromo). Historically, the farmers who lived around the capital city had been victimized by urban expansion. Since its foundations as the seat of imperial power in the late nineteenth century, Addis Ababa had dispossessed and displaced the Oromo farmers. Over the years, as capital city expanded, farmers in its neighborhood were evicted from their lands without adequate or no compensations. The EPRDF regime continued the tradition of eviction since it seized power in 1991. The new urban plan, which tripled the boundaries of Addis Ababa at the expense of small farmers, is radically different from the previous urban expansion projects (Emana 2014). The new plan is very ambitious; it is projected to aggressively alter the physical landscape of the city and diminish the cultural and political influence of the Oromo. It is designed to remove many villages and convert the farmlands to urban real estate. The plan is massive and, if fully implemented, its impact would have been devastating for farmers. It evicts thousands of the farmers and effectively divides the state of Oromia into two parts. Therefore, the expansion of both urban real estate and floriculture around Addis Ababa seriously alarmed the Oromo people and the youth (AAIMP 2013). For these reasons, all Oromos reacted to the AAMP strongly and demanded an immediate end to its implementation.

The *Qeerroo* were also mobilized not only to protect the livelihoods of the farmers around the capital city but to defend the rights of all Oromos. After widespread protests, including the Oromo in diaspora, the government agreed to shelve the AAMP. But the announcement was made only by the Oromia regional state, while the federal government did not officially declare its decision to end the city expansion plan. Many still fear that the federal government

is probably buying time and waiting for a favorable opportunity to reintroduce the plan.

The Oromo protests are not isolated incidents. Other Ethiopian communities are also affected by the policies of the EPRDF regime. For example, several violent crackdowns took places in the southern regions in 2002-03. In March 2002, at least 100 people were killed in Tepi in the southwest, while in a similar incident in Sidama, in the south, at least 60 protesters were killed at Loqee, near Hawassa city, 250 km South Addis Ababa, in May 2002 (Hameso, 2004: 175; BBC News, Africa, May 25 & July 16, 2002). The Anuak in the Gambella regional state also experienced violent acts in 2003. The Human Rights Watch (HRW) and several other organizations have consistently reported on the human rights violations committed by the Ethiopian government against the Anuak community (Human Rights Watch, March 2005). For example, HRW reported the Ethiopian government's "forced villagization–the resettling of indigenous people from land that is being leased for commercial agriculture," that led to the relocation of an "estimated 70,000 people" in the region (Human Rights Watch, August 28, 2012; *The Guardian*, August 21, 2012). In the south, the Konso people were viciously beaten by the EPRDF security forces when they peacefully protested several times (Seyoum, *Addis Standard*, April 25, 2016). In the Amhara regional state, many people were killed in Gondar and Bahr Dar cities, in the northeast, in 2016, while protesting the EPRDF rule. The Amhara are the second largest ethnic group.

In Oromia, the resistance has become stronger every time the regime has attempted to suppress it by force. The recent protests, which engulfed the country and overwhelmed the regime, have shattered the regime's narrative of stability and rosy economic development. The state's violent acts to suppress the 2014-2016 protests had culminated in an attack on the Oromo participants of the *Irreecha* festival near Bishoftu city south of Addis Ababa on October 2, 2016 (Bulcha, September 2017). The incident led to injury and death of hundreds, probably thousands, of people. When surveillance, mass arrests and killings failed to calm down the protesters, the *Irreecha*-day massacre was followed by a state of emergency declared on October 9, 2016. The state of emergency restricted constitutional rights of citizens and put civil administration under a military Command Post for ten months. When the state of

emergency was lifted in August 2017, the peaceful protests resumed immediately. The *Qeerroo* declared boycott of markets. Since October 11, the protests have gained new momentum. Clearly, authoritarianism, state violence and imposition of the state of emergencies will not end the protests (*The Economist*, October 13, 2016).

As the protests became uncontrollable, the EPRDF regime faced the dilemma of how to attract investors and achieve an economic miracle without democracy in the face of persistent protests. Some foreign investors were leaving or cancelling their plans to invest there. Tourism, which is expected to generate substantial foreign currency earnings, is also affected.[13] For this reason, the highly publicized economic miracle, which is apparently a myth than a miracle, is fading. But more importantly, the survival of the regime itself at immediate risk. To avert this, in mid-February 2018, the Prime Minister Haile Marian Desalegn has resigned and another state of emergency was imposed for six months. In the meantime, the EPRDF has engaged in a series of meetings and finally installed Dr. Abiy Ahmed as the Prime Minister on April 2, 2018. During the first few months, the new prime minister promised new reforms and normalization of relations with neighboring Eritrea. These events earned him wide recognition in including the the winning of the 2019 Noble peace Prize. But the old political traditions of repression returned quickly. Internal conflicts and displacements, arrests of political opponents, lack peace and security continued to characterize the Abiy Ahmed's government.

Conclusion

This paper showed how the contradictory stories of success and failure, double-digit economic growth and mass protests, respectively, of Ethiopia are both related to each other. On one side, the ruling party took aggressive, very corrupt measures to achieve economic growth, while on the other, massively violating basic human rights, including property rights. The transfer of land to domestic and foreign investors involved widespread eviction of local farmers and pastoralists. To facilitate the land grab, the government attacked all opposition political groups—imprisoned, killed, and

exiled their leaders and supporters. But such attempt to achieve economic growth with democracy backfired leading mass protests that eventually toppled the TPLF/EPRDF government in 2018.

Besides the mass protests, the EPRDF developmental state policy also faced other challenges. Ethiopia lacked some of the essential elements that made developmentalist states successful elsewhere, for example, an independent technocratic elite which is shielded away from politics, and which has the space to develop national economic policies. Instead, corrupt party officials ran the show and amassed undeserved wealth while competent intellectuals and technocrats had left the country in droves. Second, Ethiopia also lacks strong independent business class that can collaborate with the state. The small and emerging business elite is too weak and too dependent on the state. The emerging business elite is squeezed, manipulated and starved of capital by the state. Third, Ethiopia is a complex multi-ethnic polity where the technocratic and business elite could very easily be pulled apart by their ethnic affiliations. In fact, so far, the successful developmental states have a single majority ethnic group. For this reason, it is not clear whether the elite of a minority ethnic group in a multi-ethnic polity like Ethiopia could have implemented a successful developmental state without becoming total dictatorships. Apparently, TPLF's dictatorial instincts were rooted in its ethnic minority status, and the fear of losing it all—power and wealth—if they opened-up the political process to genuine democracy. This ultimately led to its downfall.

The lesson of the TPLF tragedy is, therefore, achieving a broad based economic growth is unlikely without democratic institutions that creates political stability and allows a fair and equitable distribution of resources. But Ethiopia lacks both. Without democracy, TPLF attempts to achieve sustainable economic growth faced mass protests and its demise.

Finally, the TPLF/EPRDF claim of achieving economic miracle was based on unexamined statistical data probably massaged by regime's experts to provide legitimacy for the regime. But the claims were unmatched by the harsh social and economic realities that citizens experienced daily. Whatever economic gains resulting from of the developmental sate policies were not shared with working population at large. High rate of youth unemployment, violations of

human rights, and ethnic dissatisfactions, especially the Oromo, fueled the anti-government protests.

The demand for change by dissatisfied protesters led to the resignation of Prime Minister Haile Mariam Desalegn and forced his successor, Dr. Abiy Ahmed, to promise reforms at the beginning of tenure of office. But recent developments, including the decision to postpone the national election indefinitely, high stake controversy with Egypt over the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), the assassination of Haacaaluu Hundeessa, popular artist, and subsequent mass unrest—especially in Oromia—and the detention of prominent Oromo political leaders and thousands of ordinary citizens have shredded any hope of successful transition to genuine democracy. In this context, while the protests continue the fate of the developmental state is doomed.

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The Coup Plot of Brigadier General Taddasa Birru: Oromo Attempt to Take Political Power in November 1966

Biratu Kenei Aga

Methods and Sources

The paper is based on the critical analysis and interpretation of archival documents and oral sources. The 'Trial Document of the Leaders of the MTSHA', of which General Taddasa was the first accused, is the major archival source for this study. The document contains the testimonies of witnesses which were given during the Trial process. The testimonies were mainly accounts of the contents of General Taddasa's speeches on various stages of the MTSHA. They are useful to understand the intentions of General Taddasa. Oral sources obtained from individuals who took part in the coup plot and those with intimate knowledge were also invaluable sources for this study. In addition to the trial document and oral sources, the available secondary sources were also examined. Both oral and written sources were cross-checked for accuracy.

Background Causes

The MTSHA was established in 1963 to challenge the discriminatory policy of the Imperial regime against the Oromo. Its founders wanted to improve the declining material and social life of the Oromo through the mobilization of its human and material resources.[1] They brought together their individual efforts under the coordination of the MTSHA when it was formally established.[2]

1 Mekuria Bulcha, 2011, pp. 531-532. Before the actual formation of the MTSHA there were attempts among the Oromo to come together in different forms of associations. Accordingly, the Oromo youth also formed the Afran Qalloo and Biiftuu Ganamoo Musical groups in Dirre Dawa in the 1960s to promote Oromo culture.

2 *Informants*: *Obbo* Abera Mekonnen, *Obbo* Gugsa Mekonnen.

Similar observation brought General Taddasa to the Association. At least since the 1960 coup, there were several issues which continued to provoke General Taddasa until he joined the MTSHA. After the coup, Oromo military officers were suspected of disloyalty though they contributed to foiling it.[3] It was circulated that their number in the military should be reduced.[4]

After the death of General Tsige following the coup, many did not expect that the police commissioner would be brought from other office, outside the police, in the view of General Taddasa's long service, experience and contributions during the 1960 coup.[5] It is reported that as a veteran of anti- Fascist resistance, he felt betrayed when he observed his position in comparison with other authorities who held higher positions. By 1963 General Taddasa realized that he was subjected to covert discrimination.[6]

After General Taddasa had joined the MTSHA, his actions and deeds seemed to have been influenced by the Salaalee resistance tradition. Resistance was a celebrated tradition among the Salaalee Oromo in northern Shawa, in which the main concern was not the outcome of the action but the determination to resist what was felt to be unacceptable. According to this custom, under normal circumstance, a person might not seem to be a critic of the existing situation. But once felt offended he would react violently which could surprise others as if he were a different person.[7]

The government was not happy with the establishment of the MTSHA from the very beginning. Initially it refused to give legal recognition. Attempts were made to hinder the movements of the

3 *Informants*: Colonel Sahilu Birri, *Obbo* Taye Badhaadhaa. See also Mohammed Hassen, "General Taddessee Birru, 1921-1975," *Goota Oromiyaa*, 2008, pp.333-334; See also Olana Zoga, p.12.

4 Olana Zoga, pp.12-13; see also Baxter, 1996, p.77; *Barruulee Gadaa, Lakk.1*, November, 1992, pp.4-8. The *Bulletin* made an interview with Colonel Alamu Qitessa.

5 *Informant:* Colonel Sahilu Birri. The Police Commission came to have two or three deputies.

6 Mohammed Hassen, "General Taddessee Birru, 1921-1975," in *Goota Oromiyaa…*, 2008, pp.336-337. My informant, a family member, however, contends that he had no any wish for higher positions.

7 *Informant*: *Obbo* Teshome Kebede, *Obbo* Kabada Sime, *Obbo* Amantee Gizachew. This is, however, not limited to Salaalee only.

Association. Its activities in the Arsi region outraged the Imperial government. It was just after the Itayya meeting of 1966 that the idea of resisting the regime was born in the mind of General Taddasa. His persistent question after joining the Association was that: '**Why the numerically large Oromo was dominated by a political minority? (**Then the Oromo were estimated to be around 17 million, while the politically dominant ethnic group was estimated to be around five million'). General Taddasa believed that the Oromo were dominated because of their lack of unity, lack of education and lack of political power**.**

It was the domination and exploitation of the Oromo which inspired General Taddasa for joining the MTSHA and continuous provocations pushed him to become more aggressive and radical. After the Dheeraa meeting in 1966, the leaders of the MTSHA had learned through their own intelligence that the regime had decided to crush them after the end of the coronation ceremony of the Emperor on November 2, 1966 (*Tikimt* 23, 1959 *A.M.*). This situation forced General Taddasa to take his own measure before he became a victim of the inevitable assault of the government. General Taddasa and other leaders did not have other options except to take prompt action of their own. Thus a preparation began to be made by coordinating the Association's members within the armed forces.[8] General Taddasa was unwilling to be a victim of his own opponents without attempting his own actions.

When he came under immense pressure from the government after the Dheeraa meeting, General Taddasa was left with two options; either to sit down and accept whatever would come from the government or to resist and die with dignity. It happened that he took the second option, as this was the most favored in the Salaalee tradition, despite its grave consequences. Therefore, even if General Taddasa knew that his plot could result in grave consequences, he attempted to assassinate the Emperor[9]

I. Preparation and the goal of the Coup Plot

After the Dheeraa incident, the MTSHA appealed to the Emperor for protection against governmental attacks. The leaders of the

8 Olana Zoga, pp.118-119.

9 *Informants*: Colonel Sahilu Birru, Dr Moggaa Firrisaa.

Association asked the Emperor in their letter: "What wrong we did to your throne and that of your fathers beginning from *Ras* Goobanaa to those officers who foiled the 1960 coup?"[10] With no response from the Emperor, General Taddasa was convinced that the Emperor himself was a major obstacle which had to be removed by force.[11] As a result, the idea of the physical elimination of the Emperor was prioritized.[12]

Lapiso G. Dilebo argues that General Taddasa targeted the Emperor from the assumption that,"*የዓሣ ግማቱ ከጭንቅላቱ"(* A fish rots from the head*)* because he was the symbol of the regime.[13] The Emperor was hoped to create big chaos in the imperial establishment. In other words, once that symbol was attacked it was hoped that the regime would collapse and create a suitable condition for the success of the plot.

The preparation was made in the meetings held in the house of General Taddasa just beginning from the aftermath of the Dheeraa incident. In other words, there were secret meetings held in the house of General Taddasa including the one on November 1, 1966. It seems that General Taddasa had already discussed the issue with his close circles and ordered the purchase of weapons to be used for the operation.[14] Later, in the Trial Document, he was accused of establishing and leading a secret rebellious organization within the legally established MTSHA.[15]

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10 IES MS: 1091, The Petition of the MTSHA to the Imperial Government written on *Tikmit* 16, 1959 *A.M*.

11 Mohammed Hassen, 1997, p. 219; Thomas Zitelmann, "Macca and Tulama" in *Encyclopedia Aethiopica*, Vol.3, p. 619.

12 Mohammed Hassen, "General Taddesse Birru, 1921-1975", in *Goota Oromiyaa*, 2008, p.352; See also Mohammed Hassen, 1997, pp.219-220.

13 Laphiso G. Dilebo, *Ya'Itiyopiya Ya'Gabar Sirihatina Jimir Capitalism, 1900-1966 A.M* (Addis Ababa: Commercial Printing Press), 1983 *A.M*, pp.271-272.

14 Tadese Tele Salvano, *Gedle Mefenqile Mengist BeItiyophiya*, 1953 E.C, 2004 *A.M*, p.8.

15 'The Trial Document of the Leaders of the MTSHA', p. 438. He was accused of planning to divide the country along ethnic lines to cause bloodshed as it was seen in Nigeria and Congo.

According to my informant, the house of General Taddasa had often served as a meeting place which even forced his family members to live in the service rooms. Particularly after the Dheera meeting, it is reported that, his compound looked like a military camp as it was frequented by groups of people who came one after another.[16]

General Taddasa was trying to convince the Oromo members of the army to support the cause of their own people in the inevitable conflict with the government. Accordingly, many Oromo members of the Police Rapid Force and some members of the Air Force were recruited to be involved in the coup. My informant, who was one of the key members of the Association from the air force, claims to have participated in one of the meetings of the MTSHA and energized the participants that there was nothing to fear if action was needed. It was hoped that the Oromo members of the air force from Bishooftuu were ready to cooperate while in Baalee there was Waaqoo Guutuu, who was already in battle with the regime. Brigadier General Dawit Abdii was expected to mobilize members the Artillery Division of the Ground Forces while Brigadier General Taddasa could mobilize members of the *Fetno Derash* Police and the Territorial Army. It was expected that the Oromo were capable of taking action if they were able to coordinate these forces.[17] General Taddasa hoped that Brigadier General Jagamaa Kelloo and Major General Waaqjiraa Sardaa could involve in the coup.[18]

After the completion of a hurriedly made preparation, a meeting was held on November 1, 1966 (*Tikimt* 22, 1959 *A.M*.) in the house of General Taddasa. Regarding the nature of the meeting and the list of those who attended it, there is a slight difference among the sources. According to Olana Zoga, the leading participants under the chairmanship of General Taddasa were *Dajjazmach* Kebede Bizunesh, Ketema Yifru, *Dajjazmach* Daniel Abebe, Lt. Mamo Mazamir, Dr. Moggaa Firrisaa, Bekele Mekonnen, Tesfaye Dagaagaa and other members of the armed forces. In the meeting, according to Olana Zoga, it was agreed to take action against the Emperor the next morning when he would come to St. George

16 *Informant*: *Aadde* Tsehay Taddasa .
17 *Informant*: Captain Lemma Guyyaa,
18 *Informant*: *Obbo* Lubee Birru.

Church for his coronation ceremony. In the confusion that would follow this incident, it was hoped to take political power with the support of other members of the army. It is reported that after a lengthy discussion, General Taddasa gave orders to those who would take actions. Accordingly, it was decided that soldier Camadaa Sabbooqaa was ordered to throw the first bomb and others would follow him thereafter.[19]

According to an informant, the daughter of General Taddasa, however, *Dajjazmach* Daniel Abebe and Ketema Yifru came together and left together after discussing with her father. According to this informant, both of them did not come to attend the meeting but because General Taddasa refused to go to the Palace. It is reported that there was a phone call from the palace on the morning of November 1, 1966 (*Tikimt* 22, 1959 *A.M.*). But he refused to pick up the phone and ordered my informant to respond that he was not at home. Upon telling his absence at home, my informant received a message that 'he should come to the palace immediately'. General Taddasa heard it but refused to go. It was after this event that the two authorities went to his house and my informant does not believe that there was a meeting in the house on the specified date. It is claimed that General Taddasa was alone in his compound on this date and ordered his family members not to respond to any phone call and not to open the gate to anyone. It was shortly after the phone message from the Palace that Ketema Yifru and *Dajjazmach* Daniel Abebe arrived at his home. When they knocked at the gate, my informant opened and admitted them inside knowing that Ketema Yifru was sent from the palace. My informant thought that General Taddasa would be happy to talk to them because they were higher officials. However, it happened that he was not interested to meet both of them at the time. This was made clear later after their departure because he asked my informant why she violated his order and allowed them to enter.[20].

19 Olana Zoga, pp.118-119.

20 *Informant*: *Aadde* Tsehay Taddasa. This contradicts with the account of other informant (Dr. Moggaa Firrisaa), who claimed to have participated in the secret meeting and moved out with General Taddasa during the coup. According to this view, both Ketema and *Dajjazmach* Daniel had participated in the secret meeting held in the house of

According to my informant, the two individuals met and discussed with General Taddasa in her presence. But both of them had different messages for him. Accordingly, Ketema Yifru told him that the Emperor wanted to see him immediately in the palace because His Majesty wanted to know those who offended him by circulating rumors about the inferiority of the Oromo.[21] Ketema added that since the Emperor had the understanding of his feelings he was ready to listen to his grievances and punish those who were responsible for disseminating this false propaganda. In short, he advised him to go to the palace.[22]

Dajjazmach Daniel, however, insisted that he should not go to the palace. My informant claims that he even warned General Taddasa in strong terms saying: "አትሂድ ልገሉህ ነዉ። እዚያ ቤቴመንግስት ስትሄድ ልይዙህና ልገሉህ ነዉ የሚጠሩህ። እዚያ ሄደህ ከምትሞት እኔ እዚሁ እቤትህ ዉስጥ ብገልህ ይሻላል አትሀድ!"(Do not go; they will kill you. Why they call you to the Palace is to arrest you and kill you. It is better if I kill you here in your house if you prefer to go and die there. Do not go*)*. *Dajjazmach* Daniel clearly warned General Taddasa not to go to the palace. Eventually, the two individuals left when General Taddasa refused to go to the palace. According to my informant both came to the house at midday, not in the afternoon. [23]

According to my informant, therefore, there was no meeting in the house of General Taddasa on the eve of the coronation ceremony that brought all the aforementioned participants together. However, the daughter of the General Taddasa, did not know what had happened in the compound outside the house. She knew that people came to their compound in group one after the other to meet with her father. Ketema Yifru and *Dajjazmach* Daniel, however, came together and left together. [24]

Therefore, though there is a claim that both Ketema Yifru and *Dajjazmach* Daniel spent the evening with General Taddasa until 11

General Taddasa and remained with him even after he left his house until almost mid night.

21 As it is discussed, General Taddasa was provoked by some circulating false stories that make the Oromo inferiority to even domestic animals.

22 *Informant*: *Aadde* Tsehay Taddasa.

23 *Ibid.*

24 *Infromant*: *Aadde* Tsehay Taddasa.

pm and returned home to prepare what was to be broadcasted on the media following the success of the coup[25], it is difficult to accept it. It was true that both went to the house of General Taddasa. This was also confirmed by the testimony of Colonel Alemu who had met both of them there.[26] But they returned soon and did not move with General Taddasa to the Pipineta Hotel. For example, Bekele Mekonnen who joined General Taddasa later in the Pipineta Hotel does not mention the presence of Ketema Yifru and *Dajjazmach* Daniel in the hotel.[27]

According to another informant, who was selected to take the first action during the coup, however, there was a brief meeting held in the house of General Taddasa. On this meeting, key members of the army were selected and given responsibility to take the necessary action against the Emperor at St George Church and other suitable areas with the use of hand grenades and automatic weapons. Those members of the army who were selected for the action were Camadaa Sabbooqaa and Lammeessaa Boruu from the *Fetno Derash* Police, Hagari Tulluu from the Imperial Bodyguard and soldier Haile Mariam Diimaa.[28] Indeed, soldier Camadaa Sabbooqaa and Hagari Tulluu were the most reliable confidants of General Taddasa from the members of the army.[29]

Through the coup plot, General Taddasa had the intention to make regime change. By making the regime change, he wanted to reform the oppressive land tenure system and create equitable educational and economic opportunities at the national level. In other words, he wanted to establish a kind of government that would implement equal and uniform distribution of land ownership,

25 *Informant*: Dr.Moggaa Firrisaa. See also Olana Zoga, p. 120. However, close assessment of the sources does not show that both Ketema Yifru and *Dajjazmach* Daniel spent the night in the Pipineta Hotel around Buraayyuu.

26 See the 'Trial Document of the Leaders of the MTSHA'- the Testimony of Colonel Alamu Qixxeessaa, p. 330

27 See the 'Trial Document of the Leaders of the MTSHA'- the Testimony of Bekele Mekonnen, p.72.

28 I*nformant*: Hulluuqaa Baabsoo. His name was Camadaa Sabbooqaa when he was serving as a member of the Police Emergency Force.

29 *Informant*: *Obbo* Lubee Birru.

educational services and other opportunities.[30] The coup plot aimed to take state power because General Taddasa, and other leaders of the Association, knew very well that politics is mainly about the control of state power.[31] He knew very well that the authorities used the state power in their hands to oppress and exploit others.[32]

Had the coup succeeded, it was probably the first Oromo attempt to take political power. This was understandable from the statement prepared to be read on the radio, proposed cabinet members and flag. According to an informant, if the coup became successful, there was a statement prepared and recorded to be read on the radio. My informant claims to have heard the opening part of the statement when it was checked on a tape recorder in his presence. It was read,

> *ይህ የኦሮሞ ነጻነት ድምፅ ነው። የኦሮሞ ነጻነት በዚህን ሰዓት ለመቶ ዓመታት ተቀምቶ የነበረውን አገሩን እንደገና መልሶ በእጁ ማስገባቱን እናስታውቃለን። ጃንሆይ ተወግዶዋል። ከአሁኑ ሰዓት ጀምሮ መንግስትን የሚመራዉ ነፃነት የተባለዉ የኦሮሞ ድርጅት ነዉ። በየቦታውና በየጠቅላይ ግዛቱ ያላችው በሙሉ ከዚህ የሚከተለውን አዋጅና ደንብ ተከትላችው በያላችውበት በጸጥታና በሰላም በአዲሱ መንግስት እንድትመሩ እናስታውቃለን።....*
>
> *This is the voice of Oromo Liberation. At this time, the Oromo Liberation has taken over its country which it has been denied for a century. Janhoy [the Emperor] was eliminated. From now on the government would be led by an Oromo organization known as Liberation. All of you who are in the provinces and other places are requested to be led under the new government in a stable*

30 'The Trial Document of the Leaders of the MTSHA," pp. 400-401; Gemechu Taye, pp. 21-22.

31 Mohammed Hassen, *CMI-Report*, pp.30-3; Asafa Jalata, "Oromumma: Nationalism in Transition or Stagnation?" in: *OSA Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Conference: Prospects and Challenges of the Oromo National Struggle for Freedo, Cultural, Economy and Political Factors*, edited by Ezekiel Gebissa, 2002, p. 16.

32 Asafa Jalata and Mohammed Hassen, 2014, p.54.

> *and peaceful manner accepting the following rules and regulations….*[33]

The intention of General Taddasa was to make a regime change by targeting the Emperor. For example, some of the documents found in the hands of Lt Mamo Mazamir contain the plan to write a new constitution and prepare a new land reform that would enable tenants to own land.[34] With the intention to form a new government in mind, it is reported that, General Taddasa had a list of educated Oromo and some of them were short listed as cabinet members of the new government.[35]

According to the various documents that were found in the hands of Lt Mamo Mazamir during the police investigation, some of the proposed cabinet members were as follows:

1. General Taddasa Birru- as President
2. Yilma Dheeressaa- as Prime Minister
3. General Abebe Gammadaa – as Minister of Interior
4. General Jagamaa Kelloo-as Minister of Defense
5. *Dajjazmach* Kebede Bizunesh- as Minister of Agriculture
6. Bulchaa Dammaqsaa -as Minister of Finance
7. Ketema Yifru, to remain where he was, as a Minister of Foreign Affairs
8. Qana'aa Gumaa- as Minister of Justice
9. Amanuel Abreham -as Minister of Education.[36]

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33 *Ibid.* According to this informant, the statement was prepared in group but it was brought to where he was through Basazinehu Baayisaa and Dhinsaa Leephisaa.

34 The Trial Document of the leaders of the MTSHA, p. 400.

35 *Informant*: Bulchaa Dammaqsaa.

36 'The Trial Document of the Leaders of the MTSHA', P. 398. Whether General Taddasa had discussed this issue with the nominees or not is, however, unclear. According to the Trial Document (p. 274), when he personally gave his words to the court, Lt Mamo argued that the police did not get the paper that contained the list of proposed cabinet members from his house but forced him to write the list in the face of extreme torture while in prison. According to the sixth witness, Lt Colonel Mekonnen Wolde Dawit (the police officer who captured him), the paper that contained the list of new proposed cabinet

In addition to the new cabinet proposal, the coup plotters had the intention to hoist their own **Oromo flag** based on the Gada philosophy instead of the existing Imperial flag. Accordingly, the new proposed flag had three colors drawn horizontally: black on the top, red in the middle and white in the bottom lines.[37] In short, the colors were Black, Red and White instead of the existing Green, Yellow and Red. The new proposed flag and the order of the colors had their own meaning in the Oromo philosophical view within the Gada System.

It is reported that General Taddasa had interest in the documentation of Oromo history[38] and he was seen looking for documents and books written on the Oromo people.[39] The documents found in the house of Lt Mamo, but confiscated by the police and presented against him as evidence in the court, reveal that there was a grand plan to make a broader study on the history, political, social, economic and other aspects of the Oromo people and the country in general. For this purpose, according to the document presented as evidence, a committee was established to carry out the study. Some of the members of the committee included: Seifu Tesema, Tesfaye Dagaagaa, Moosisaa Mazamir [probably Lt. Mamo Mazamir], Dhinsaa Leephisaa Abbaa Joobir, Bekele Melse Abbaa Joobir, Guutuu Ejjetaa and Adane Magarsaa. Some of their tasks were to:

1. collect and document Oromo history
2. explain the existing conditions of the Oromo in political and economic terms. These include land ownership, educational status, health services, power share, cultural and social development of the Oromo people.

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members was found from the pockets of Lt Mamo. See 'The Trial Document of the Leaders of the MTSHA', pp. 50-51. According to an informant, *Obbo* Bulchaa Dammaqsaa, General Taddasa had the list of educated Oromo whom he knew.

37 'The Trial Document of the leaders of the MTSHA,' p.50, 399.

38 Merera Gudina, *YeItiyophiya Polotika Misqilqil Guzo ena Yehiyiwote Tizitawoch: KeItiyophiya Temariwoch Niqinaqe Iske EPRDF*, 2005 *A.M*, p.56

39 *Informant*: *Obbo* Bulchaa Dammaqsaa.

3. analyze the prevailing administrative system, justice system and the parliament structure.
4. dispatch annual news and reports about the activities of the MTSHA every six months
5. criticize or recognize the political figures of the country since the time of Emperor Menilek II.[40]
6. look into how the Prime Minster was elected
7. examine the existing hatred against the Oromo people
8. document the biographies of the Oromo figures.[41]

II. The failure of the Plot and the punishment of General Taddasa

The movement of General Taddasa was already under security surveillance. The security office had planted agents who closely reported the progress of the meeting held in the house of General Taddasa. Hence, some of the participants were captured while returning home after taking the mission to be carried out the next morning. Accordingly, Seifu Tesema, Haile Mariam Diimaa and Fiitumaa Hiiksaa were captured that evening.[42]

General Taddasa moved to Buraayyuu area and spent the night there in the Pipineta Hotel.[43] Camadaa Sabbooqaa was able to escape.[44] With the arrest of the key members of the plot, the security agents took preemptive measures to foil the planned coup. Accordingly, they delayed the arrival of the Emperor at the scene up to 10 am and made strict control in the area. The security became so tight that soldier Camadaa was unable to carry out the mission

40 'The Trial Document of the leaders of the MTSHA', pp.397-398. These political figures who were either to be recognized or criticized based on their deeds include Emperor Menilek II, *Fitawrari* Habte Giorgis, *Ras* Goobanaa, *Lij* Iyasu, Emperor Haile Selassie I, *Ras* Mesfin Sileshi, *Ras* Abebe Aregay, General Merid Mengesha, General Kebede Gebre, General Isayias Gebre Selassie, General Jagamaa Kelloo, and the Sons and Grandsons of *Ras* Kassa, who grabbed the land of the Salaalee Oromo.

41 'The Trial Document of the leaders of the MTSHA', pp.397-398. However, it remained a plan because of the failure of the plot.

42 Olana Zoga, p.121.

43 Olana Zoga, p.120; *Informant*: Dr Moggaa Firrisaa.

44 *Informan*t: *Obbo* Hulluuqaa Baabsoo.

assigned to him though he managed to reach there. Moreover, other soldiers who got the opportunities wasted them while waiting for the first assigned to begin the assault.[45]

In the early morning of November 2, from the Pipineta Hotel, General Taddasa with Tesfaye Dagaagaa, Dr. Moggaa Firrisaa and Bekele Mekonnen went up a hill in the temporary commanding centre while *Dajjazmach* Kebede went to Walmaraa to distribute weapons to his followers and to make preparation for armed struggle. Though General Taddasa waited until 10 am from his commanding centre around Kattaa area, there was nothing heard. He began to feel that the coup failed. My informant claims that he was sent to clarify what had happened and to report back. While my informant was carrying out this mission, he was surrounded by the security forces but managed to escape to Walmaraa to meet *Dajjazmach* Kebede. While the security forces were chasing him he was joined by Dajane Booji'aa, another determined member of the MTSHA. When both reached Walmaraa they found *Dajjazmach* Kebede distributing weapons to his followers.[46]

Having heard nothing about what had happened; General Taddasa moved to the direction of his house, around Kolfe Atena Tera, to see what was happening there. He saw from a distance that there were people under the fence of his house which he believed that they came to kill him. He sent Bekele Mekonnen to clarify what had happened around his home. When Bekele entered the house, he met religious leaders, Abune Tewoflos and Abba Habte Mariam, who hurriedly asked him the whereabouts of General Taddasa. His compound was also surrounded by the security forces but Bekele was able to disappear from the area immediately. When General Taddasa was assured that his family members were not hurt, his group preferred to remain in the forest being dispersed. [47]

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45 Olana Zoga, pp.122-123.

46 *Informant:* Dr. Moggaa Firrisaa; Olana Zoga, pp. 120-125.

47 'The Trial Document of the Leaders of the MTSHA'- 18th Witness-Bekele Mekonnen, pp.71-74; IES MS: 1091, *18th Witness*, Bekele Mekonnen. What happened in the gun fire around his home was that his *guddifacha* son, Kasa, killed a policeman when the police entered the house and abused him. General Taddasa was able to learn later that no member of his family was hurt.

Around 1 pm, however, heavy gun fire was heard around his house. At this time, they gathered again around General Taddasa to discuss what to do. He thought that the firing around his home had targeted his children and vowed to go and die with them. Though he was prohibited from going back, he was deeply offended; became sick and even could not speak for a while out of extreme anger. [48]

The Emperor's safe return to his place confirmed the failure of the coup. The Emperor was not harmed and it was heard on the radio that he safely returned to his palace. Those who were assigned to take actions could not carry out their mission due to the tight control of the security. Action takers were assigned in three different areas. The main site of operation was St George Cathedral where the coronation ceremony took place. The security forces used different mechanisms to avoid the ensuing danger. Accordingly, they tightened the security control; delayed the time of the arrival of the Emperor on the site and then kept the crowd at a distance. Therefore, it became impossible to take action at St George Church. The second chosen place was at Arat Kilo before he entered the Parliament and finally inside the Parliament building when he delivered a speech. At all three places, it was not possible to take action and the Emperor was able to return safely to his Palace. It was when the news of the safe return of the Emperor was heard on the radio that many who were waiting for the news learnt that the coup had failed without any attempt.[49]

The coup plot failed even before it was attempted. It failed partly because the leaders of the MTSHA were not mentally prepared for an armed uprising from the very beginning within such a short period of time.[50] It was the fast moving events which forced General Taddasa to confront with little preparation. Informants attribute the

48 'The Trial Document of the Leaders of the MTSHA'- 18th Witness-Bekele Mekonnen, pp.71-74; IES MS: 1091, *18th Witness*, Bekele Mekonnen.

49 *Informant*: *Obbo* Lubee Birru.

50 *Informants*: Colonel Sahilu Birri, Dr. Moggaa Firrisaa**.** Even though the Coup Plot of General Taddasa was foiled before it was attempted, what is more important is not whether it had succeeded or failed but the attempt itself and its implications. It was probably the first organized coup attempt by the Oromo against the Imperial regime.

failure of the coup plot to the poorly and hurriedly prepared plan. In fact, even this hurriedly prepared plan was not hidden from the security agents as they were closely following it. Moreover, there was no contingency plan as an alternative if the first option failed. Because of these situations my informants came to consider the coup plot as a rashly attempted act of self-suicide by General Taddasa.[51]

General Taddasa did not have enough time to prepare a better plan because he was quickly pushed into this situation by the provocative and intolerable behaviors of the authorities. Despite his expectation and hope, people were not mobilized to the level he wanted because of several decades of subjugation and exploitation. Moreover, at the time, there was no other means of mobilizing the people except through his moving speeches during the meetings of the Association. This was because the mass was almost illiterate and there was no newspaper, radio, TV or social media at the time to reach them.[52]

Once he had learnt that the coup had failed, General Taddasa did not want to surrender and hence, began his movement to Walmaraa.[53] His team remained in the forest the whole day and travelled to Walmaraa during the night. The team was a group of four: General Taddasa, Bekele Mekonnen, Tesfaye Dagaagaa and Argaa. They reached Walmaraa the next morning but they could not meet *Dajjazmach* Kebede. They found and met only Waamii Araddoo.[54]

The reason why General Taddasa had decided to move to Walmaraa was that many of his family members were taken there.

51 *Informants*: *Obbo* Bulchaa Dammaqsaa, Teshome Gebre-Mariam Bokan. In fact, General Taddasa knew very well about this from his experience of few years earlier during the 1960 coup that the failure of such a coup plot would bring disastrous consequences for the plotters, they were hanged publicly.

52 *Informants*: Colonel Sahilu Birru, Dr Moggaa Firrisaa.

53 Olana Zoga, pp.124-125. According to my informant, Hailu Gebru, General Taddasa brought Kasa, his *guddifacha* son, from Salaalee.

54 'The Trial Document of the Leaders of the MTSHA'- 18th Witness- Bekele Mekonnen, pp.71-74; 40th Witness- Waamii Araddoo, pp.135-136; IES MS: 1091, 18th *Witness*, Bekele Mekonnen.

More importantly, he had to meet and discuss with *Dajjazmach* Kebede on what to do next.[55]

Thus, he moved to Walmaraa to meet *Dajjazmach* Kebede. From Walmaraa he continued his movement to Meettaa under the guidance of Waamii Araddoo. When they reached Fo'ataa around the evening, General Taddasa became exhausted. His companions, Bekele Mekonnen and Tesfaye Dagaagaa entered a village and requested food pretending as if they came to buy land because they were carrying guns and wanted to avoid suspicion. They were given dinner; gathered their energy and continued their journey to Ada'aa Bargaa.[56]

It was on the third day of difficult travel that General Taddasa and his group reached the house of Abbaa Jifaar, which was located to the north of Ejeree (Addis Alam) town in the locality of Cirrachaa, after midnight. Upon reaching there, they found Asfaw Abdii, one of Abbaa Jifaar's dependents, who gave them a separate room to sleep. Abbaa Jifaar was informed of their coming only in the morning.[57] Later when Abbaa Jifaar himself was informed of their arrival, he came and greeted General Taddasa but asked him of why he ascended all the way up the hill, the terrain which was difficult even for a car. General Taddasa responded that he came all the way to seek his support hoping that he would help him in sending messengers to Gindabarat to mobilize the people against the regime.[58] In order to convince Abbaa Jifaar, General Taddasa was said to have remarked, "…አማራ ከድንጋይ ዉስጥ ወጥተዉ አባቶቻችንን ፈጅተዉ እኛንም ይጨቁናል፡፡ይኼም ሹማምሌ ንጉስ እነርሱን ነዉ የሚረዳዉ፡፡"(Emerging out of stones, the Amhara killed our fathers

55 *Informants*: Dr. Moggaa Firrisaa, Colonel Sahilu Birri

56 'The Trial Document of the Leaders of the MTSHA," 40th Witness-Waamii Araddoo, pp. 136-137; IES MS: 1091, *40th Witness*, Waamii Araddoo; Olana Zoga, pp.130-131; IES MS 1091: *18th Witness*, Bekele Mekonnen

57 According to the existing custom, it was not usual to awaken a Qaalluu until the crowing call of a cock was heard twice because Abbaa Jifaar was a Qaalluu, traditional Oromo religious leader.

58 IES MS: 1091, *34th* Witness, Asfaw Abdi. Abbaa Jifaar was a member of the MTSHA but later he betrayed General Taddasa when he disclosed his presence in his house to the authorities and facilitated his capture.

and now they are oppressing us. This elderly Emperor also supports them).[59]

In the meantime, General Taddasa heard that *Dajjazmach* Kebede had settled the issue peacefully with the Emperor and his family was safe and no one was hurt. He was told that it was his *guddifachaa* son who killed the police during the gun fire he heard earlier.[60] It was on the evening of November 2 that Abba Habte Mariam arrived in Walmaraa and met *Dajjazmach* Kebede and the family of General Taddasa. He was sent by Princess Tenagnework who requested the coup plotters to return home before midnight and if not they were warned that the Imperial Bodyguard would be sent against them. At this point, *Dajjazmach* Kebede was provoked and vowed: "I will make here the third Maichew[61] and let her order whatever army she wants."[62] According to my informant, who was an eyewitness, Abba Habte Mariam retreated and changed his approach into begging with the use of his cross. Eventually, he was able to convince General Taddasa.[63]

Eventually after convincing *Dajjazmach* Kebede, who now felt that the coup failed, and others who were with him, Abba Habte

59 IES MS: 1091, *33rd Witness*, Abbaa Jifaar Waaqayyoo. It seems that that General Taddasa wanted to explain the fact that the Shawan Amhara kingdom came out of the mountains and gorges of Tegulet, Bulga and Menz and invaded the surrounding Oromo territories.

60 'The Trial Document of the Leaders of the MTSHA," 40th Witness-Waamii Araddoo, pp. 136-137; IES MS: 1091, *40th Witness*, Waamii Araddoo; Olana Zoga, pp.130-131; IES MS 1091: *18th Witness*, Bekele Mekonnen

61 Maichew was the battle where *Dajjazmach* Kebede distinguished himself as a known patriot of anti-Fascist resistance. He fought the Italians at Maichew, which was regarded as the first Maichew for him. His second Maichew was in Walmaraa, the site where he built his compound later, in which he killing many Italian soldiers as a guerrilla resistance fighter. Now when Abba Habte Mariam warned him to return, he vowed to make the third Maichew if the government would deploy forces against him.

62 *Informant*: Dr. Moggaa Firrisaa; Olana Zoga, p.125.

63 *Informant*: Dr. Moggaa Firrisaa. See also Olana Zoga, pp.126-127. According to an informant (Tsehay Taddasa), in addition to Abba Habte Maiam there were other persons, presumably the relatives of the Empress.

Mariam was able to take back some of the family members of General Taddasa. His reason was that Princess Tenagnework wanted the children back home because they could not endure the rural hard life. Those who returned that evening were his elder daughter, Almaz, and other two *guddifacha* sons: Tirfe and Caalaa. They were taken to the house of *Dajjazmach* Kebede after they met with Princess Tenagnework. That evening the wife of General Taddasa and other children, including my informant, remained in Walmaraa. They all returned the next morning when Abba Habte Mariam returned with *Abune* Tewoflos to take all of them, including *Dajjazamch* Kebede to the Emperor. The wife of General Taddasa was initially taken to the house of Princess Tenagnework and then to the Emperor. When she was presented to the Emperor, who knew that her father was a *Menze*, he is reported to have said to the Prime Minister: *"እሷ እኮ የኛ ናት ኢታዉቅም እንዴ? እና ታደሰ የሚጣላዉ እኮ ከራሱ ልጆች ጋር ነዉ።"*(She is ours, don't you know it? So, Taddasa is quarrelling with his own children." She was told to bring her husband back and Abba Habte Mariam was assigned to assist her in the search of his whereabouts.[64]

Likewise, the religious leaders had also convinced *Dajjazmach* Kebede that the Emperor was ready to give pardon to the leaders of the MTSHA. In his turn, when *Dajjazmach* Kebede was presented to the Emperor, he was asked, "*ምነዉ እጃችንን በእጃችን እድንበላ ታደርጉ? እርሰ በርሳችን እንባላ?እኛስ ምን በደልናችዉ?*"(Why do you make us to eat our hand with our hand? Should we have to hurt each other? What wrong we did to you?). Then he pardoned *Dajjazmach* Kebede and other leaders if they returned saying, "እስካሁን ድረስ አዉቃችሁም ሆነ ሳታዉቁ ላጠፋችሁት ጥፋት ምረት ሰጥተናል።ወደ ቤታችዉ ግቡ።*"* (For the crimes you have committed so far knowingly or unknowingly, we have given you pardon; return to your house.) *Dajjazmach* Kebede was also ordered to bring back General Taddasa.[65]

As his wife began to search for the whereabouts of her husband, rumors began to circulate that he was seen around Bishooftuu. According to this story, it was told that he was seen in Bishooftuu

64 *Informant*: *Aadde* Tsehay Taddasa. This conversation was made in the presence of my informant.

65 *Informants*: Dr. Moggaa Firrisaa, Colonel Sahilu Birri; Olana Zoga, p.128.

with the intention to cross to Arsii and then Baalee to join the armed struggle there. It was Abba Habte Mariam who was leading the search team together with the General's wife. Abba Habte Mariam attempted to include my informant into the team, but she declined when she was informed by unknown individuals that there was a plan to kill Abba Habte Mariam and take out both General Taddasa and his wife (Work-abeba) through Arsii and Baalee if he was found in that direction. When Abba Habte Mariam and Workabeba reached Bishooftuu, Lemma Guyyaa told them that the general did not come to that direction. The news that he was seen around Bishooftuu was probably fabricated to divert the attention of the security forces from the western direction taken by General Taddasa.[66] Nevertheless, the route to Arsii was carefully watched by the police because it was suspected that he could move in that direction.[67]

Though the coup plot came to an end within few days, it had several impacts. His coup plot and disappearance became talking points especially wherever people came together, including at bus station, hotels, cafeteria and other places. His rebellion boosted the moral and the conscious Oromo in general. It also encouraged those who had ignored their Oromo identity earlier to start to reaffirm themselves. It is reported that some families had even began to teach *Afaan* Oromo (Oromo language) to their own children. In general, his action boosted the moral and confidence of the Oromo who were earlier pressurized not to reflect themselves. It enabled them to come out and declare themselves as Oromo.[68] On the other side, it forced the security condition of the palace to be tightened more than ever before. The protection and security for the higher authorities had also increased significantly. The existing check points became strict; especially those leading to the city and more check points were established including entrances to Churches.[69]

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66 *Ibid.* It was at the house of Abbaa Jifaar that he reestablished his communication with *Dajjazmach* Kebede who also requested him to come back to Walmaraa.

67 'The Trial Document of the Leaders of the MTSHA," 41st Witness-Captain Amare Ishetu, p.139

68 Daniel Tefera, Dandi: *Ye'Nagaso Gidada Menged*, pp.65-66.

69 Tadese Tele Salvano, *Gedle Mefenqile Mengist 1953 E.C*, 2004 *A.M*, p.9.

In the meantime, General Taddasa reestablished his communication with *Dajjazmach* Kebede who requested him come back to Walmaraa. On Sunday he reached Walmaraa with his few followers and the next morning on *Tikimt* 28, 1959 E.C (November 9, 1966) Abune Tewoflos, Abba Habte Mariam and *Dajjazmach* Kebede came and took him to the Palace to meet the Emperor.[70] When General Taddasa was presented to the Emperor for pardon, His Majesty is said to have asked him about what had happened to him and why he refused to tell him if he was mistreated. The Emperor told him that it was because of fabricated stories that he was pushed into this situation.[71] As was expected, the Emperor told him that he had forgiven him for what he had done knowingly or unknowingly before *Tikim*t 28, 1959 *A.M*. Then General Taddasa thanked the Emperor but requested him to release *Hajji* Roobalee Turee, an important figure and organizer of the Dheeraa meeting and other elders.[72]

However, it seems that many Oromo who were happy earlier, when General Taddasa rebelled and then gave up the struggle, those who supported him were greatly disappointed. For example, Negaso heard the reaction of one of the university students: "ከእንግዲህ እኔ ኦሮሞ አይደለሁም ። በስብሰባቸዉም ላይ ሁለተኛ አልሄድም። እንደዚህ እንቁላል ያድርገኝ! ይሄ ታደሰ እንዴት እጅ ይሰጣል? ፈሪ ነዉ። (Here after I am not an Oromo. I will not go to their meeting again. Let me be like this egg [broken]! How this Taddasa surrender himself? He is coward).[73] According to an informant, many expected him to be defiant at least for months and his return within few days was found to be embarrassing.[74]

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70 IES MS: 1091, *18th Witness*, Bekele Mekonnen; Olana Zoga, pp.130-131

71 *Informant*: *Aadde* Tsehay Taddasa.

72 Olana Zoga, p.133. According to an informant (Hailu Gebru Jimaa), the Emperor still appeared to be considerate towards General Taddasa and when he learnt that his house was damaged during the police operation, he is said to have ordered one thousand birr for replacement purpose. But it did not become effective because General Taddasa himself was practically put under house arrest and was chased by the Police few days later.

73 Daniel Tefera, *Dandi: YeNegaso Menged*, p.67.

74 *Infomant*: Dr. Moggaa Firrisaa.

Though General Taddasa returned to his home through the mediation of the religious leaders, the pardon of the Emperor was broken within a few days.[75] He was provoked to react when his house was surrounded by the police. But he managed to break the siege and escape again. In general, though the coup plot of General Taddasa failed, like other coup plots in Ethiopia, it should be given recognition in the Ethiopian historiography. It was one of the unsuccessful attempts to change the Imperial regime. It took more than half a century for the Oromo to have access to political power though there are still challenges.

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IES MS: 1091, *40th Witness*, *Obbo* Waamii Araddo.

IES MS: 1091, *34th* Witness, *Obbo* Asfaw Abdi.

IES MS: 1091, *33rd Witness*, *Obbo* Abbaa Jifaar Waaqayyoo.

II. Informants with age, sex, place and date of interviews

1. Colonel Sahilu Birri, 84, M, Finfinnee, 22/03/15; 05/07/16. He was one of the founders and leaders of the MTSHA. He was its chief treasurer from the very beginning and had closely worked with General Taddasa.
2. Dr. Moga Firrisa,81, M, Finfinnee, 08/02/15; 09/08/16. He was a close follower of General Taddasa and an active member of the MTSHA.
3. *Aadde* Tsehay Taddasa, 68, F, Finfinnee, 30/03/16;13/05/16;29/07/16;10/01/18;30/04/19. She is the daughter of General Taddasa and was interviewed at different times. She is the leading oral informant with invaluable accounts. Her age is based on the last interview.

75 Olana Zoga, pp.135-138.

4. *Shambal* Lemma Guyyaa, 88, M, Bishooftuu, 09/08,16. He was a key member of the MTSHA in Bishooftuu and was a member of the Air Force there. But he is better known as an artist because of his art works.
5. *Obbo* Lubee Birru, 75, M, Finfinnee, 26,02, 19. He was a young member of the MTSHA and knew a number of issues.
6. *Obbo* Hulluuqaa Baabsoo, 81,M, Finfinnee, 05/06/17. He was a member of the *Fetno Derash* police and had a close relationship with General Taddasa. During the coup plot, he was assigned to throw the first bomb and was also helped General Taddasa to break the police siege of his house latter. He was better known as solder Camadaa.
7. *Obbo* Bekele Urgeessaa, 84, 11/11/17. He was a driver of General Taddasa since the death of General Tsige Dibu. He took the family of General Taddasa to the compound of *Dajjazmach* Kebede during the coup plot. But was sick and in bed by the time he gave this interview.
8. *W/o* Aregash Alilu., 70, Finfinne, 11/11/17. She was a wife of Bekele Urgessa, the driver of General Taddasa.
9. *Obbo* Bulchaa Dammaqsaa, 86, Laga Xaafoo, 07/03/17. He knew of the activities of General Taddasa during the Imperial regime.
10. *Obbo* Hailu Gebru Jimaa, 70/M/ Finfinnee/ 06/01/17. He met General Taddasa just before he moved to Meettaa and was a close friend of Colonel Hailu and Takka Tullu.
11. *Obbo* Muktar Hajji Tuqaa, 45, Itayyaa, 03/12/15. He has gathered oral sources on *Safuu*. He is a relative of *Hajj* Roobalee Turee, one of the key organizers of the MTSHA in Arsii, especially the one at Dheeraa.
12. *Obbo* Teshome Gebre-Mariam Bokan, 87, M, Finfinnee, 02/03/16; 17/08/16. He was the Attorney General when General Taddasa, Lieutenant Mamo and other prisoners of the MTSHA were accused. He was excluded from handling their case probably for fear of sympathy with the prisoners.

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Gender Constructs in the Gadaa System and a Discussion of Symbolic Oromo Women in Pre-20th Century Historical Accounts

Ginbar Nagara Kumsa

Introduction

Gender is a socio-cultural construction about female and male relationships in society (Scott, 1992; Oyewumi, 2006; Weeks, 1996). Gender is a crucial category which has recently emerged in the literature. Feminists are the most important gender-focused constituency and the source of most knowledge on women and gender hierarchies (Oyewumi, 2006: 314). According to Weeks (1996:377), feminist scholarship sees gender as relationships of power. As to Oyewumi (2006: 314) the feminists use gender as the explanatory model to account for women's subordination and oppression worldwide. Scott (1992:53) also explains gender which is used to theorize the issue of sexual difference with functionalist or essentialist overtones that feminists have chosen to emphasize the social connotations in contrast to the physical connotations of sex. The architectures of feminists have largely been distilled from European and American experiences and this has become grounds for feminist theory (Oyewumi, 2006: 314). Hence, gender has gone global and the link between the category of 'woman' and subordination is widely recognized.

However, gender study has also reflected different perspectives to feminist literature with endeavors made to address the topic in light of systems in various cultural and historical experiences. Literatures appear with different analytical conceptions due to the different socio-cultural contexts, religious-philosophical notions and epistemological backgrounds (Jeylan, 2004). In this regard, Mama (2006: 306) suggests that the African context is one stance which we need to ground the philosophies, lived realities, languages, popular

discourses, cultural, sexual mores of social contexts within which they are situated. Oyewumi (2006:320) also put it that the African reality needs separate interpretation outside western claims that the nature of marriage/family idiom in the people's cultures describing patron/client relationship. The feminist logic of the patriarchal nuclear family of the western type is inappropriately universalized. For example, in non-gendered societies like the Yoruba of southwestern Nigeria, the fundamental organizing principle of this society is age-based seniority in which the social ranking of a persons is based on their chronological age more than gender. Hence, the analysis, interpretation and the meanings must start with Africa and are derived from the social organization and relations of a given society paying close attention to specific cultural contexts. Scott (1992:53) has explained that it is possible to think of gender in terms of different gender systems and the relations of other categories. This study has also focused on *gadaa's* treatment and construction of gender drawn from the broader Oromo cultural and historical contexts.

On part of the Oromo, the work of Kuwee (1991); Qumbi (1989); Qabbanee (1991); Mamo (2006); Dani'el (2006) and Jeylan (2004) are which I consulted for this study and they discussed different aspects of gender particularly representations of female in *gadaa* through feminine-centered institutions (*siinqee, ateetee, qanafaa, wayyuu* and *saddeetaa)* and experiences derived as instrument. Ginbar (2010 &2016) attempted to entice women, indigenous form of feminine movement and responsible institutions, and idioms of femininity in the pre-20th century Arsii Oromo. However, albeit that *gadaa* is claimed to be formative, historic and egalitarian gender study have characterized with prevalent of competing perspective and polarized claims between universalistic feminists (Hirut, 1996; Dani'el, 2002) and *gadaa*-centered 'particularistic' (Kuwee, 1991; Qumbi, 1989); Qabbanee, 1991; Mamo, 2006; Leila, 2016). Driven through these perspectives they made disputing claim on women's status proponing as elsewhere identical subordinated class and relative better experiences under the auspices of *gadaa*. Mamoo (2006) in his discussion of land raised the most gender related impugned issues connected to, the land and economic assets. He argued that land, in Oromo concept, is property of the *gosa* (clan) administered under

collective communal customary rights of ownerships in which every person whether male and female owned the privilege of lifetime use and was inherited through the male line within the clan jurisdiction. There was no concept of land privatizationl. Concerning *gadaa*, he was explicit, males and/or females can never inherit land outside his/her *gosa* and this was to avoid interference into another clan's land, individual based access, self-interest conflict and to maintain customary collective ethos. Female non-heritance of land was to disallow or block a male married to her(husband) access to it. Moreover, this shall be further researched from the aspects of *gadaa's* mode of production. In response to feminist claim, albeit the Oromo is patriarchal dominating society and women's underrepresentation at politics and military sphere, they had deserved some better status under *gadaa* governance than since 20th century Ethiopia state politics. However, *gadaa* and gender need to be pursued further.

Gendered concepts are presentin the Oromo and *gadaa* system (Jeylan, 2004; Mamo, 2006; Dani'el, 2006; Leila, 2016). *Gadaa* is all-inclusive system of life for the Oromo to which the pre-20th century accounts of the people, including gender, form an integral unit (Ginbar, 2010). A talk about *gadaa* and gender is part of the nation's comprehensive history and cultural practices which need to be interrogated within the general framework and as basically seated, experienced and manifested. However, scholars of *gadaa* have not given balancing weight to gender as what it meant and the extent focuses given to socio-cultural, administrative-governance, legal-political, etc. The long historical account of humanity never achievewithout female/woman which constitute almost half of any population and while they become fundamental ladders, carriers and bearers of it (Hirut, 1996). This study aims to explore the foundational relationships between *gadaa* and gender and the subsequent roles of women who were raised to frontline public order in the long history of the nation.

Towards this purpose, the paper addresses as to what were female and male seated at *gadaa*, as an essential or ancillary part of the system or both at the same or different order. Where were females and males made to occupy out of the 'brain and heart system' of Oromo worldview and/ *gadaa*? Is there any link or trace of gender in the formulation or formative structure of *gadaa*?

Primarily, the idea of female and male is positioning determine. Only with the understanding of this can we get the idea of gender and an understanding about the female and male's rolein the *gadaa* system and the worldview in the Oromo tradition more broadly. G*adaa's* gender construct emanated from the manner gender is seated in *gadaa*, it is constructed in the relationships between the male and female and the general posture of their organization. Female and male were *gadaa's* positioning determines for which each was identified and where they were made to be deployed in various activities and expected for answerability. Positioning, as to my assumption, is an assignation and placement examination where and how each is seated, the sort of privilege, prerogatives, responsibilities, etc. entitlement and degrees of access both female and male identity. To conceptualize the constituencies, we need to examine those forms, attributes and manifestations that several non-human physical, non-physical and non-biological elements are subject to this arrangement and correlation.

II. Gender in Oromo Worldview

The Oromo worldview is is sympathetic to nature and in conformity with the natural order. The whole life and living from the background including gender can be conceptualized within this worldview (Gemetchu, 1998; Ginbar, 2016). As to Gemetchu and Kassem (2019) the Oromo classify different things by gender recognizing as: masculine, feminine and neuter and the entire universe is gendered, as *isaa-isii* (he-she). Gemetchu (1998) who explains the Oromo worldview the universe is comprised of two principal divisions: walaabuu *gubbaa* (the upper) fi walaabuu *goodaa* (the lower). The upper is *ruudaa*/*qolloo* (sky, God) and the lower part constituted the earth which composes the dry land and water. This division is given a gender:*ruudaa* is a father/husband and the *goodaa* is a mother/wife (Alemayehu, 2009; Dereje, 2005). Gemetchu and Kassem (2019:166) highlight that the universe is dismembered into primordial gendered halves. Such dualities are not polarities, but complementary pairs.

The Oromo creation mythology is the other area which has imparted gendered notion through the Waaqeffannaa divinities: the feminine realm, *Uumee* (the She Divinity) and the masculine, *Uumaa (*the He Divinity*).* Both *Uumee* and *uumaa* are given

feminine and masculine forms of noun continuum expressions. *Uumee-Uumaa* is a dichotomy or Oromo form of binary analogues expressing dual origins of human population amid of female and male divisions (Ginbar, 2016). In connection to this, Oromo tradition recalls whenever a strange thing is felt it is mentioned to saying as "*erga uumeen walaabuu baate dubbii akkanaa agarree hinbeeknu*"(since the creation of *uumee* out of *walaabuu* we have never seen such strange thing), feminine form of creationist view attributing reproductive to female (Dereje, 2005).The analogue further explains to denoting the earliest human creature ancestors of all were *horoo* and *hortuu*, the 'He and She' progeny (Ginbar, 2016). Hence, gendered mythology imparts female and male respective lines of origins.

The notion also states several other non-human elements in human replicate relationships representation and simulate terms of expressions. For instances, wife/mother to husband/father binary correlations appear between the grass-rain, night-day, left-right parts of human bodies (hands, ears, eyes and nostrils), etc. (Ginbar, 2016). This underlies essential functions and services each element in separate and in combination as natural order to one another and for the totality in universe patterned. As imbued, gender also defines the natural existential ties and relationships both between identical and/ different elements (Ginbar, 2010). Gemetechu and Kassem (2019) explicit other gendered elements: moon as a male, sun and star as a female. These scholars again mention number two designates duality and of which *isaa-ishee* is one. Symbolically, number two represents the presence to two things altogether. In lines to this, Ginbar (2016) explicit binary analogues form of gender expression in Oromo as *xunduu. Xunduu* is a philosophy which indoctrinates about female male beings as sister-bother, father-mother, husband-wife forms of ultimate interconnectedness posture and governs this pattern based assignation and positioning. It is a conception which rejects solitary representation for any female and male to be out of this normative relation, any matured person to be considered as unmarried and divorced in normal circumstance is uncustomary and socially belittled. As to how dual forms of classification and expression intending to marriage/family formation familiar in Oromo can be manifested from other configuration. One of the examples is clan based divisions into

moiety system (e.g. Maccaa-Tuulamaa, Siikkoo-Mandoo) (Alemayehu, 2009; Dereje, 2006). Hence, gender is the commonest form and aspect of expressing duality in interconnectedness.

The arrangement depicts that male and female are one halfof something compact (binary analogues) which together can form a whole functionary unit. Second what roles and responsibilities each and every element should hold to the other and the rest in universe. Third it is the principle of governing the duality's inseparableness as to reinforcing the check and balance system. Fourthgender is a lens through/by which the universe and cosmic elements are being defined and captured. One who understood how essential and decisive these elements are can conceptualize the importance of gender to the Oromo especially while *gadaa* was healthily operational prior to the 20th century (Ginbar, 2016 & 2010).

III. Methodology

This study was conducted through a qualitative research approach and based on the data obtained from written and oral sources. As a gender study topic, the area has only recent emerged as a subject in research and there is a scarcity in literature on the topic. Particularly for the Oromo, whose written history is recent, the study about gender is much quite immature. Nevertheless, as recent as in scholarly studies, efforts have been made to reveal the significance of gender within Oromo society by scholars with different academic background, with varying methodological approaches, epistemological stances, perspectives, depth and commitment. Some of these contributions are made in the fields of history, anthropology, cultural studies and feminists studies.

The area is treated in these works with varying scope and depth. While some of them have completely dealt with women studies others have treated some remarks towards femaleness in their focus on gender and gender biases. Nonetheless, they are important that since they contain and provide some pertinent information on the subject under study. Still, oral information which is most often used to fill the gaps in literature on issues of the Oromo itself is scanty as the subject has been given little attention. The scholars of *gadaa* have widely focused on political governance, military, socio-cultural aspects, etc. more than gender. The sensitivity of gender seemed to have made scholars abandon the area as a means of risk avoidance.

Hence, the researcher has shown his best level efforts to construct this work based on the observation of the cultural landscape an analysis of religious-philosophical notions, and through his continuous engagement in the area of study.

IV. *Gadaa's* Gender Construct Setup

The Gadaa system's construction of gender refers to conceptions about males and females, the manner of their organization in relation to the other and within the totality which determines their places and roles in a society. The place this notion was given and the extent its assumption determining life necessitates female and male identity and class highly crucial and sensitive. As to the data, gender is placed at the heart of *gadaa* as its fundamental. *Gadaa* has been foundationally established on a gendered structural formulation and philosophy . There is thought that *gadaa* was basically founded on a pillar of gendered assumptions. As to the assumption, reproduction and protection are the two fundamental pillars upon which *gadaa* was first itself founded and then, defined every other under its notion corresponding to female and male identity (Ginbar, 2016 & 2010). Hence, protection and reproduction were dichotomous foundational bases to *gadaa* that parallel female and male arrangement, assignation and organization take place (Gemetchu, 1998; Ginbar, 2016 & 2010).

Female to reproduction and male to protection representations are manners of positioning to which and what side of life one apportioned as crucial for the other, each other. Therefore, *Gadaa* understands everything within 'his vs. her' placement and these determined social places, positions, status and tasks a person as a male and female (s/he) is bestowed in *gadaa* age-sets (grades, classes and generations) (Ginbar, 2016). The entitlement for protection incurred the male to assume political-military privilege as opposed to female privilege through reproduction dominion over the social-spiritual spheres. Valuing reproduction equally and corresponding to protection is the underlying view of *gadaa* and as its balance sheet. However, the *gadaa* system's gendered foundation and framework has not been the focus of few gender studies. As seen, for instance, Kuwe (1991); Baxter and Almagor (1978) put the *gadaa* system discuss the exclusion of women from its politico-military-administrative structures, and they were only married to

men in a *gadaa* grade. Emphasizing women's reproductive value, nonetheless, Crowley (1996: 344) entices the place of women as primary cares are conventionally naturally allocating nurturance and childcare. They are biological categories who see difference as the guarantee of the naturalness represented in different cultures and historical periods.

Organizationally, G*adaa* is an egalitarian governance system that contrasts other forms of rule, refutes hierarchical arrangement and any sorts of discrimination thesis. G*adaa* has reinforced this quality with its nature of avowing horizontal lines of communication and organization which also repeated in the notion of gender. Any sort of relationships at any level between and among individual members is imitated and expected to fit this customary standardization and suggested align to the ethos. Whatsoever the Oromo is patriarchal dominating society, it was under the jurisdiction and no data which show that relations transcend beyond the egalitarian tenet of *gadaa (*Kuwe, 1991*)*. The horizontalness ethos reinforces equivalence, respect and mutualism how extent members are differentiated into: sex, *gadaa* age-grades, social classes and generations set. Data showed, these three are the major forms of social differentiations and there were no economic and political based class stratification and arrangements in the egalitarian *gadaa* system (Gemetchu and Kassem, 2019).

Gender/sex, age-grade, age-class and social-classes are means of differentiations, but they have not resulted to inequalities. Kuwe (1991:119) explicit g*adaa* prevented the transformation of gender role-segregation into gender inequality, and women and men "had a functional interdependence and one was not valued any less than the other" in the system. As it will be seen in the next part discussion, these differentiations function under different stance and principles guiding them to operate sometimes conflate and another time separate. This is meant that they are bound to same and/ different principles steered them to operate either overlapping and/ breaking the boundary of another. The stances under and by which these systems operate either beyond the other boundary and/ in support of each other and those conditions which necessitated them need to be captured. Hence, differentiations of roles in age, class and gender between female and male emanated from the reproduction/protection notion expect someone for wide-ranging

tasks, duties, privileges and prerogatives (Ginbar, 2016). As to how *gadaa*'s formulation has become gender driven and shaped age-grades, classes and generation's role need to be addressed.

V. Female and Male in *Gadaa* Age-grades and Classes

As discussed above, gender is a mega-level perspective which is foundational to *gadaa* defining everyone's place in the universe. The female-male identity representation is a fundamental establishment of *gadaa* from which the sub-leading gendered roles derived to age-grades and classes. *Gadaa* is divided into 11 age-grades (a male 180 years' age) across which member of the society passes through in life assuming duties, rights, privileges and prerogatives (Asmarom, 1973). However, from what we were predominately made to know about *gadaa*, it is the story of female exclusion from age-grades and age-classes (Hirut, 1998). Including Asmarom (1973), senior scholar of the *gadaa*, clearly put the non-inclusion of female in *gadaa* age-grades and classes and the female role is obscured. However, study on g*adaa's* setup traces female's positioning context age-grades and age-classes. Accordingly, females and males have passed through sometimes shared and/ separate agegrades and classes, depending on the nature of activity and apposite to the undertaking bestowed initially (Ginbar, 2010 & 2016). While the male passes through protection centered age-grades, the female engages in reproduction this gender principle operates at every level of life and human physical-biological and socio-cultural development.

Jeylan (2004), who gives us clues about genderless stance of the first *gadaa* age-grade (*dabballe*, 1-8 age). In this age-grade everybody without having female and male distinctions is mutual and identical. This genderless (neuter) age-grade members have shared privileges, burdens and roles as a class without differentiations. The stance is similar to what Gemetchu and Kassem (2019) have mentioned as neuter. He depicts differentiations into male's exclusive control exhibited in the remaining next age-grades: *gaammee (*9-16 years*), qondaalaa(*17-24 years*), foollee (*25-32 years*), raabaa/doorii (*33-40 years) and *lubaa* (41-48 years). These age-grades are exclusive masculine attributes and only inclusive of a homogenous male class. Hence, what is being mentioned as male age-grades the tracks the path

which a defender of the society walked and was promoted through to assume sufficient capacity for military and politics zeal. However, the lenses through which gender seen shall be decorously adjusted towards the sort of differentiations in *gadaa* and interrelationships among gender, age-grade, class and generation.

This study reveals the tracks of life females are expected to pass through, to which they fit and also detached from males in order to qualify for the task bestowed and for which they were necessitated. After departure at the first genderless age-grade, the female has differently walked through two major tracks: puberty/unmarried (*dubra qarree*) and mother/married (*haadha warraa*). Accordingly, females attends roughly (not well elaborated like that of the male) two grades (as girlhood and motherhood) for reproduction, life-giving and nurturance for which *gadaa* understood and without which it would malfunction. Crowly (1996:354) criticizes the feminist tendency toundermine mothering. He states mothering is not just a social construct, it is natural, moral and supports psychological ties and relationships between a mother and child through a care system.

Besides, information processed from the literature trace the involvement of the female as a sister (girlhood) and wife (motherhood) of someone male class in *gadaa* process to qualify ritual fulfillment (Qabbanne, 1991; Qumbi, 1989). In general, female and male who assumed the same age-grade and class as *dabballee* are separate only between 9-40 years of age-range and, independently passes through 2 and 4 (from *gaammee* to *doorii*) different age-grades (Ginbar, 2010). However, they come to form matching cluster after *dabballee* again as the husband joined the *luba* (40-48 years) stage and henceforth they went through shared age-sets (48-80 years or 5-11 age-grades) becoming womanhood and manhood (Asmarom, 1973).

Asmarom (*ibid*), in his identifications of age-grades into 11 tracks which any male identity passes through since birth to 80 years put the phases before 40 years (9-40) as active grades and those after (40/8-80) as passive ones. The classifications into active and passive age-grades of male marked the phases at which someone is vigor and/ inactive to the protection duty he is apportioned. While the period before *luba (*40/8-80 years*)* as active and after as passive age-grades is masculine attribute cognizant and falling phase. As Baxter

(1978) notes, the Oromo have used age-sets for war because generation-sets "cannot be an efficient means to mobilize troops, and a quite distinct organization based on closeness of age … exists for that purpose". Ginbar (2010) asserts female age-grades and classes did not demand firm elongated cycle and numerous steps. Females have gone through loosely constructed active and passive phases with undertaking reproduction as on-peak (9-40/48 years) and off-peak time (48 and more years).

The other commonest form is the class in *gadaa* which consists of men and women (Ginbar, 2016). Class is a group whose members share a common position often involving a common lifestyle and which is differentiated from other groups in terms of power and status (Bradley, 1996: 129). In *gadaa* female and male who have enrolled through separate active phases will finish the cycle and enter into passive terms all together as an interlace class. At this stage, female and male come to form conflating terms. The husband terms on power by *de facto* raises the wife to his equivalence and corresponding social class (Qabbanne, 1991; Qumbi, 1989). Female/wife to male/husband as womanhood and manhood age-class or social-class status corresponding relationships, for instances, include the following. The wife of *Qaalluu/abbaa muudaa* is *Qaallittii*/*haahda muudaa*, of the *abbaa bokkuu/gadaa* is *haadha bokkuu/gadaa*, of the *guulaa*/*gadaamoojjii* is *cifiree/haadha hanfalaa*, male's insignia, *bokkuu* corresponds to *siinqee*, *kallachaa* to *caaccuu*, etc. (Ginbar, 2016; Qabbanne, 1991; Qumbi, 1989). For instance, among the Karrayyuu without the sister of *abbaa bokkuu(amayyuu)* and saying *amayyoo*, a sacred melody to mark and declare the transfer of *gadaa* power (*ballii*) intelligible the whole ceremony and activity is illegible. She is seriously sought, warmly approached and pleaded to make the transfer of *bokkuu* smooth and as customary. In addition, *haadha bokkuu* (the mother of *bokkuu*) is the guardian of the scepter during their *gadaa* power and she is unexpected to spend every night outside leaving the *bokkuu* at home. Hence, the mother of *bokkuu/gadaa (haadha bokkuu/gadaa*) is better in her social status than males who have not held the scepter at a time and the rest of the female class. This indicates how the area is complicated beyond feminist notions and challenged their theoretical supposition about subordination female subordination. But, the numbers of age-grades determine the weight

of roles, privilege and prerogatives deserved to unequal degrees of influence at different social place (Dani'el 2006; Ginbar, 2010).

As seen in the figure below, the age-grades, age-classes and gender differentiated anyone of individual member into dissimilar groups, categories and for separate purposes but not unequal. They have also sometimes compromised and regulated members to be bound together as overlapping. This is meant that they comply with other principles and for different purposes gender and age-grade established breaking the boundary set as actual different assumption. This is meant that there are stances in *gadaa* when age-grades and classes formed from a homogenous cluster of either female or male without intermix of another sex identity. The other stance is when a class of gender intermixing both female and male identity apparent without bowing to the either principle alone. The third instance is when the necessities of gender and age roles differentiations undermined by social-class status. *Gadaa* is hence bound to age and gender class rules and principles under different conditions. The principle of gender, age-grade, class and generation sets have also worked within both female and male class means of differentiations. Here, they all are active means of differentiations. There are stances when differentiations become clear by gender, age-grade and class roles. The following picture depicts female and male age-grades



Fig. 3.1. Female-male Age-grade and Class

To summarize, *dabballee* age-grade (1-8 ages) is when age-wise roles undermine gender. At those next to *dabballee* age-grades (9-40/48 ages) gender roles are activated and in turn reactivate age-

grades based differentiations. Post-*lubaa (*40/8-80 ages*)* which comprises of 5-6 remaining age-grades is when gender differentiation by roles is undermined and age-wise power minimized. Particularly the male (masculine attribute) at post-*lubaa* compromises on its masculine rather to feminine attribute. A similar trend that Oyewumi (2006:320) explicates non-gendered category practice is an established custom in certain Africa family to which the *dabballee* and post-*lubaa* age-grades showed some resemblance.

Female and male class above *luba (*40/8-80 years*)* are identical passive agents. Passivity of male marks the falling of masculine attribute and turning to domestic realm. Male at this phase drops the life-taking, muscular and ferocious character and join life-giving, nurturing and promoting social space. He has instead taken the personal characters and dispositions representing and presenting the feminine. One of the utmost temperaments of this sort anyone wants to attain in life is ascribed as *leemmoo (*humblest/purest*)*. *Leemmoo* are males of highest purest behavior and finest character who was only legible and entitled to visit the land of *abbaa muudaa (*center of pilgrimage*)* located at Dalloo in Bale when *gadaa* was active. The *leemmoo* imitates female constellation and feminine categorical in all their aspects (Ginbar, 2010 & 2016). They wear female's dress, eat food taking only from female, urinate seating down, grow their hair and abandon life-taking as replicate of female. Hence, feminine character is finest behavior someone of highest male class wants to attain in life. Femininity is not despised and undermined but it is the one male class becomes at the final point of his life. At this stage, the biological sex and physical identity is undermined, so that the boundary between femaleness/femininity and maleness/masculinity becomes flexible and shift of identity is tolerable.

From what *gadaa* has revealed gender is seldom crosscut by the social class category and religious-cultural positions a person entitled under different age-set conditions. A principle which guides gender is not always rigid as determined by several conditions. Oyewumi (2006:317) who raised the Yoruba cultural context of seniority operate beyond gender interfaces and African social categories fluidity crossing anatomic boundaries which the Oromo culture shares. For that matter, who do what with the prerogative sorts the either represented at determine female and male relationships of power that feminists claim. Femininity reinforces

some designated power motion entitled to the area they controlled that is the natural power of giving birth and controlling over it spiritually (Ginbar, 2016). The power of giving birth is delivered spiritually (Qabbanne, 1991; Qumbi, 1989). This study which sees into gender through g*adaa* has rather presented an alternative approach by positioning.

VI. Justifications for Gender Positioning

The Oromo, like many other people and society, is a gendered and patriarchy dominating society. *Gadaa* is steered through gendered foundational view and age-clusters. The fundamental thought is said to be the requirements about who ensures superior degrees of sustainability than whom or the other at which and what key areas of life convinced those founders differentiate between/into female and male identity. As to the founding thought differentiations into female and male positioning, has principally underscored some factors: the then natural-physical environmental challenges vs. degrees of resilience, socio-economic development facilities and services availability conditions, assurance of security from within and out vs. questions of attaining greatest survival and the kind of socio-economic advantage vs. labor conditions (Ginbar, 2010). Oyewumi (2006:315) quoted Chodorow(1978:12) "the gendering of men and women is a matter with particular personalities, needs, defenses, and capacities which create conditions for and contributes to the reproduction of this same division of labor". These factors in spatial and temporal reasons have pursued human experience different across historical and cultural trajectories. Oyewumi (2006) expresses his convictions that persons bound in accordance with the character and position to which they belong to change the surrounding world of nature and society in a given condition. The direction of this will to collective activity produces the guiding thread for the emergence of their problems their concepts and their form of thought.

Boldly speaking, males are structured for promptness of defense opposed to the reproduces female for ensuring possible ultimate sustenance through the greatest means, chief possible way and found safest for them. This was originally verbalized through the idea of inherent biological nature and body structure to protection and reproduction underpinned by in and out driven social and natural

world order. Bradley (1996:141) woman and man by principle are not naturally different nor biologically but in terms of inherent personality. Since *gadaa* has prompted sustenance within through reproduction and from out in protection the essentiality of both are complementary. They were believed therefore fit differently by the doctrine of separate sphere.

In this regard, the safest of all safeties was compelled to reproduction and nurturing which can be only achieved through provision of ultimate protection against external threat and internal dissidence. While female regulates the most inner thing, male was externally together to maintain *gadaa's* balance sheet. The hardiness nature of protection and military combat and what to achieve with it necessitated tough muscular readiness, laborious exercises and strong mobility to which fighting and politics become the prerogative and privilege of male whose inherent physical quality has fit at maximum. To prove competent responsibility, male is continuously coached, trained and qualified while passing through elongated age-grades. Male's realm requires intensive and extensive outdoor through tasks such as horse riding, hunting, military, fighting, cattle keeping, long voyage, etc. The toughest are these tasks; the high caution needful must be supported through continues and regular skill training, attitude and moral building, information and wisdom imparting. High energy requiring tasks summoned male accountable to develop the essential quality to be rewarded when succeeds and blamed for his failures. The reason why age-grades of male take more elaborate than female's cycle was to ensure these qualities for the best advantage of the nation and thought to have reproduction pillar lesser/unburdened. Male greater access to political and military advantages was only passing competently through risks and being vulnerable to human and non-human adversary. Bradley (1996:141) quoted Ruskin (1965:59) "man in his rough work in the open world must encounter all peril and trial…often he must be wounded or subdued …and always hardened. But, he guards the woman from all this…"

Hence, male is not simple gainer of advantages of these over female who is corresponding to social and spiritual domain influence. These duties of male were undertaken at far distance from residence, needing much more energy and tiring time at hunting game, with cattle at mineral water field and seeking sufficient forage.

They are assumed as parts of *gadaa's* fulfillment to assume military control and political administration at fullest length under *odaa* tree located at some distance and/ remote outdoor. *Gadaa* also included a journey to center of pilgrimage (*abbaa muudaa)* which is apt to someone less tightened with other schedule particularly reproduction. By these assumptions female inherent care-takes, softhearted, less-muscular and life-savers are unmatched to the characteristics male fit in. Even if, the proponents of feminism accuse as male's selfishness the decision was thought to be meticulous to save the life-saving as backup from danger. *Gadaa's* disallowing female to protection was deliberately to evade them from life-taking which is inapposite to their life-giving essence. If not, there was meant exposing female/women to various forms of prejudices: physical attack, sexual abuse, moral and mental impairment. In general, it is about division of labor, means through which societal arrangement and organization endorsed at their level. *Gadaa* should be appreciated for its consciousness of all these to save the *Hanfal-laafoo(*soft-hearted/feminine*)(*Ginbar, 2016 & 2010*). Hanfal-laafoo* is an equivalent to the term feminine in Arsii. Hence, seeing female at their non-representation sides (politics and military sides, the privilege of male) and outside their positioning has demonstrated Janus-face implications. One is to show their underrepresentation and the second, while mounting this idea their optimistic roles indiscriminately concealed.

VII. Some Symbolic Oromo Women

This part discusses those stories told in connection to gender, female and woman identity and some major great tasks the greatest did in history. Some these include story on *haadha saglan* Booranaa, *Qaallitti* Dalloo/*Aayoo*, *Hintala* (female) Karrayyuu, *Akkoo* Manooyyee, Waaqee, Dagattee, Loylaa Waaree and Omuu Baasee. These are women who had passed on under *gadaa* experiences and whose account and story is untold.

1. A Story on Karrayu Female

One of such story is in connection to the Oromo of Karrayyuu, a role a given female who is unspecified in name played long back in history. A story of certain unknown female who had been rescuing the group from being dilapidated while they crossed River Mormor,

during one of their early on movement around 8th century (Alemayehu, *et.al*. 2006). This goes on as follows:

> They [Karrayyuu] moved out of Mormor[Abay River] and settled in the present day of Arsii when their country(people) were troubled following the conflict with the *Qaalluu*. By the time, they abandoned Mormor that was a very big river full of Crocodile and big Snakes they found it very difficult to cross. They lost many of their companions... [but], people crossed safely when the daughter of Karrayyuu/Jillee hit Mormor with a stick *Siinqee* and the river was divided in to two parts

This communicates female through the power of *siinqee* and safely guided the whole people to cross the river and overcome the encounter on their way. The power of *siinqee* is driven through motherhood emotion, essence, moral and natural attributes.

In addition, the girls from Totaya sub-clan of the Dayyuu clan from Dullachaa moiety of the Karrayyuu are told to have demonstrated the power of their *siinqee* and enabled the Karrayyuu to transvers hard times at several different periods. Girls belonged to this sub-clan are still believed to have endowed with the power to curse to cause harms and bless for prosperity.

2. A Story of *Haadha Salgan* Booranaa: Matcha-Tulama Account

The story of a woman named *haadha salgan* Booranaa mother of nine Booranaa (whose name elders do not recall) in Maccaa-Tulama oral account. The mother of the nine Booranaa had played greater role in the foundation of a socio-political center of the Maccaa-Tuulamaa Oromo groups, *Haroo* Walaabuu and in making the nine Boorana dominant among the neighboring peoples. Originally, *Hora* Walaabuu was a mineral water from which people let their cattle drink at specified times. Once upon a time while the nine Booranaa and their mother who used to live in Walaabuu were traveling, they came across a group of people who had come to the *Hora* (*Hora* Walaabuu) and had established their camp there. However, the nine Boorana are said to have been shocked and became unconscious the moment they reached at the *Hora* and saw the group of people. Then as a solution, the mother of nine Boorana told the people that the

children would regain consciousness if a bull (*korma*) was killed and their foreheads smeared with its blood. The nine Booranaa were led to the north from *Haroo* Walaabuu by their mother and had captured about thirty men and many women of the pastoralists or peoples living by cattle husbandry. In this traditional society women of the conquered peoples were made legal wives while the men were referred to as the Gabbaroo (Negaso, 2001; Dereje, 2004).

3. *Qaallittii* Dalloo/ A*aayyoo* among the Arsii

The Arsii tradition has made some narrations on the presence of woman who had been piously led the whole group during one of their movements. As already discussed, husband and wife were occupants of parallel or corresponding positions to the social space they belonged in the society, the wife of *Qaalluu* is *Qaallittii* and both are analogues. In lines to this a historical recount on early history of Arsii traced a spiritual father (*aabboo*) and mother (*aayyoo*) who had rescued and transverse them at a given hard times in point. This symbolic woman name is not evidently mentioned but she was only recalled with her good leadership quality roles during movement. The encounter is uttered in the following *Darmaa*, a spiritual song.

Afaan OromoGloss

Aabboo galma Dalloo a father whose *galmaa* at Dalloo
Aayyoo mootii heefaa a mother princes of women
*Gaafa bahriin qarree bullee*a day we spent on the edge of an ocean,
Nu baaste baarjeefaa you saved us from being drowned into the ocean.

Aayyoo harka Siinqee a mother holds a *siinqee*,
Aayyoo tiyyaa qal'oo a lean mother of mine
Dayii ammas ta'i bal'oo again be a reproductive. (Ginbar, 2010)

The spiritual song implies the symbolic representation of women to *Siinqee* since very ancient period and the *darmaa* shows the sort of relationships between *Siinqee* and the *Qaalluu* of Dalloo. A piousness of this woman is a prince mother who by roles had guided and saved them from dilapidation. On the other hand, the term *bahriin*[ocean] implies when the Arsii are said to have crossed the Gannaalee River, for which, as data indicated, the group had lived to the east of the river before they moved from *Madda* Walaabuu. The

earlier move from *Madda* Walaabuu was taken place around 1450s (Alemayehu, 2009).

In connection, spiritual song which is said to be sung long in the past among the Arsii demonstrated woman magnificent place. The tradition goes that,

> *gaafa Arseen baar ceetee dhufte dura Waatich botawaa fi kallacha qabatee ce'e, achii beerrii Siinqee fi gaadii baattu eegee goromsaa qabattee ceetee, itti aanee dhiirri ce'e dhiiratti saawii mul'achuu didee, beerri Ateetee baste jennaan saawii jabbilee waliin dubartiiitti mul'atte. Saawicha Arraagessattu tiksaa ture. Waata irraa kallacha fudhatanii biyyoo kennaniif, har'a Waatatu hunda dura dhiiga buusee gumaa araarsa...(Ginbar, 2010)*

Its translation is

When the Arsee crosses an ocean, it was the Waataa carrying a *Botawaa* and *Kallachaa* crossed the river earlier, then a woman carrying a *Ciicoo* (milky container) and a *Siinqee* seized tail of a heifer crossed next. Then male comes third. The Cattle refuse to be seen to the male, soon female celebrated *Ateetee* cows with her a calve appeared to them escaping a Crown. Before, it was a Crown that kept them. They [Arsii] took *kallachaa* away from the Waataa and gave him a soil, then now-a-days it is the Waataa who made any forms of rituals for the *gumaa* ceremony.

..

From the tradition, Waataa is claimed to be descended from the eldest son of the Oromo and as usual an elder appears earlier in any matters of the nation following seniority in birth. Secondly, woman surpassed male with a feminine emblem symbolizes authority, and women's close associations to *Ateetee* back to the period indicated.

4. Dagatte and Waaqee

Oromo historical account that gave indications for women's role in raising male's to politics is Dagattee, who is the mother of Abiishee Garbaa in Horoo in the 19th century (1800s) (Ginbar (2010). Following the tradition Dagattee is said to have played key role in bringing her son to power and she is generally mentioned to *arjaa, gamnaafi beektuu* (generous, wise and intelligent). In almost the

whole period of 19th century (1800s) in Horroo was an era of civil war (*jabana eeboo*) among the male who were competing for establishing the *mootii(*monarchical*)* system that war was rampant among the various clans and groups of the Jawwii subgroups of Maccaa Oromo. In the period, which lapsed for almost a century, women were assuming the remaining all types of activities across into the territories of fighting group and entering in between them for reconciliation, marriage, trade, diplomatic task, etc.

Using the cultural power of peace likeness, its agents and symbols through the custom of *siinqee* women were leading at the era nearly about a century. Waaqee is mentioned to be a prominent woman in gadaa Hullee, the Jimmaa Gibee Oromo *gadaa* system even though what roles she played and her roles are not clear (Filee, 2017).

5. The Legendary Woman: Akkoo Manooyyee

Evidences both from written and oral information asserts about the Oromo identity of the female ruler widely acknowledged with the name *Akkoo* Manooyyee. Oral tradition relevant to illustrate this woman is related to the story of the *Gadaa* system with particular reference to the *Cinna Gadaa* (*gadaa* cleavage) that has been already seen to be occurred between 756-1116 A.D. This period indeed marked the decline of the central *Gadaa* assembly and the predominance of despotic leadership which makes it safe to assume that *Akkoo* Manooyyee must have been one of the contemporary despotic leaders. In traditions in the olden days, men and women had been living equally, peacefully and with respects to have been maintained by ancient laws of the society. But, through time an era of manhood and womanhood created. Accordingly, the era of Akkoo Manooyyee is said to be one of such type and it was preceded by one man rule regime. According to the tradition, prior to this womanhood era representing feminine was a manhood regime which had been replaced by the Akkoo due to its despotic rule over the people. It is thought to be in both rules of persons the equality of male and female were violated.

Other sources indicate the interruption of *gadaa* system of governance gave to rise of personhood rule. However, as both eras became despotic over the people elders met and decided to change womanhood into people's rule that is revitalization of *gadaa*

(Alemayehu, *et.al*, 2006). Written sources illustrated the occurrences of *gadaa* interruptions, at the center of *Odaa* Roobaa during the 12th and 13th centuries several times that presumably the period in which *Akkoo* is said to have ruled the people (Ginbar, 2010). Depending on the data accessed to the story of Akkoo Manooyyee is told among the Booranaa, Gojii, Arsii, Tuulamaa and Karrayyuu.

Women felt as if they were surpassing the men and refuted every roles of the men unless what they intended to say and to do. Women felt that they were exceeding men because they are said to have fulfilled three things i.e. a mother, a wife and a sister' and above all, they have borne the men themselves. According to informants, in those old days it was the women who were wiser and shrewder then the men. This period, *Akkoo* had seriously disliked elders assuming that they have challenged her and could not be easily convinced as others. However, she let youths believing to accept her order easily. Inevitably, some wise elders warned the people under her governorships not to eliminate elders, because a land [country] without the elders are said to have no longer survives (Ginbar, 2010).

Akkoo Manooyyee is one exemplary woman of importance and queens ruled over the people. During her rule, every task, including caring for children, was performed by husbands, and every decision was made by women (Dejene, 2009). She ruled her people to accomplish things that were impossible for them. In the Arsii tradition, the regime of *Akkoo* had been mentioned before the period that was known as uncertain in their early history.

The story from Arsii oral traditions narrates about *Akkoo* Manooyyee and her regime as follows:

> One day she ordered her people to bring a bag full of fleas, an order they were unable to carry out and, therefore, they consulted a wise elderly man. He told them to collect a bag full of donkeys' dung and spill it on the ground. They did it accordingly and the dung was filled with mosquitoes. The queen thought the mosquitoes were fleas and made another difficult directive, which was building a house on the air. Once again the people went to consult the elder man on how they would carry out the order. He told them to ask her to put up the door poles, which customarily is done by the owner of the house. When they asked her to do so,

> she knew that she was outmaneuvered and failed to respond to their request and suspected the presence of an elder. Again, she ordered them to move a mountain to face her house's door. The people contacted the elder man who told them to baize her whole body with butter during a day to make her retired. Accordingly, when she got deep sleep at night, they changed the door of her house facing the mountain side. However, she came to understand that still an elder advisor still remained. Then, she she ordered her people again to bring honey loading it on back the of a donkey without tying it with leather. Since, it was an impossible task they consulted the elder and he told them to add a thatch on donkey's back and to be clutched together to honey. Later she ordered the women to bring twitch dried meat of cattle at the night to go to a campaign in the morning. She also ordered the male to bring a wild animal called *Qorkee* (Swine beast). Since, it was very difficult to seize *Qorkee,* as usual the old man advised them to dig large large hole at the edge of a mountain and then chase this animal down to the directions of the hole and captured the animal in the hole. Later, the old wise man told them to tie her legs on the *Qorkee* pretending not to fall down and haul up the harness and soon this was done. The *Qorkee* had taken Akkoo to the forest and she died there (Ginbar, 2010).

Accordingly, when *Akkoo* understood the case, she is said to have uttered *ta kooraa, ta boonaa eessaa dhfe na galaafate jaarsii*, which literally means of the saddle, of the proud, from where did an elder come and havocked me. *Akkoo's* skeletal vestige is said to have grown *laancaa* (a kind of shrub) which the Arsii women tie it on their body or smelled it because it is believed as the plant of Akkoo.

In the tradition, the death of *Akkoo* had marked the end of women's reign in the political and administrative power. The Arsii women are aware of the potential legitimizing role of the myth and try to use it for their own empowerment in rituals and prayers. Her orders indicated how far the shrewdness of women was deep. Excessive use of power and her measures against elder males is said to have affected the relationships among the female and male. Although the story demonstrates how the concentration of power in the hands of men is justified, the regime of *Akkoo* seemed to have ruled against the interests of the elders.

Among the Arsii the end of the regime of *Akkoo* brought about an end to the rule of women in political and administrative power. It

was also followed by end of the *mootiis* system and revival of *gadaa* system. Sources mentioned some major tasks were performed by the Oromo in the 12th century to organize themselves under the *gadaa* system and formed their own *Abbaa Bokkuu* and *Aabbaa Duulaa (*Dereje, 2005*)*. This idea is supported by some reliable written sources which indicated the end of *Akkoo's* regime during the 12th century (Alemayehu, *et.al*, 2006)

Informants' mention the term Manooyyee is alternatively known as Mandooyyee, a corrupt name from the eldest moieties of the Arsii called Mandoo or Mandooyyuu. Still some others persist the name Manooyyee was taken from *Mana* Waayyuu (the Wayyuu clan), of the Mandoo moieties. All views of informants have a commonly referring to the name of their moiety and *gosaa.* They insisted, one of the lineages of Waayyuu, the Garjeedaa have not eaten the meat of Qorkee for the *gumaa* of the *Akkoo* (Ginbar, 2010).

The *Akkoo* is said to have given some guiding principles for the women on several issues and manners in a way women should approach the men. *Akkoo* is remembered as, *hayyuu dubartii*, councilor of the women and the following utterances are inherited from the *Akkoo*, while she was in life:

Afaan Oromo *Gloss*

Yoo ciistu achi na jalaa siiqii hin dhiisiin.

Always, when you go for a bed, do not repudiate from claiming more and more extra spaces.

Yoo dhirsikee si waamu otuu takkaa
When your husband's calls you, do not
hin dabrasiin hin owwaatiin
immediately reply unless you disregard him, once at least.

Dhadhaa raastee baastu dhiiratti hin mul'isiin.

While you end churning of milk do not let your husband's to know the amount of butter it acquired.

Otuma mana jiruu waakkachuu hin dhiisiin.(ibid)

When he requests you for something, do not provide him unless you disclaim once.

6. Loyla Waaree and Oomuu Baasee

Enunciation of *Seera Ambaa*, Arsii customary law at *Odaa* Roobaa c.a. 1490 incorporated the rights and prerogatives of female and women at various points and sanctioning measures. This forward direct in person involvement in the law making process named Loylaa Waaree and Omuu Basee, a member of legislature house and assembly. Omuu Baasee is said to have been *haadha saddeetaa/garayyuu*(head of women's assembly) in the *bokkuu* committee, the highest law making organ in the political decision making and formulation of the law. She was a feminine spokeswoman to safeguard and maintain feminine prerogatives and those institutions. This *bokkuu* committee was parallel to male assembly formed from eight individual women(Ginbar, 2010 & 2018).

The *saddeetaa* was a council of eight elders elected from among the members of each *gosa* which had its own *abbaa bokkuu.* The *saddeetaa* council was under the auspices of *kora bokkuu* (*Bokkuu* committee) that women in the neighbor come together and elect their *Saddeetaa* (Women Committees) from among themselves based on their best knowledge of the tradition and the ritual (Mamo, 2006; Leila, 2016). Since then, the elected council has become one to whom women's problem was related. The next is the adoption of *dhaddacha dubartii* (women's assembly) as highest executive *bokkuu* assembly and decision making on matters of female made by *saddeeta hanfalaa* (assembly formed from 8 women).

Loylaa Waaree was another woman as *haadha Ateetee*. The *Ateetee*/female deity/ was institutionalized in the *gadaa* system. *Ateetee* is deity or divinity which women worship in the belief that it makes them fecund, happy, wealthy and prosperous, etc. (Ginbar, 2010 & 2018).

7. Other Woman: Anolee Martyrs

Pertinent to Oromo traditions female is saved from taking part in life taking activities opposed to life-giving and raising attribute. Woman did involve in any conflicts during at early history of the nation till their inclusion in OLF army (WBO). However, during the Arsii's war of resistance against the conquest of Menelik II (1881 to 1887), women were presented as gallant resistant and collaborator roles image. Halko was a woman with betraying the Arsii and others were

ruthlessly exterminated and became victim by the Amahara warriors. During historical massacre remembered as *harma muraa fi harka muraa* Aanolee, which implies breast and hand cutting of the battle of Aanolee women were heroes. Few of these whose breast and hand mutilated include Ganamee, Galgalee, Saafiyee, (Huseen, 2017). Such 'a mission for agents of civilization' at the cost of building empire state brought the conquered people and their property subjugated to one of the utmost cruelties in history.

VIX. Conclusion

The Oromo, like other people and society in Ethiopia, is a gendered and patriarchy dominating society. This study which presents the possibility that one thinks and says on women through the ways of *gadaa* steered by gendered foundational view and its resolute power. The presentation made clear that gender is a grand perspective for *gadaa* to define, realize and give meanings to the totality in universe. Thereby that the requirements who ensures superior degrees of sustainability than whom or the other at which and what key areas of life convinced those early founders differentiate almost anything in lines into female and male identity. To do this, *gadaa* notion must have underscored several factors as barriers to which sex vs. those key tasks: reproduction and protection one becomes answerable and appropriate to ensure survival first and foremost in unity. The more protection and reproduction are secured the better survival ensured and continuity determined which otherwise was culmination. These are, like identifying determinisms such as physical-geographical and natural environmental challenge, level of socio-economic and cultural development and external/neighborhood relationships for/on any activity/job efficiency and effectiveness. In view of this, life-giving female/woman was socially and spiritually remedial to life-taking male, praying and performing ritual for cleaning his sin. The power of gender was pledged in the name of those parallel arrangement (e.g. Waaqaa/samii-lafaa) and feminine institutions (like *siinqee, ateetee,)*. A male through his access to protection advantage was militarily and politically incurred to better prestige as the *abbaa bokkuu* and *duulaa* albeit female was spiritually and ritually important. Conversely, both sides are similarly underrepresented or less-represented in another/opposite domain.

This female-male positioning notion does not imply any lesser and greater comparative degrees of relationships. The arrangement shows how is innocence at distinguishing society based on sex for mobilization and management of labor resources, bestowing with rights and duties at the center of the worldview. The influence of military and political mighty unparalleled with social and spiritual power should be recognized as weakness of the positioning but it might be at the expense of clear survival difficulties. If protection and reproduction was not established by the class apt for it there would not be continuity and unity. Hence, the possibility that *gadaa* did for the nation through feminine and female/woman (as some through story and other in names) was indiscriminately reduced to a preconceived exclusion account and became victims of feminist studies. So that gender is a leading perspective and female-male assignation is a matter of representation than it is not an omission and misrepresentation nor neither center on male alone nor makes its sole privileged over all areas.

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Some Oral Insights into the Arsi Oromo Cultural Values: The Power of Words as Indicators in Conflict

Gemechu Kedir

1. Introduction

In Oromo culture, words have values equally called "*hafuur*a" (breath), which represents positive or negative meaning in the process of developing identity making. Love, joy, grief, hesitation, reverence, war and peace expressed clearly values for words indicators in conflict. These selected Oromo words are very polite by their very nature when using them properly, for example, "*yaboo*" (oh, please), "*nagaha*" (peace, salute and goodwill), "*nan-badee*" or "*ani-haabaduu*" (sorry), "*anaha-dhufuu*" (welcome), "*obboleessoo*" (dear), *"goshoo/goshooma*" (darling), in communication between two or more people to agree on their status in society. "*Jecca* /word/ mean, i.e., as something have in mind" (Tilahun Gamta,1989:339). Impolite and stereotypical words that have negative connotations debilitate human dignity and show a lack of concern for good relationships. To that, end they would unquestionably be sources of conflict between members of their same family, groups, or and others. Bad words normally carry the syndrome/chaos of conflict that is able to change one's mind. They also carry spiritual and physical expressions of every individual in the constant progress of generation, ethnic mentality, world perception, tradition, consciousness together with universal knowledge of humanity.

Words are defined in a number of ways. They represent an idea, object and human action, description of something good or bad for human the way he/she/ thinks, feels, promises, suggests, foresees, translates, express surprises, either in the same way or differently. They naturally give a chance to speak about that of what a human has to do. Words are means of expressions of the human beliefs. They are what we all breath, means of conversation passes messages

between people, individuals, what let us to give words, honor, keep one's word to another, command on what we want from the others, by word of mouth or spoken and written, help us to take someone's advice call on names have been known.[3] Generally, words have different interpretations in different contexts. For example, in the Christian religion, initially there was the Word and the Word was with God. Moreover, that Word is God, and then all things started to exist by God. In it, there was life, and life was the world of the human.

Everything on the earth has the Word of God and in its essence, is God.[1] In Islam, a word is perceived as an element of air considered as part of a mystical and cosmic system. In many traditions of the ancient world, the natural catastrophes were identified by the sounds of water, air, and wild animals, etc. Sounds determined plays of the musical instruments too. Outgoing from a spirit of the seven planarian principles in the classical/antique/ Greek–numbers of completion of the grammars, vowels which divided into two groups of: a, o, and negative: u, i, also could by an intermediate vowel e form seven series of sounds. These are: a, o, oe, e, i, iu, u are associated with the diatonic scales: C, do, D, re, E, mi flat, F, fa, G, sol, A[la]flat, B si, and color spectrums consist of red, golden-brown/orange, yellow, green, sky blue, pale blue, violet determined play in music. [4] They all substitute for words of symbols in the human mind. Besides, words are used in the written record [5]

3 Словаръ Совеременного Английского Языка. «Русскии Язык» Москва. 1992. С 1213.

4 Ibid.,

5 Ugaritc Inscriptions of (XV- XIII) BC; Phoenicians of (XII – XI) BC; which have based on the ancient Jewish and Aramen; the Southern Yemen Inscriptions of (XI – X) BC; the Proto – Sinaitic Inscriptions of XVII – XV); Proto – Canaantic alphabet; Afrasian and Safaitic Inscriptions; Balcano – Balto – Slavica; Cornelius Gallus Inscriptions in the Philae temples and other sources. The Gallus's inscriptions make it possible to reconstruct events that occurred at the Egyptian – Cushitic boarder directly after the Augustan invasion. (See Albright 1966); (Branden 1979: 121, 174, 179); (Cross & Lambdin 1960, N°– 06, 20 – 26); (Demsky 1977, 4, 14 – 27); (Hneyman 1952: 136 – 147), (Kohvi 1977, 4, 1 – 13); (Segert 1983: 15, 18, 201 – 218); (Sh.Schifman 1963: 14) etc.

afterward started using a copy paper/'crib paper'/ for replacing a memory, whereas in the peaceful places people have been calling on to 'use their own minds' orally.

Analyzing essences of the power of words indicators in conflict with the African societies in theory is not so much admirable. Leave alone, the Africans local communities; their so-called elite members have no ideas to the very essence of the power of words in conflict. My experiences of the Arsi Oromo '*Jaarsummaa'* [6]I had produced a book on it after doing my field research to the Arsi proper Arsi and Bale showed me that although would necessary to collect words have made a difference in that particular areas the Arsi Oromo community. All words I tried to collect and put in this piece of paper are serially arranged. They are very important words carry the cultural history of the Arsi Oromo all way through their past, present and the future generations will tend to learn from them too. All power of words are valued for their culture identity. If they would not properly, mannered they certainly bringing conflict where there would always be state of inconsistency. Each word is vigorous in Jaarsumma/ a particular knowledge of the Arsi Oromo mechanism of conflict resolution). I see it is aimless to group these words in one single temple of meaning. Doing so is as going to be undermining that part of society where such specific knowledge came from. Therefore, it is important to scrutinize these very. Here by conflict, we mean «the clash of interests between the two sides at loggerheads amongst the opinion of social groups struggling for power, and phase in an inconstant development of society. »[2] Conflict is that what comes from conflict situation, which denotes a maximum possibility of strains at the contradiction within group members of any society.

6 Gemechu Kedir. 2008. Ethno–conflitology in Cultural Philosophical Research and « the Arsi Oromo JARSUMMAA, Gumaa and Ateetee in the Rule of Lallabataa »: a Comparative Analysis of Men and Women Distinctive Cultural Models. unpublished manuscript of 407Pp.

2 Gemechu Kedir. 2015. "Knowledge in Effect of '*Ateetee*' in a specific Culture of Conflict Resolution: Arsi Oromo." *Zena – Lissan, Journal of Academy of Ethiopian Languages and Cultures*, Volume xxiv, Number 1.

Concerning theoretical methodology of the research since this knowledge of the power of words largely depends on the local community of the Arsi Oromo where no one happened to make a research on such words that should be reflected this way even though I found the s are very scarce. Concerning the knowledge in the theory of conflitology has to scrutinize the local communities that one may add to this part of the power of words are at an infantile stage. Therefore, I developed my own approach which brings together insights from history, culturology, anthropology, ethnography, psychology, and conflitology,. Besides, there are scarcities of written source materials for scrutinizing the power of words, a research methodology, I have employed is interviewing method for what the old men and women were categorized and assigned according to their different roles and knowledge. A group and face-to-face interviews were made with the knowledgeable sages of the Arsi Oromo, and then the collected data are analyzed, interpreted as per qualitative method. A cross-cultural method has employed following those vast and compacted areas of the Arsi beginning from Batu- of the ***Wayyuu Shanan***/***The Five Wayyus***/ of the Rift Vally region, Shashamane, Gadab, to Filtuu, Kokossa and the like.

Generally, although there are no clear lines of demarcation between two sources both written and oral sources are funds of knowledge for every society. As in many several societies and so could the Oromo words have similar terms, we try to explain briefly what they have to bring about negative, social unsafe situations on hand might lead to conflict between social groups regardless of their complex distinctiveness. In such an original work and the bulk of data analysis and where the written sources on this issue are very scanty or almost nil. Anyhow, the arrangement of this piece of writing follows from this that: an abstract, Introduction, 38 --power of word indicators in conflict in one, summary and references

Thus, by selecting **all the thirty–eight words** indicate to conflict the author has put together as follows.

1 Bidhata' **(**suspicion/
2 Daluu/daloo- (preferential treatment),
3 Dhara murteesuu- (unfair decision/injustice),
4 Dhawa-dharaa (strategy for a mischievous act),
5 Dhiigoma-wollaaluu (may fail to know family tree/linage/),

6 Diqqeesuu (to mortify),
7 Dondhoomuu (to happen to gluttonous),
8 Fakkeesuu (to masquerade as/imitating or clue led to believe).
9 Fanfansuu (stigma and discrimination or to alienate)
10 Funyaan butu (to put someone's nose out of point),
11 Gadoo (to grudge),
12 Gad-qabuu (to demean/stoop someone low),
13 Ganuu (to betray/deny),
14 Gorsa sobaa (false/fake counsel),
15 Hamachuu (backbiting/gossip or unkind remarks),
16 Hanna/hatuu (theft/robbery/to thieve),
17 Hanqachuu (disappointing somebody's hopes or short of a word once promised doing)
18 Heetachuu/heetatuu (to argue with somebody instead of doing himself),
19 Hifatuu (to deaden or mind numbing,),
20 Hinaaffuu (to be envious of somebody),
21 Jaalala (to love)
22 Jabeeny[n]a (an intense high-flying),
23 Jibbuu (to abhor')
24 Jifata (to knock against),
25 Kadhachuu (to beg/request earnestly),
26 Kijibuu(to lie)
27 Luqunuu (to chomp/munch or require something without stopping)
28 Namatti maluu(devising scheme or plan to do something evil against someone),

28: 1-21 Physical Features Generating Conflict

29 Nasiisuu (cause panic or to scare somebody out of his/her wits),
30 Qaanqanyuu (to be diffident),
31 Riphuu (to go into self–hiding),
32 Saalfachuu dhabuu (shameless or an act without feeling abashed of anything)
33 Shakkuu (to be suspicious of the horrific activity/ uncertain for morally unacceptable things)
34 Si'a (chew/brood over something erroneously happened or will happen)

35 Ufjajuu (to brag about),
36 Wolitti-suwi jechuun (causing yelp to each other),
37 Wol-midhuu (giving pain to one another),
38 Yaadaan addabaduu (divergent idea). One who does not use these words properly is as on the verge of conflict situation undoubtedly.

II. 38 –Power of Words Indicators in Conflict in one

As explained in an introductory part of this work, words do cause peace and war, and help to bless, to curse, to damage one's personality, to bring shame on someone, to speak the truth to avoid doing overstatement, to connote a foundation nature of somebody's behavior. Words make one to be a constant if he/she does not eat his/her words; they are means to give respect for another. Words are mechanism of expressions of the brainwave that comes from the heart of human mind. Through words, one can restore peaceful relations and happen to love to others. Words are the languages that human being speaks and conversely reading what one is saying according to his/ her understanding when there happened to be speaking the truth. Words carry the human spiritual cultural fundamental nature. They determine the human relationships based on his/her/ daily activities. Accordingly, these selective words are which every member of Arsi having them with each other in a day-to-day life communicate in all directions are treated well by "***Jaarsummaa" (***a traditional cultural mechanism of conflict alleviation.) These words are not nominal; instead, they carry cultural values for community's relations unbroken.

Therefore, the author all the way through attempts to demonstrate some oral insights into the Arsi Oromo cultural values for the power of words indicators in conflict the paper. This is also, for what knowledgeable informants based on their knowledge dedicated teaching the author all about these words value for culture. Besides the author rowed/limned up/ these words across from Bidhata' (suspicion)-Yaadaan addabaduu (divergent idea) as already indicated alphabetically. In general, where there are, dishonest words dominating either land of living or mind of human there always are conflict. Using words erroneously lessen reverence for others. Therefore, to particularize about this let me start with some

selective words that one by one derived from Oromo maxim goes as such:

"*Aafaa gaarii irra Afaan gaarii woyya"*[8]

(Literally, "good words are far better than good bed.)

'Bidhata'(suspicion/hesitation) etymologically, a term '*bidhata*'' is applied to the character of anyone in a disoriented situation without meeting a requirement but vacillates between facts and an insubstantial shadow. '*Bidhata*' might any pretense of what is that: a) keep out the bystander and concerns to the theft only, b) unsupplied with paying heed to the truth, c) serve as an occasion in which one simply tell untruth to anyone else as if he or she has stolen one's property. D) This is when one who has previously known having this specific character for 'thief/bandit' caused by such a personality doubtfully supposed so although there is not any confirmable eyewitness. E) Similarly, this happens when there are concerns about two individuals previously did not have good relations to one another but, due to on occasion of like so that result in the losses of property by chance just then caused both of them to vacillate between one option to another suspicion and the like. Thus, as to Arsi sages[9] an individual with this kind of personality who normally intend to reprove whom supposed bypassing his exact name but inform all doubts about that case afterward might greatly exposed what of it. This is indicating in sign of concerns about somebody ultimately become renegotiated, etc. This helps the Oromo sages to look at one's problem properly with all conditions of him supposed to be convinced to tell them again, for what the mediators will push forward the previously decided on the value of whatever types of property has stolen matches with the discussion. However, if he is free from any guilt or unlawful activity, then the Arsi mediators' will protect this person for all truths, and turn suspicion down to bring both of them together, so that they should negotiate without more ado. If they think that he, maybe perjure one /bears false witness so that they necessarily make him to swear. Then

8 My Interview with the Arsi key Informants, Shubsaa Adeemaa, Kaduu Urgoo, Imaama Nageessoo Dasiisoo, and many others, January 2008.

9 Key narrator, Gadala Uloo of 125 years old and a person with an encyclopedic knowledge about Arsi Oromo culture in general, April 21, 2005, E.C.

if they come to decide on to settle down pat issues, then the next procedures should follow the same procedure, as in the part of '*Kakuu*' (oath). This moment a juncture when the women '*hoodaa*' (go-between) also go to take privy to mitigate the dispute, that ought to deal with the problem all over again.

'**Daluu/daloo'** (preferential treatment), is a term that is used to show an act of 'nepotism' that could be the root for individuals or groups strength of will to do jaundiced eye/bias. Such immoral social acts as to Arsi informants [10] characterized by a psychological nature of the person uphold individuals without their real potency (heartiness). Thus, some of Arsi Oromo sages prefer to say, doing this is as distorting the truth of nature and 'Waaqa', due to the domination of a cheap modesty leads to all for wrongdoing upon others out of their true background. Therefore, any deliberate act of like this kind is, as deliberately coming to harm another in favor of his/her own friend and then in that case of what deal with a simple reason that makes '*daloo*'. Then, any dialogue based on such arguments of a question of why and for what it is believed to be the situation in it is alienating anyone from a group. Simultaneously while anyone other who has dual, motives supported by that of what unavoidably create in one's mind 'have a spat/or go for each other'. This kind of temperament of an individual can cause conflict with any other. Because it come from such a condition that one boasts about the position he has already agitated whereas another does not accept him at all.

'**Dhara-murteesuu'**– (literally, unfair decision/injustice), is an act of kangaroo court that pass partisan decision to benefit other side based on personal interest or being under pressure. Moreover, an action is not based on any fairness or an authenticity, there always is unfair decision. Nevertheless, this case happened to be amongst the things morally considered very 'bad' and completely prohibited to perform as a duty. Any act of like this is decisions rooted in conditions tell a lie cannot be in favor of anybody. Actually, this situation measures up to lead to be an objection of 'man' to 'Waaqa' and vice versa. It is what with anybody can pretend to show down others and causes one to look guilty without having any real evidence and yet, continued to impose upon him/her as if he/she/

10 1984 – 2003.

carries such a natural behavior. This situation as to Arsi sages,[11] had not been at all in the antique culture of them, but happened to manage to get by on the more from the time when they were annexed by the so called '*naftegna* force' of the *Menelik II* as said by informants. [12] Added to this point (Abbas H. Ganamo) in recent book brilliantly analyzed as how the Naftagna force under the rule of Menelik beginning from1880-1900 and had downplayed the whole system of socio-cultural history of the Oromo people in general and that the Arsi in particular. That had been created new burden Arsi with unfair treatment as if the they be fated to obey the feudal proprietors made the Oromo very bare. Culturally untruth words have to dominate because unfair life activities doubled enfolds. Therefore, this word of unfair decision is a typical nature of an individual's performance, which one can highlight in it, is 'long lung' more than the real state of perception of an objective world. Such behavior is usually in the political affairs with the system of repression under the enemies control founded on hesitation. In summary, this point of injustice could have characterized by the following expressive/psychosomatic traits that are a)–duplicating ideas do not account for a real word of person, b) – telling a lie about which thing he/she is not eyewitness, c)–being an ignorant of concert implications of personality of the Arsi Oromo traditionalists. Similarly, truth is conceptualized as something tangible form of an objective reality one can see it as telling fact of life not beyond one's eyes to turn off. This by itself is not in a roundabout way remain not witnessed, unjustified, if would be an act like palm off on individuals in the situations enable to create interest of conflicts amongst members of the given society. According to the Oromo culture in general justice seem to have been objective. Because there were no corruption and bribery to distort the justice for the judge; justice is well treated by local elders; every case is investigated in the light of murti /decision/ and bulti/ conflict therapy/ and every case is supported by eyewitness (Abas, Haji 1982). Accordingly, justice in the case of reimburse homicide and

11 My interview with the Arsi Informants, Gadaala Uloo, Shubbisaa Adeemaa, Azmaach Eadaoo Hagaa, Daaluu Roobaa, Qacaa, Saimannaa Eelaa and Baatu, June 2005 E.C.

12 ibid.,

hemorrhage the body part of a human have similar weight and special therapy (Abdurhaman,1992).

'**Dhawa-dharaa'** – (literally, strategy for a mischievous act), is the term used to denote the question of conflict between groups that reached a serious degree of an intrigue against to pay no heed to anyone. This kind of an impish tactic is normally exposed by a group of 'Qora' (investigator), 'Jaarsolee' (esteemed Oromo sages) and 'Hayyuu'/expert at the Oromo cultural laws), and others, who know how to go about that and park themselves for finding an essence of such plan and design for a particular issue needs to resolve. The subsequent points here to show are these in the spotlight. Therefore, what if anyone has a prone to the question about that issue on what problems could be such as: a) did these issues bring about conflict or not? What if these thoughts cause a fertile ground for a war conflict? Then they advise to side with no risk, the tact for this is how one could get on with such an approach to solve that issue forms of this sort. b) After that, they sit in judgment of the tact or strategy to find another way, which, could help to stop the problem continuing. C) Furthermore, they choose and look into the distinctive types of cultural models of conflict resolution, which already had ground rules in the society when arising needs to pass on such a social agreement and planning. Of course, these kinds of motifs should not be the responsibilities of civil society members of the Arsi Oromo, but it needs a traditional specialists namely "*beektota worra dhawa dubbii*" (a family/group unit of tact for conflict resolution). Therefore, a word *'dhawa'* has an equal weigh on that, what is in the traditional cultural guiding principle of Arsi use for making a balance on conflict improvement. According to some informants'[13]confirmation in the absence of this kind of cultural enrichment, it could not be possible to solve any sort of social problems. There are some other forms of tact, which come to mind and contained by the individuals heart but outside of anyone advice for shaping a real behavior of crooked personality so that to help everybody to stop from a wrong doing and give potential capacity for prevention an incident of conflict situation from the given Arsi Oromo community's side.

13 My interview with Shubisaa Adeemaa, Nuuree Manjoo, Haaji Aabbuu Gammadaa, and Haaji Dodola Nuuree, Eelaa, September, 2003.

‘**Dhiigoma-wollaaluu’**- (literally, may fail “to know family tree (linage”) usually take root from the petulance of a person. Anyone who does not accept this system of relatives is in hostile with the seven marriage types, as follows:

1 ‘Fuudha- addabaanaa’ – (unilateral marriage),
2 ‘Fuudha- wolgaraa’- (two-sided marriage),
3 ‘Fuudha- Benbetoo’ (sorority/sibling marriage),
4 ‘Fuudha- Asennaa’ – (voluntarily marriage),
5 ‘Fuudha – buttaa’ – (marriage with kidnapping),
6 ‘Fuudha–gabbaraa’–(marriage based on the repayment in Cash and in kind),
7 ‘Fuudha–gursumeettii’–(literally,remarriage). All the general lines of marriages take root from unbroken aim at the very system of close relative to the Arsi groups. These types of marriages are possible amongst them only after ten generations. If anyone avoids doing the said remakes, then he/she is considered a ‘*Nyaaphaa*’’[14]. This term goes again to the one who a) forgets to a visit to native blood relationship, real unity, and does not go and say hi to his/her relative, b) does not attend mourning ceremony when anyone of his relatives dies and does not show even any grief except laughing at them, c) and he/she who is despondent and has deteriorated to assist his or her relative to a certain extent and get off/lost from there.

The other point of ‘*Nyaapha*’ is a situation in which individuals; or groups do not claim an origin of the sameness and any close blood relationship/propinquity/. Therefore, the term ‘*Nyaapha*’, have to do with the people whom it is possible to establish married state. Overlooking such kind of understanding, the Arsi sages have a say to this is what obviously causing conflict between the same family members of the Arsi Oromo.

14 (The Oromo term that stands for those individuals, groups become ignorant about his or her closeness relations) or all who do not belong to the whole blood set of Arsi Oromo and considered non-Arsi native including other neighboring ethnic groups these also come to be known as a ‘Nyaaphaa’.

'**Diqqeesuu'** – (literally, to mortify), is a term used to denote an act in which one disparages another. Thus, this word for the Arsi commonly considered whimsy and is perpetrated by an individual who has a personality to defame or make a fuss of that kind of activity without having any reason, contention/conflict with the other groups. It holds in content and forces them to be in a state of contention or conflict. As to our informants [15] confirmation such a character can originate out of ignorance. Arsi sages (wise men) further account for these issues as follows: «… Even though he is young, if anyone is known as a knowledgeable person and then all members of society respect him of course, he similarly will have admiration to them, as is being deferential to society»[16]. On the contrary, the reason of defaming, disrespecting, undermining an erudite person is normally originates from immorality, ill manners and imprudent character of unknowledgeable individual. As to Arsi a small person's awareness is attached unkindness. This could be a cause for conflict with an individual or group' mentality. While we are on the subject, I take for granted that Arsi usually like to tell about those who do not undermine the personality of anybody else because all live in the same period, leading almost similar life pace up and down that a country has where everyone used to walk and knows each other. This has an understanding that undoubtedly concerns to all people who live on the same land for cultivation to it crop up cereals cause everyone to grow, and make to take advantages of the same kind of food intake. Moreover, a feature of natural element to be achieved from there is and an occasion that largely related to an individual life may not make a wide gap between individuals of the same country in that one jeer at the other personality. In contrast, many Arsi sages confirm that, 'false modesty' and 'mouth without lung' (vague talking) is a nature of

15 Interview with Nagawoo Ukee, Tusura Abiyyuu, Kadir Tufaa, Shaafoo korrosoo, Haaji Aabbuu Gammadaa, Shubisaa Adeemaa, Kaduu Urgoo, and many others, in Seroftaa of Bale and [T]Xijoo, Eelaa and Tulluu Urgoo of Arsi of the Upper Waabee River; May-June 2003.

16 This interview has taken from the Oromo sages Shubisaa Adeemaa [June 2003], Dullee Tattagoo [May 1995], Husseen Galgaluu [September 2003], in Tulluu Urgoo, Eelaa, and Qoree of the Arsi region.

whose personality of such like category. Thus, the Arsi Oromo expresses feelings in this way using simple terms:

"*Diqqaan diqqoma; guddaan guddama*";

(Literally, means to say a small is small; so is the big).

This saying shows apathy for a conceptual nuance of individual's nature in that it is valuing what makes a difference of dealings within relations of individuals. This association is naturally true and as having had a weight on the things corresponding to the sizes: big or small Mountain, Hill, Lake and River, etc. Misjudging what is in nature can generate conflict of mind ultimately, bear on in need of attention enters someone's mind and then taking pictures of false parody (cartoon).

'**Dondhoomuu'**–(literally, to happen to gluttonous), is a term that denotes personality of an individual who does not have any character for charity other than likes to quit all and is determined not to assist the other people with their inquiries. An individual or a group is of such a behavior considered as bad ever since time immemorial of a traditional moral norm stated in progress that valued for unaccepted act in front of 'Waaqa' (God) and 'Nama' (man). Thus, after that behaviors should characterize these individuals, as who a)–neither stretch out arm to one nor another, b)–at an extreme dislike of relative to relative, c)–at an extreme dislike of blood to the blood that really is very bad for all and considered one of the conflict causes may happen to any family. (*Informants: Shubisaa Adeemaa June 2003, Dullee Tattagoo May 1995.)*

'**Fakkeesuu'** – (literally, masquerade as/imitating or clue led to believe). This word is used to indicate character for a naughty individual who continuously poke fun at anyone or be kidding ones dealings. This term also denotes that what somebody presumes his or her place at the core of attention. It is culturally associated with the 'pure gibberish', kind of talking under the pseudonym, with jingoism sentiment of the 'wizard ritual leaders'. These one usually are in the lead of the people by the nose of former ghost. Even though, disguising is very rare in the Oromo culture what if it happens and then it could bring about conflict between individuals, group members of their communities, and others. This as to put oar in ones anyone's affair without being asked to give personal judgment about someone else.

‘**Fanfansuu** – (literally, stigma and discrimination or to alienate). This is a term used to denote an action rarely taken by the one who likes to impose himself upon anyone in reprisal for what dribble away whatever be the thing his/her close relative has to do. Then one of the two happens upon to deny fully their next of kin/blood relation/ may well unite them beforehand. More to the point, a word *‘fanfansaa*’ is associated with a concept of an estrangement; at the push of a button, anyone aside from a kind of position, apathy, and lay claim to an individual’s one side that should have manifested in the expressions using to say these words that. a) It is an attempt to say to someone 'you are not our closer relative, or b) you belong to someone’s family who come outside of us, c)and a total refusal to accept one’s origination form one of the Arsi families by pushing him out forever, etc. In brief, this is believed to be the measure up to take a decision for such a personality one says to another we do not have the same origin. This is typically occurred due to the day head of the family with more than one wife and a number of children possessions common to them all and then this could be one of the causes of ‘conflict’ between groups, individuals in one and the same family or close relatives, etc.

‘Funyaan butuu’ – (literally, to put someone’s nose out of point), is the term that designates an act, which refers to a secret communication between two individuals who want to cause another person very angry and want him to be isolated by rebuking their inner wickedness of hearts and that reflect on their face by nose. This could happen when the two individuals who a) – sit parallel with each other/face to face and then clandestinely intend to get in touch with one another either not by the word of mouth or in talking manner but by sign of telling a thumbs down to accept what one is saying, as true. B) A nose in sign of the communication between two crooked/dishonest individuals who intentional have a plan of calculation in that they happen to against the will of a third person case, c) it is a sign of what one aims at putting any discussion out of sight that supposed to be among individuals, and others. It also concerns to a specific manner of a person who thinks about to wrongdoing and by having not a word but like to treat others unfairly to symbolize his or her misdemeanor that connected with a case could create a ‘quarrel’. Generally, the Oromo meaning ‘*funyaan*

butuu' is an act to continue poking one's nose into another person's affairs.

'**Gadoo'** – (literally, to grudge), as to Arsi sages a major root cause of all conflicts. Hence, 'gadoo' either traditional or modern has a capacity to play havoc with every party's pans. In general, all conflicts conceptually take their roots from this very traditional understanding addressed oneself to identifying relation between two faces whether are or not having a "*lafee",* (literally, bone) '*gadoo'/xinsoo/cittee'* (revenge) leads to a latent conflict. When Oromo expresses feelings of any kind of revenge, they normally say like this.

"*Gadoon lafee gola woraanaati*"

(Grudge is sitting bony room of a war).

There is also an additional expression used like so,

Tontoomuun gadoo hinbaaftu ittii edaati malee »[17]

(Boxing cannot redress the balance of grudge rather aggravating it).

'**Gad-qabuu'** – (literally, means to demean/stoop someone low), is a term shows us in sign of a repressive condition in which one can make someone deteriorate whereas another who does not morally and culturally have any credence happen to be maintained to be on top form of an opportunity in general. In line with this, the next points are mirror images manifested in the definitions of these very points given below. These are a) when the causes of conflict between two sides are not expressed under equal verdict, management and have not seen in the same eyes, b) or when one has an access to obtain anything in excess than another has and keep on upgraded. Concurrently when another confined to get a little amount or a few benefits or else is completely detached from any level of chances. C) When this in turn goes up to the level of a basic ordinary family, which then to community level no matter which society either a traditional or modern. When one has no or less access to all opportunities, then the Arsi sages conditionally call it '*gad-qabaa*' (subjugation).[18] On the contrary, when all sides have been given

17 My intensive interview with the key informants, Kadiir Argata Sufii, Saymannaa Eelaa, July 2000, E.C.

18 This is not as a segregation in the United States, legal or social practice of separating people on the basis of their race or ethnicity, as before

access to all opportunities, it is a condition of '*wol-qixa/qixumma*'[19]. Subjugation certainly does abandon dignity of others because it forfeits personality. One can derive some evidences; for example, in the process of conflict mediation when amongst mediators who intentionally take side, because of they already had have a good relation with whom they unfortunately stand on behalf of them against the law. In the case of those mediators, knowingly be in favor of a lawbreaker, who clearly knows about the guilt of wrongdoing, and his turn from a reality by tending not to admit about the very fault due to their prior friendly relationship. Then stoop another party low as I said is meaning–'*gad-qabu*u' too.

'**Ganuu'**–(literally, means to betray/deny) is a term refers to the character of person who is disloyal to the truth in that he makes somebody look an idiotic and also fudges confidence in a man or woman native to the Arsi land at what time is being difficult circumstances. In general what if dominating this very character for anyone, for what it is believed to be the following prevalence: (fire, poverty, war, disease), which as to Oromo sages[20] would face that man/woman stand in hostile to nature and make betray the natural truth value foe what is in the clouds on every occasion of waging war, etc.

To Arsi sages, any attempt and organization of self-grouping in the false mirror or camouflage is character for a person who usually engages in distorting and replacing of an indigenous culture by alien exoteric one. Such a commitment of 'ganuu' obviously causes conflict amongst groups and diverts the line of development into the bargain standby /side with/ that. '*Aadaa*' (culture) + 'Seera' (justice/the rule of law) + '*Heera*' (bylaw/rule) = '*Nagahaa*' (peace), but at time that this is having countered to such a conceptual representations of the circumstances could cause 'hostility and chaotic state of affairs' to the Arsi communities. As to informants, Arsi look upon refutation from the spiritual cultural elements and as

1960s or as the former European Jews, Gypsies (Roma) under the German, Armenians under the Turkish empire, system of apartheid, South Africa, and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and others.

19 (Any possible access to an equal position/status/ that does not create any dispute between their members.)

20 Informants: as is in the footnote №-16.

a cursor of conflict. [21] Given that, this is nothing new and conflict as embodied in the human nature, has been existed intending for several centuries and will continue living everlastingly to the extent that, a day to day life rhythm of human is functioning.

Bypassing or ignoring these kinds of cultural analysis of the power of word indicators in conflict structures, as in previous saying considered having a negative result in the human awareness and in capacity corrupting one's identity. In addition, this could undoubtedly lead to the sticky situation of conflict within every mind of individual in that kind of condition. If were the truth told, since Arsi Oromo are naturalists and greatly do with the 'ecological cultures' then in that case, some conflict with them could arise from this specific systematic archetype culture have been dominating their lives and coded in the traditional mentality. Although Arsi are traditionalist, but they have not ignoring the reality go on all the way through the history of the entire Oromo people and that.

'**Gorsa sobaa'** – (literally, means false(fake counsel). This is a term used to express a negative advice anyone to distort the truth of one be in the mood for not supportive of him/her/, so if would we take, for example, one's son/daughter either forced or agitated but in the case intend to leave from his/her parents home. This term equally shows that negative concern to individuals who wrongly tell against somebody and intends to create phrases used to split in the relation with closer friends or relatives, individuals, social group, and others. The term also an act of marring/ruining/ somebody's pleasure, and create perverse disposition between members of the same family. Avoid doing answer negatively, to Arsi is considered as the good turn, for what it is believed to be the respect for one's father and all parents of the same family without differences. Generally, when somebody tells about what to do and what not to do, go into hiding how to behave or how not to behave is what should usually be prevalent to a 'contention' between any two community members. Besides, bad direction of advice is that what does not have to go with any will of an individual, family, and others. Seemingly, such type

21 Interview with Gadaala Uloo, Kaduu Urgoo, Shubisaa Adeemaa, Nuuree Manjoo, Kayo Buusaa, Haaji Aabbuu Gammadaa, Haaji Ibrahim Buuxxee, Haaji Said Annasiroo and others, in Saimannaa Eelaa of the Arsi region, May 2003.

of an occasion causes whoever one person to rise against another and making him slip away from a specific family, group, the public, and others. (*Informants: Nageessoo Dasiisoo**: 2003***.) There is also positive aspect counsel for any action. Look for example, as I said what time one's children or any person say no to their parents and not critical of doing something to help, in that case, a positive advice is usual for him/them. Based on such advice it is possible to go in with a chance of making the children or a person volunteer to do what is good for any family members. Besides, this is for what other social activity to have a go reestablished too, as culturally accepted norms and mechanism that one can usually call it '*gorsa qajeela*' (positive advice/ positive thinking)[22]. However, in the case of a family relation, what if one's son refused to accept to be at father's beck and call/disposal/ as always needs ready to do, then the Arsi senior sages and couriers repeatedly give required advice to those, as it should be volunteers to a social activity demand from their parents. Hence, these advices are of twofold intentions. A) The first is aimed at avoid doing an intolerable personality relation, so that to make one in a group make happens to be upgraded and B) secondly, an advice, which links up the whole complexes of the relations to one another and enable to calm down hot /boiling/ situation that alongside make a difference of opinions reach agreement. Seemingly, such advices concerns to any groups in order that to make a treaty of handling the whole thing, peacefully work together in hostile condition, and then cause them to live unperturbed. Besides, the other extreme of this concept is that the need to make a criminal person aloof from a legal group comparatively, (Informants*: Azimachi Eeda'o Hagaa: June 2004.)*

'**Hamachuu'** – (literally, backbiting/gossip or unkind remarks) is the term that denotes an understanding connected with an act of 'transgression,' by means of a word of mouth/gossip/ is done and in the absence of a good person upon whom another tells about untruth. Moreover, pretends to improve somewhat guilty as if he did. Specificity, this condition is also concerned to whom also tells about the real thing, but has wrongly taken to mean or talk terrible things

22 Interview with Arsi sages, Shubisaa Adeemaa Dullee Tattagoo, Nuuree Manjoo, Haaji Dodola Nuuree Haaji Aabbuu Gammadaa and many others, in Saiymannaa Eelaa of Arsi region; June 2003.

about one's personality and campaign upon him so that, to complicate the matters later on also could be source of conflict cause person to be alienated from a collective fellow member groups, community at large. Generally, '*hamachuu'* is bad behavior of a person who intentionally aims at defaming another deteriorated his individual personality and psychologically causes to be confining to a certain socio-political interest, geographical area, knowledge, individual tendency of ethnicity or society only. Unfortunately, backbiting could have caused because of the natural hesitative hateful odious, behavior, lose of value for love and respect for one another, but not on or after the mutual relationships between two have these kinds of problems (Informants*: Gadaala Uloo, 2003 E.C.)*

'**Hanna/hatuu'** – (literally, theft/robbery/to thieve), as to some informants[23] is considered as one of the Machiavellians behaviors for devious person doing prohibited acts that what be able to cause social split and detachments of a good relationship between members of the Arsi communities. As regards Oromo culture, this is for what it is believed to be that '*Waaqa*' and '*Nama*' do not like whichever one does this, because taking ones property in the absence of its possessor and in the absence of eyewitness is that what is at fault, and is a prohibited act and could undoubtedly cause about conflict (Informants***:*** ***Kadu Urgoo and Shubisaa Adeemaa: 2003 E.C.)***

'**Hanqachuu'**- (literally, disappointing someone hopes or short of a word once promised doing) for anyone else. This term is understood as it would have you know that association with the insufficiency of behaviors of some individuals who have preordained to block up to tell either a 'real fact or truth' about their some kinds of cultural identity traits. Therefore, the question what and why the events because certain kind of quarrel is that case in one may not fulfill some sorts of assurances need to do for another individual, group, people, who should obtain answers for that. All the same, to betray somebody's trust, and start to discard his or her story with one's eyes open would bring about a 'quarrel'. Besides, a word '*hanqachuu*', is associated with the one who is willing to get

23 Interview with Arsi sages: Gadaala Uloo, Kurkee Seeroo, Kaduu Urgoo, and many others, in Tijoo and Eelaa of the Arsi region, June 2003

permission go to on errands readily and pass the message to the other individuals properly for the next expression of good luck where we may you respected but by saying no that, to bring shame on hearing it in front of many people'. Therefore, the last phrases I am talking about that able to give rise to a quarrel between individuals, who are not accepting anything like this matter that could undoubtedly create an unsafe situations in hostile to this group and others. (**Informant*: Kadu Urgoo: 2003 E.C.)***

'**Heetachuu**/heetatuu' – (literally, means to argue with somebody instead of doing herself/himself). This is the term used to denote a kind of negative response to divest oneself to have had a deed and responsibility that could be expressed by the dialogue between two sides as to next remakes. These conceptions usually consist of two apathies on the same issues, manifested in the monologue, which they usually like to say, for example a) let him go but not I do, b) let him go and tells about that what he thinks but not I do it, c) let him discusses about the disputes with those, but not we do. d) Let him take revenge, but not in the self-case we do, etc. Thus, such apathy of conceptions perhaps will happen whence there should inevitably be an impulse of reply angrily contention or dispute amongst Arsi group members, individuals "*Gosa*" (or an extended family), and others.

'**Hifatuu'** - (literally, means to deaden or mind numbing,), this term does not have any exact meaning in English as it should does not explain what we wanted to reflect on the situation. In any case, Arsi uses this term to denote boring affair. A term point up what kind of character in that specific, anyone is refusing a message of his/her mother and father or else what the other parents want from them other than one who feels cold and then wrinkled with a sit. Therefore, such an activity is which any family who is not happy with it undoubtedly ends up to be hostile to the children of one's family. In addition, Arsi dwell on the concern to specific characteristics of individuals or groups to the extent that could adversely affect parent's life and deprive them of right. Hence, a person who does not want to go on/tug/ at an errand readily is providing the condition that could hysterically cause exchange of ideas between any two groups and lead them to conflict. Similarly, when children of any individual family say no to what their parents' desire for, then and negatively respond it, then this automatically make one's mother and

father be annoyed and afterward followed by a quarrel. Arsi says this kind of character does on the one hand occur from an immoral fiber and on the other hand from also a shilly-shallying of '*dhaloota'* (by origin).

'**Hinaaffuu'** - (literally, ''to be envious of somebody''), as having a parallel meaning "*kilaafuu*" or a 'word' or as a current derivative of an older form, the Oromo term '*kilaafuu'* stands for a self-centered individual or group who likes to ask questions why are we /you are, as for other individuals, etc. A word is concerned with the greedy or selfish character for anyone at what time another person obtains something good with the authority to be reached while/just as/ he/she is not doing. Individuals are of these end behaviors neither see and understand nor want to reason why such differences exist. In this connection have also seen only those are with such specific natures amongst their masses. '*Hinaaffuu'* verifies or shows an emotional nature and a sign of unhappiness for a better luck or anyone's achievement or success etc. This situation by itself can cause and bring about dispute between individuals or groups with those unconventional/odd behaviors.

'**Jaalala'** (literally, ''to love, humanity, friendship, good relation, etc.'') Though this phrase is naturally used to convey a real desire to make close contact of a male and female relationships, as may disclosed in several literatures possibly, but other traditional verses of it is not that much known yet. Besides, this is what actually we do not know very much about those concerns of the traditional society meant for it in both senses of the real love and love inconsistency that could bring about disagreement. As to our informants[24] the definition of love is nothing but: a) an observable fact when, anyone Arsi comes and ask for a condition of daily life rhythm. b) Then in case anyone stays put for a day or even more than that without getting together /meet and happens to get to pass up the night in different places at the same time they be heartedly worried/concerned/ to each other for safekeeping. This has to because he or she wanted more scope of love, which I am talking

24 Informants: (Dodola Nuuree, Haaji Aabbuu Gammadaa, Kedir Argataa, Woticha Argataa, Gadaala Uloo, Haaji Qandii Ciqaaqoo, Haaji Ibrahim Qandii, and other, in Saymannaa Eelaa of the Arsi region, in between 1990 – 2003.)

about it that coupled with them, c) it is when anyone who previously and certainly gets together for a regular like meeting but unconditionally gets absent from there. d) It is when due to a kind of tension anyone gets absent from there, where another person goes to look for/check on the very cause that makes a friend get lost on that particular day or night. For that reason, the expression of love is sometimes recognized as having a way with a situation on hand and when individuals or groups come to take care for each other respectively. If any relation to that situation we mention is diversely, unconditionally changing and deteriorating out of one of the two sides' knowledge, in that case conflict is, predictable irrespective of the degree somewhat different from a socio-traditional value for a case we tried to show you, as an independent psychological cause of conflict exists in the Arsi Oromo communities.

'**Jabeeny[n]a'**–(literally, an intense high-flying), as said by Arsi informants, this term is used to allude to the trait of a person who likes to take ones property forcefully, as another is very feeble, i.e. when a weak one gets forced to be regained consciousness by the strongest who sometimes fly in the face of traditional law. That is why quite the opposite, when a weaker gets to be stronger and then speed up to take revenge on another; for what it is believed to be the conflict is predictable between such two individuals have this kind of case. Yet, they have usually three personalities of the intense high-flying names[25]: a)'*Beekaa'* (knowledgeable person) b) 'Janna' (heroic or courageous person), and c) '*Aarjaa*' (charitable or an open-handed person) with cases to mention possibly associated with such specific traits even though they are meant to be different. These individuals are socially outstanding members of the Arsi society, who culturally assumed, as if 'Waaqa' is very close to them in all daily life activities all the better for humanity. Nevertheless, those men with jealous characters would like to denigrate their personal traits by showing antipathy towards them, these actions, as to Arsi Oromo traditionalists' would cause conflict among social groups.

'**Jibbuu'** – (literally, meaning 'to abhor') this term is used to denote adominant character of whichever one selfish person or group that simply argue against one's success, in progress of any condition of either traditional or 'modern' society. According to the

25 June, 2003

informants, [26] a person who has such a character usually likes to exacerbate negatively the personality and dignity of other people in any spheres of their progress. He likes to contradict himself too. His character is like 'night that goes and gets rise. Hence, either he or she is of 'bendy psychological makeup' indicating self-changeable nature, as a hen at the end of the day remains in a nest whether eggs are hatched or not. These behaviors are usually associated with the personalities that have an unfair and often an unfavorable feeling, which as to Arsi sages seem look to other partners down due to a personal interest in personality is of an inferior complex and also because of narrow-minded mentality. Therefore, under no circumstances abhorring character is an ethical norm that supposed to be in the culture of the Arsi Oromo communities. The heart of every person must be in an open and tolerant of all aspects of the no matter what need to deal with whatsoever maybe. Arsi In any way having such, natural quality has to deals with all aspects of the matters. In that case, counteracting once established orders, norms would cause conflict between members of their social groups that of every Arsi must be in.[27]

'**Jifata'** – (literally, to knock against), is the term that is used to denote character of a person who knits an eyebrow at another or front onto another with bad or annoying eyes. This occasion usually manifests in question of asking the reason that what is about. Such circumstance takes place when one call in a question for what and another person owing to act towards reply angrily by saying to him get lost from here with no time. At that juncture, the practical details of dialogues could inevitably cause conflict with one another. Further, this word is also expresses feelings by an occasion of which time one goes for asking a 'solute or expressing a good wish' for whichever one disregarding for a given solute and chuckling at him

26 Interview with Oromo informants: (Kaduu Urgoo, Gadaala Uloo, Kurkee Seeroo, Waabee Woticha, Nagessoo Kumee, Aaabichoo keroo), and others, in Siitoo, Saymannaa Eelaa and Tulluu Urgoo/Qoree of the Arsi region, September 2003.

27 This interview has taken from the Arsi Oromo sages Shubisaa Adeemaa Aarri, Azimach Eda'oo Hagaa, Azimach Kinfaa Diinssaa, in Hadaammii Tulluu, and Hajituu/Baatuu, of the Arsi in the Rift valley Arsi region, June 1994.

and treat offensively and vaguely. In the replication of such temperament, extensions exist among, party groups and others. A question here cab be asked how such psychological elements did lead to fight. In anyway *'Jifata'* is one that causes dispute between members of the same groups of Arsi family, and the rest.

'**Kadhachuu'** – (literally, to beg/request earnestly), is a term used to denote a specific character of an individual who does not have his own property and beg for food, money from those people who have these, etc. When any person has exactly known as badly needy then, it is culturally acceptable to provide him with something necessary. If not it is hardily acceptable to provide man for something seeing as he normally does have hands and legs with the exception of the eyes. Such traits of doing '*kadhachuu*', as to them is amongst things, which is morally considered wrongdoing and shame to see beggar among the Oromo society in general and the Arsi in particular. Similarly, when anyone in the real difficult situation and happed to supplicate/plead for something, in that case, Arsi believe that he should have provided with all necessities, consider himself lucky so as if he comes to express thanks to the contributor/ Charioteer/ too. It follows that, having ignored what in all were said and done out off once culturally acceptable norm could create '*komii'* (the Oromo term that stands for a slight heartedly feeling of bad and an ill will or else resentment against any person) that can arise to the occasion before long may perhaps bring about 'a quarrel'.

'Kijibuu'- (literally, means to lie) this word, as to Arsi informants[28] points to what is to mean one of the most immoral norms characterized by doing a social evil. This obviously takes the lead conflict with the others and pulls apart any cordial relation. *'Kijibuu'* is the term that stands for a person whose name escapes for a moment, but tells lies about others to somebody without actual and concrete characteristics, as if he/she has to do with condition that there is tirelessly given the 'wrong impression'. Subsequently, in case this person has openly known and exposed in front of the

28 Interview with Kaduu Urgoo, Gadaala Ulö, Shubisä Adêmä, Shubbê Haaji Wäbê Lolö, Umar Tasii, Tusura Abbiyyuu, My own mother Gabawoo Urgoo and others, in Saymannaa Eelaa of Arsi and Serofitaa of Bale Arsi regions; June 2003.

people, and then become incriminated for a guilty of his/her unlawful activity, could seriously give rise to 'conflict'. Accordingly, we would like to recommend the readers to refer to short remarks that hit the mark up the system of 'oath' help to bring truth to light based on the Oromo methods of analyzing this concept thoroughly. There five limits of the humped law are attached to this points need to find a ground of extension.

'**Luqunuu'** – (literally, means to chomp/munch or require something without stopping) and this term often has two connotations:

A) Firstly, the need to' *eat slowly with mouthful'*, greedily, expressed an opinion of this clearly in Oromo sayings this way that: "*Lubbuun badduun haada Aabbatti/Namatti gooti*", [29]

(Literally, means a bad soul put a rope onto one's body to vanish)

B) Secondly, too much interest for jobs. In here, it manifests in the one's given broadmindedness to what he/she actually happens to perform whereas another does not do it. Generally, both points have negative implications, because anyone of such specific traits on the one hand, has seen from a point of specific interest associated with that reason he has have many wants for food and on the other hand, one's intolerance that compared with other individuals or groups, in the same working facilities. As to givers of information on this particular point, those people who are under such characteristics, do not see and understand the end of jobs in hands, but go to consider more than a few with much more appetites of working. So doing this is what ubiquitously leads them to interfere in the working areas of the other individuals. Therefore, one of such behavior and personality always does not put his/her home, people, and company remain stable at the working places without causing them to be in conflict. He/she does not come to say that, this work has come to an end even if it is accomplished as required at the specified time and place awaiting what time one's has previously begun to achieve an objective too. They like to move beyond what is limited, but scoop out to know the works of others, which in a dissimilar manner they

29 Informants: Hajitu Kadir, Gabawoo Urgoo, Inne Kerree, Lookoo Ganamoo, Dammee Ganamoo, Ruufee Ittisoo, and all that, in Saymannaa Eelaa of the Arsi Region, May 2003.

drop in somebody gun for that condition could undoubtedly result in a quarrel/conflict with other individuals.

'**Namatti maluu'**– (literally, devising scheme or plan to do something evil against someone), the term used for an illegal behavioral action totally impairs one's future career. On the word of it is out of an ordinary maneuver that does not to imagine, but advised by somebody should do it get hurt; so that to cause to remind someone of taking revenge and purposefully agitates against another in his/her nonappearance. Eventually, doing this is an immoral norm of tearing a close relationship apart and lead to the divergent opinions amongst citizens of the Arsi Oromo, which the principle of 'Arsoomaa'[30] cannot accept it and strongly forbid all from doing so. So one can explain such an act of '*Jifata' n*ot only theoretically but also physically are what of it, listed in a table below.

No	**Features generating conflict**	
	Oromo	**English Translation**
1	Ilkaan namatti ciniinuu	Biting teeth on somebody
2	Nyaara namatti guuruu	Frown/knit the eyebrow at somebody
3	Fuunyaan namatti butuu	Put somebody's nose out of point or abhor or hate somebody very much
4	Quba namatti irbuu	Waggle finger at somebody
5	Ija badduun nama ilaaluu	Treat someone partially/looking at somebody with bad eyes
6	Afaan keessa wal dhabuu	Shout at somebody/exchange argument; call somebody name; exceed the limit of propriety in what one says; abuse
7	Dheekamuu	To scold somebody

30 This interview has taken from the Arsi Oromo sages Shubisaa Adeemaa Aarri, Azimach Eda'oo Hagaa, Azimach Kinfaa Diinssaa, in Hadaammii Tulluu, Baatuu, of the Arsi in the Rift Valley Arsi region, June 1994.

8	Mataa namatti raasuu	Shake the head somebody/node one's head angrily
9	Araba namatti baassuu	Protrude one's tongue on somebody
10	Namatti tufuu	Spit at somebody
11	Fuula namatti guuruu/ jijjiruu	Knit the eye brow at somebody or changes the face to somebody
12	Fuula dhoowachuu	Rebuke or snub, use with an expression of disapproval shown by a negative attitude
13	Dudda namatti galuu	Turn the back to somebody
14	Namatti roqomisuu	Shiver on somebody
15	Garaa namatti dhiibuu	Protrude /bulge out/ a stomach to somebody
16	Quba namatti qaxxisiisuu	Brandish the finger to somebody
17	Ija hafarsuu	Blink eyes fast against your will/involuntarily
18	Ilkaan namatti ciniinuu	Biting teeth on somebody
19	Nyaara namatti guuruu	Frown/knit the eyebrow at somebody
20	Fuunyaan namatti butuu	Put somebody's nose out of point or abhor or hate to somebody very much
21	Quba namatti irbuu	Waggle finger at somebody

Table№-1 shows physical features symbolizing what are generating conflict

'**Nasiisuu'** – (literally, cause panic or to scare somebody out of his/her wits), is the term has denotes an insinuation for something accidentally happened because of a special character of a person that does not concern to what regardless of who simply one causes another to be down and tear to shreds. In any case, such an act could apparently bring about that situation in which one deny access to the

psychological mutual interdependence exist between their members.[31]

'**Qaanqanyuu'** – (literally, to be diffident), this term is used at time that anyone measure up to the truth, and asked for doing so then a situation gets realized by the eyewitness to that level of what is automatically make ashamed but laugh for telling against one's will, for what Arsi Oromo commonly call it *qaanqanyaa*'. Human being of such a trait is keen on to regret over an action at one time he himself executed and then regularly says if this would have; stop to militate against a word. Undeniably weighing against a background of such a person who does not speak for truth in that case out in the open publicly this can mean to have an unpleasant disagreement in which situation their members feel angry.

'**Riphuu'** – (literally, to go into self–hiding), is a term that used for clutching about which character for an individual who simply sit and quietly live in the debilitated manner. Individuals of these characters, as to Arsi sages, do not usually want to let somebody in on the facts about all they see and understand, and hear from the other people. Two hearts said to have dominated them, for example, when they asked to hold up but they refuse to do and go into hide something to have not known and regret to renounce, and always ask themselves about that thing either to hold up or not? They ask themselves, do we give a talking–to either clearly or not? Generally, they are afraid to hold up things and never talk about what to put forth but like to lie in between interests, either call for them or not and be furtive/with pussy foot without having any goal to reach at it. This act is more accurately expressed by the Oromo term "*Luuxuu*" (be furtive/pussy foot), hence, a) – if need be talking to him he does it slowly. B) – If it requires to strike for something instead of using strong hands he/she simply stretches out his/her hands and unhurriedly strikes someone. These individuals are the one who characterized by particularly 'phobia', which traits, as to Arsi Oromo would cause a quarrel amongst their members. The Arsi culture enhanced such a behavior in the aphorism that denotes metaphors have a paradigm make an impression on people like this. «...*Waa sadih waa Namaa hingodhan* (three things cannot help man at all).

31 (Informants:Kaduu Urgoo, Kurkee Seeroo, September 2003 and July 2004.)

Ka *uduma jiruu ykn qaaban biratti du'an* (you are die in front of it while it is within reach there/). In more elaborated saying, this meant to be when you die in front of him while he has food or in condition he can helps you). These are that: '*Aanan saree'* (the milk of dog), '*aanan farda*a' ('the milk of horse'), and '*aanan harree'*, ('the milk of donkey'), likely 'aanaa sadiin': (the three close relatives: a) 'aanaa *laafaa',* (the weak relatives), b) 'aanaa *l[n]unna'* (coward relatives), c) 'aanaa *dondha'* (the niggardly/stingy/ relatives). »[32]

As said by the informants, although these would be available in nature, but all milk sorts of the said domestic animals for drinking, eating, consuming and so could these relatives neither help nor defend Arsi from the 'enemies' faction. Here we find out about the resemblance to the term '*riphuu*' that dispositions of individuals' who fall into line of an inactive part of society and may possibly dominated by no matter which form of life. A further political analogy to draw parallel with this concept make oneself understood a third party of society, which the foe always uses against the Oromo in general, and the Arsi in particular. The third association of this is that, with what for no great concerns everyone should pay no heed to them. The last association of these remarks shows that traditions in which their minds are not ready to utilize, as one can see and understand in any situation on hand and one is in hostile to their members.

'**Saalfachuu dhabuu'**– (literally, shameless or an act without feeling abashed of anything or closes the eyes to feel anything bring shame on in hearing it). This happens to what time in any act on that case one fails to give a positive response, get hold of the wrong end of the stick on a social and on an individual life that formerly had a profound respect for what it was rooted in moral norms, or cultural values have to meet the terms with this. Therefore, having violated traditional law is as having had not to give respect for other groups and all laws or as having had the similar positions to this understanding of what is actually giving a birth to 'squabble' amongst collective members of the Arsi Oromo. Therefore, Arsi

32 Interview with informants Shubisaa Adeemaa, Gadaala Uloo, Kaduu Urgoo, Kurkee Seeroo, Shubbee Waabee Loloo, Nuuree Manjoo, Hussein Galgaluu, and many others, in Saymannaa Eelaa of the Arsi region, September 2003 and July 2004.

think that any person under the pressure of this character is the one who devoid of go red in the face/feel ashamed of anything but falcon, etc.

'**Shakkuu'** – (Literally, "be suspicious of the horrific activity/*shakkuu* uncertain for morally unacceptable things"). This term corresponds to a psychosomatic manner of abhorring dreadful activity with a power to give rise to a quarrel among individuals, groups, and society at large. Thus, any conflict that comes from such a psychological factor is normally rooted in talking about others in their absence that paves way to be doubtful of each other and at its climax may be able to create troubles among group members. Therefore, when one has ill-will for anyone other friend and misbehaves if such a case between two friends is being happened to be known then the one before another be naughty mortified. So the one who happens to bear in mind those details of misdoing does have a question to his friend, which from any undoubtedly result in suspicion. In view of that case, informants[33] provide evidence of an inevitable conflict.

'**Si'a'**– (literally, means Chew/brood over something erroneously happened or will happen) to someone. This term traditionally makes anyone clear from something has been unsupplied with any tangible knowledge about what may the name escaped for a moment, but simply suspected heart of his/her own and so Arsi commonly comes to call it as a count against one's better judgment is meant to be 'si'a'. Such kind of understanding categorizes any person into the two facial characteristics, who even could not ask for one's circumstances doubled up, which may convince to accept his slap someone in the face. What if it asked; he should tell the facts of that life might not tell against any person to make him not in a mood for it. As a result, *'si'a'* meant for them when they happen to identify whether a person has sympathy for what Arsi normally try to do. Therefore, an irrational value for every this circumstance kind is as a precondition can cause conflict between the members the ethnos. Therefore, the Arsi sages give advice to soldier on with the right side of anyone who has a rational

33 My intensive interviews with Kaduu Urgoo, Kurkee Seeroo, Gadaala Uloo and many others in Saimannaa Eelaa, Siitoo and'Xijoo Baamajjaa' of the Arsi region, September 2003.

knowledge about these entire situations. In their further explanation the informants,[34] say that where there are bias largely dominates there always be '*si'a*'. Likewise, '*si'a'* dominates where 'bias' forms the power of words indicating to conflict.

'**Ufjajuu'** – (literally, to brag about), is the term that denotes a trait come of 'jingoism' that categorize an individual in a group who likes to build self too much. Moreover, this is an act of a person, as if and he was with a kind of similar character for monkey in the field that acts out as if has a special place, but where there is practically nothing to reach. He has to because his behavior is as an animal that walked like a killer buffalo and how living in the jungle. This term get even with the chauvinist person considered himself as if he is a giant, respectful but who in reality devoid of an actual potential life. A person of this character may not have any single chair for sitting in place of living. Other than what if anyone probably happened to be guest to him does not have practically anything to assist guest to make pass the night. Besides, he is as a bloated/puffed up over–eating person who walks only just/barely, and usually remains with an empty stomach after some hour. Therefore, an emptiness of such a personality is what counters against a confidential real life usually leads individuals in hostile to one another because they usually tend to looked down by other people. The Oromo proverb "--- *Jiruu jireenattu mudhisa*" (literally, means a manner of living can show rhythm of life style) that could undoubtedly indicate a comparison of life in such kind of human psychological traits.

'**Wolitti-suwi jechuun'** – (literally, causing yelp to each other), is the term that shows a manner of an agitation for unrest situation on hand be able to cause individuals, groups, "Gosa", to fight against one another. Therefore, individuals of such characteristics, as to the informants[35] are considered agitators/stirrers who know how to bring about conflict between people and being capable of demoting one's

34 Intensive interview with, Badhaasoo Ganamoo, Obssee Akaakoo, Danboobaa Obssee, Kaduu Urgoo and many others, in Saimannaa Eelaa of the Arsi region, Sept. 2003.

35 Interview has taken from Oromo informants: Nuuree Bunuu, Danboobaa Obssee, Obssee Akakoo, Haaji Hussein Buusaa, Said Kadir, Shiikoo Argataa, Tussaa Woticha, Kayoo Buusaa, and many others in Eelaa, Arsi June 2005.

position and reduce to rubble the relationships amongst members of the Arsi Oromo have formerly rooted in the harmony.

'Wol-midhuu'[36] – (literally, means giving pain to one another), is the term explaining a tricky situation in simple terms, followed by that social curve the Arsi Oromo culturally call it 'cubbuu', (peccadillo or prove false swearing or statement that is not morally right to anyone innocent). Once anybody uses the tactics of shrewdness guess and thereby dodge to get rid of a good place along with a hot relation to that extent without knowledge of the one could not like to do it is also 'cubbuu'. Separately, an act of like this could be in many social stratums including members of the same family who are of two-timing or double standards to one another and others. This occasion is also manifested in any assistance, for example, when an individual, group, even parents who feed their children well, unfortunately happened to be denied them to that; when one assists his own children to drink and eat but the children denied to that; the same way when one provide one with clothes, but another deny to that help, etc. As said by these apathetic points, 'peccadillo/sin', is meant a moment when the feeders invoke a supernatural power for an evil to befall or curse their dependents and say, the same phrase in often forms urge on a curse by using the following words saying these: a) may you get not clothes? b) May you, get not food for using up? C) Why did it you may get not something in taking/drinking to any further extent. In one go, it is from this condition that an extravagant individual is caused suffering a lot. Causing discomfort to one another is amongst socially immoral and prohibited norms and unexpected from close relatives in both cases of the past and the present Arsi Oromo communities. In the same way, as to them breaking the rules and orders of the Oromo culture could cause for an even out that value for a volatile circumstance for what it is believed to be immoral may perhaps cause to feel for affecting the children of one's family and personality. Because no one is born outside of the human family, where there is no such parallel cultural value of that we are talking now.

36 My interview with the Arsi Oromo informants as in the footnote 28.

‘**Yaadaan adda-baduu’** (literally, “divergent ideas”). The very word is originated from two incompatible interests of the groups, individuals as to have a say of the informants’ in no way one group is getting to be alienated from another opposite group without having a personal motive. This moment supposed to be coming about from a nature of abominating realized by source of distorting the relations between opposing interests of individuals, groups. If prior to that time they were a) being together, as closer or intimate friends and using to eat from the same dishes, b) sleep and living or settling around the same community. C) Similarly assisting one another, as it is usually said in Oromo language (‘*wal-gooharuu’) i. e.* designed for not being to be lonely /tedious and drink a coffee from the same coffee of cups and pot, d) working many things together, etc. Nevertheless, when there is an act of back bite, one’s personality in the absence of him in that case it becomes obvious that a situation would be followed by difference of opinion and then such detestation could unquestionably cause about the detachment between two parties. Therefore, Arsi Oromo belief that it is vital to find the middle ground of disputing points to cool situation, between disputants especially if they are relatives. Concerning this, the Arsi sages [37]say. *“…Abbaan quba ufii qutee ufirraa hingatu yoo shamellee”* (This is literally means one can’t cut off his finger even if it is rotten.)

Summary

This theme has encapsulated a traditional system of analyzing conflict based on the Arsi Oromo culture. By scrutinizing power of words indicators in conflict, as in the explanation and summary, the theme attempted showing the very essence of vulgar words, parallel with the immense values for socio-cultural aspects of the community, moral norms, which come with the remarkable forefront in the hearts of every Arsi Oromo.

Therefore, the lesson to learn from these promises is that, using words in between conflict and reconciliation process properly can help to avoid doing conflict.

37 Informants : Azimaach Eda’oo, Azimaach Ashamii Baadhaanee, Bulbulaa, June 2006 E.C.

Finally, the suggestion I would like to recommend the readers of this article is that, if knowledge about the process of conflict therapy and cultural mechanism of conflict mitigation learnt fully from multi ethnic societies of Ethiopia, it is possible to make a country walking by its own foot and using its resources that would form self-esteem system.

Many Arsi informants swear to the very power of words indicators to conflict correspond with the mythology they have known yet, in that, there has been in hostile with them etc.

Being ignorant of the power of words indicators to conflict can bring about negative influences on people. Because of these and other reasons using improper, uncultured words are devastating relations to that ends and cause havoc to society. This largely goes against a harmony, and break the peace, whole systems of social stratums, 'Orommumaa' (Oromoness), which cause can indubitably create conflict situations.

More to the point, for Arsi Oromo anyone who becomes hostile to these conceptual traditionally representations of the power of words indicates to conflict with their cultural values would unavoidably as the one who could about to bring about social conflict. A peaceful coexistence of Arsi Oromo with the neighboring ethnic groups has undoubtedly connected with this specific understanding of self-validation. Moreover, every word of this can separately need to turn to be a big chapter of a book, which may also give the other researchers to have impulse/desire/ to work on similar problem.

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Negative Impact of Globalization on Indigenous Cultures: the Case of Salale Oromo, Ethiopia

Zewde Getahun

1. Introduction

According to Nsibami (2011), globalization is a process of advancement and increase in interaction among countries and peoples of the world facilitated by progressive technological changes in communication, as well as the interaction of cultural values, systems and practices. In line with this definition, Kwame[2] defined globalization as a process of linking regions or nations of the world which is facilitated by information flow (communication), encouraging changes in the pre-existing socio-cultural, political and economic structures and systems of nations and peoples.

In the assessment of the impact of globalization on individuals, nations and the global world, many scholars and political analysts have expressed different views. While they all agree that globalization has a political, economic and cultural impact on individuals, nations and the world at large, they however, disagree on the nature and extent of this impact. While some argue that it is all positive, some believe that it has negative impacts. Yet others see it as being both positive and negative (Kwame, 2007).

Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether globalization absolutely brings about the improvement of the global world. This is why some have defined it from a negative perspective. For example, according to Aborishade (2002), argued that globalization is Western colonialism, particularly American imperialism that seeks to impose its hegemony on other subjugated and exploited nations' threat of economic, culture, political or military coercion.

Currently, the United States of America dominates the current global traffic in information and ideas. American music, American movies, American television and American software are so dominant, so sought after, and so visible that they are now available

literally everywhere on the world. They influence the tastes, lives and aspirations of virtually every nation, Wassim (2013). On the other hand, the U.S. government has played an important role in promoting cultural exports; not only as a source of export income, but also as a means of exporting beliefs, values, and practices that inherently favor U.S. based corporate capitalism (Mel, 2013).

The dynamism of culture casts doubt on the possibility of a global culture. Part of this dynamism is that each culture has its own personality. Central to globalization is the idea of a global culture, Mel (2013). However, the idea of a global culture is imaginary or unreal. If culture means a collective mode of life or a collection of beliefs, styles, values and symbols, then we can only speak of cultures not just (one) culture, for a collective mode of life presupposes different modes and ranges. To this end, the researcher argues that the idea of a global culture is impossible, except in ideal terms.

Key informants explained that indigenous cultures are joined by a host of additional cultural forms from abroad, presenting people with a confusing array of lifestyle options from which to choose. Established identities and ways of life are giving way to new forms of hybrid 'identity' composed of elements from contrasting cultural sources. Thus, Ethiopian youth today might continue to be strongly influenced by western cultures and western popular culture has attained an immense global following. In Ethiopia, it is common to see that most adolescent living style which includes way of dressing, talking, dancing, eating; beliefs etc. are highly changed to western cultures. Most of youths' cell phones with audio and video player have wide various western cultural products. Thus, the exposure to these western cultural products makes the youth despise their own indigenous culture.

Language is a prime area where the negative impact of globalization has been existing. For example, according to the estimation of English Cultural Council, the number of people around the world who are learning English has reached 1 billion and about 1.5 to 2 billion people are in contact with English. By 2050, half of the world's population will be proficient in using English. The linguists divide the people using English into three categories: the first category refers to the people, who are using English as their native language, and usually it is their only language. These people

mainly live in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Iceland, and South Africa. The second category refers to the people, who are using English as their second language. These people generally live in former British colonies and areas and regions which are greatly influenced by the United States, such as India, Nicaragua, Singapore, Philippines and Hong Kong of China. The third category refers to the people who are using English as a foreign language. Generally, these areas and regions do not have a close relationship with the United States (Jiao, 2013).

According to Afsaneh (2013), the world is a home of 7,105 living languages; among them 1,481 are in trouble and 906 are dying. As some statistics indicate, it is estimated that if nothing is done half of these languages spoken today will disappear in the future. Seemingly, with the extinction of unwritten and undocumented languages, humanity would lose not only a cultural wealth, but also important ancestral knowledge embedded in indigenous languages. Among all these languages "English" is the only language which is spoken by more people as a second language than a first language.

For example, according to Raja, English is become dominant or official language in over 60 countries and is represented on every continent. It means English is used in every country, across the globe. Most of the scientific, technological and academic information in the world is expressed in English and over 80% of all the information stored in electronic retrieval systems is in English. In a practical sense, the knowledge of English is essential. In terms of the appreciation of language and literature, knowledge of English is extremely important in understanding some of the best writings offered, Mel (2013). In addition, according to Mbea (2005), the advent of colonialism gradually eroded the place of African languages in African economies by granting the highest prestige value to school education in colonial languages.

The extinction of language has been existing since ancient times, but the problem is now a day its scale is bigger and speed quicker. According to Jiao (2013), due to cultural imperialism half of the languages will disappear in middle 21stcentury. Therefore some countries such as France spend 100 million US dollars to promote French culture every year. French scientists are clearly aware of the situation. They say that either they publish their articles in English

or die with French quietly. Thus, the non-English speaking countries will be faced with a dilemma, to integrate into the world to be modernized or to isolate them to maintain national character. In order to be modernized, it is necessary to integrate into the world, but this will certainly bring some changes to traditional culture. Further, according to Mahon, the minority languages, which are native, become appropriate for use in fewer and fewer contexts, until it they are entirely supplanted by the incoming new language (English language). This language shift or the act of dying happens gradually over several generations (Mc Mahon, 1994).

Finally, the current situation of globalization is leading to cultural imperialism or dominance of one nation's culture over others which are closely related to global communication. It is about imposing a culture of a 'superior' country over less powerful societies. Thus, cultural imperialism is the practice of promoting and imposing a culture, usually that of a politically powerful nation over a less powerful society and alienating people from their indigenous culture. Thus, the specific objectives of this article are to assess the negative impact of globalization on indigenous Ethiopian language, food style, dressing style, marriage, religion, and history.

2. Methodology

In this study, the researcher used qualitative methods of data analysis. Thus, the research tools used are open ended and in-depth individual interviews and observation to analyze the negative impact of globalization on the indigenous of Ethiopian cultures. The key informants were selected from five towns in the North Shewa zone of the Oromia regional state of Ethiopia which include: Fitche town, Garba Guracha town, Gowa Tsion town, Tullu Milki town and Debre Tsige town.

In order to find relevant data, the researcher had chosen snowball sampling which depends on initial contacts suggesting further people to be contacted by the researcher. Generally, as a primary source, the researcher used in-depth individual interviews and observation with different key informants in order to feed the study with recent and updated information about the negative impact of globalization on the indigenous Ethiopian cultures. Secondary sources such as books, articles and research papers were also critically used.

3. Results and Discussion

If the culture is growing in a homogeneous character, it can be assumed to be a form of cultural imperialism. For example, change in language usage is usually considered as an indicator of cultural integration if the principal language in the community differs from that of the native language. One of the most common criticisms we hear about the impact of globalization of today's world is that it is producing mainly one culture, it is destroying diversity and it is bringing everyone into the same global culture.

In Ethiopia, currently domestic cultures are joined by a host of additional cultural forms from abroad, presenting people with a confusing array of lifestyle options from which to choose. For example, According to Getalem (2015), different western based satellite Television (TV) programs, which deliver western cultural and entertainment products, could negatively impact the indigenous cultures of Ethiopia.

Today, individuals and groups trying to annex their cultures with new global practices based on what they have seen from mass media worldwide. As a result, Ethiopian cultures and values are highly changing over time and become more dependent on western cultures. In fact, all western cultures are not bad, but the problem is when Ethiopians accept all western cultures without identifying their negative impacts in their life. Globalization is hiding or at least underlings all previous ways of answering need and of dealing with changes of human life. According to Jeremy (2004), all other ways of life are diminished and marginalized at a stroke due to globalization. He considered globalization as a declaration of war upon all other cultures. The following are dimensions of negative impact of globalization on indigenous Ethiopian cultures which further identified in this article.

3.1 Language

In fact, language is the carrier of culture, and every language is the crystallization of each culture. It is the process of cultural exchange and cultural diffusion for people to use language to communicate with each other. However, key informants explained about the role of English he said that currently English is spread and used worldwide; it inevitably becomes an important tool for the output of western culture and even a means of western countries to seek

cultural hegemony. He adds, language users can gain a sense of cultural identity and social belongings through language. In general, the language of a nation is deeply rooted in national culture and accompanied by national traditions. Language cannot survive, develop and improve without culture. Language is the core of culture. Conversely, the strong culture is always in a dominant position, and it can select and deploy other culture according to its own needs to strengthen itself.

When the researcher asked interviewees about the impact of English on local languages, they said that due to the western education and colonialism in the past some cultural values have been destroyed. For example, the local languages (e.g. Gee'ez language in Ethiopia) became outdated because of its displacement by the English language which is currently the most efficient medium of education especially at secondary and tertiary levels of education. During colonialism, human development became valuable only when it was acquired in the colonial power's language and ability became only valuable to the national development effort if it acquired in the colonial master's language such as English, etc. Thus, colonialism influenced the world and changed radically in terms of culture, education, science, communication etc. The British colonialism introduced English language in the countries ruled by the British and now it has become a global language with the roots of the British imperialism in the past and the modern imperialism of America.

When the researcher asked about the extent of influences of English language over other languages the key informant said that, in Africa, English has become a highly influential language though some countries in Africa were ruled by France, Italy, Spain, etc. In this modern world, African countries are following English language particularly, South Africa, Nigeria and Zimbabwe have adopted English as their own language. Especially, amongst the educated, English functions as a lingua franca and is a primary language of government, business and commerce. Educationally, it is a compulsory subject in all schools and is the preferred medium of instruction in most schools and tertiary institutions. In terms of societal influence, it is clear that English has spread far beyond the domain of those of British origin. Amongst the African majority, English has typically been seen as the language of liberation and

black unity. Especially the mixing of English and another indigenous language is perhaps the strong indication of the impact of English.

Other interviewees explained about the extent of influences of English language over other languages he said that the influence of English language over other languages has been increasing. For example, today educational qualification in Ethiopian language became less value than qualification in the colonial language (English) because of the influence of westerns due to their science supported civilizations. The introduction of English language gradually eroded the place of Ethiopian languages in education. Even, sometimes it becomes difficult to find individuals who are more interesting to use their mother tongue especially at urban areas than English. Instead of using their mother tongue, they are highly interesting to use English which is not native for them due to the reasons that English is considered as valuable and highly necessary than other native languages of Ethiopia. This is why some Ethiopian languages (such as Gee'ez) are at the stage of dying.

Others key informants add, it has been established that a lost language is a lost culture, a lost culture is invaluable knowledge lost. In fact, the influence of English dominance on non-English speaking countries like Ethiopia may be contrary to the influence on English speaking countries. Its negative impact may be more than positive impact. The benefits brought by English are that people from different countries can communicate with each other freely. However, language is not just a communication tool; it is also the carrier of culture and signs of identity. Faced with the resistance of English dominance, many non-English speaking countries may feel helpless, and may also feel worried about the culture invasion brought by English dominance. Although the impact brought by English dominance is invisible and intangible, they indeed exist and can't be changed in a short time.

Other interviewees said that even the current situations of using English language more than any others local languages shows that there is cultural imperialism, which is the continuation of colonial policy, but the means is relatively civilized updated. Especially for those minority languages, the dominance of English can be devastating, and it may even mean the death of some languages, cultures and identities. The death of language has been existing from

the ancient time, but the problem is now a day its scale is bigger and speed quicker.

In Ethiopia, English has been taught as a subject for students starting in primary school since 1994, when a new education policy was implemented, Jeremy (2004). In addition, most universities in Ethiopia use English as the language of instruction because, as one informant explained that, "90 percent of academic resources we get in Ethiopia come from the West and this is almost done in English language," Bogale (2009). Thus, English can be considered the language of academia, and therefore, English proficiency is a necessity for success at the tertiary level. However, Bogale, using qualitative research results in several regions of Ethiopia, argues that inconsistent language teaching practices and under-resourced teachers make the effectiveness of English language acquisition in the younger grades often inconsistent. These inconsistencies can make success in the higher levels of school more difficult for students because they do not have the English language skills necessary to succeed. Despite these challenges, Bogale reports that population surveys reveal that both students and their parents recognize English as the language of education. In this sense, there is a strong shared understanding of the importance of English language acquisition (Bogale, 2009).

Ethiopia, one of the oldest independent nations which have its well-developed language of Amharic, also has used English as a language of instruction at high schools and post-secondary schools since modern education started in the country after 1920. What makes the Ethiopian use of English language unique is that as one key informant said, for example in Oromia region English was given as a second language from grades 1 to 8, and when students transfer to grade nine and above, the language of instruction will be changed to English, and this is continued all the way to colleges and universities while Ethiopia's working language remains Amharic. On the other hand, this caused for low academic performances of students in school *(ibid).*

The new government structure of Ethiopia emphasizes the self-determination of people based on their linguistic and cultural identity and created nine regional states and two special administrative zones. Among the nine regional states only Amhara and the Southern Ethiopia regions use Amharic as their working language, which is

also the working language of the federal government located in Addis Ababa and the Dire Dawa special administrative zone. Hence, this federal arrangement and freedom of language use for local language necessitated adopting English as well as Amharic as an official working language by the federal government of Ethiopia. However, as one of key informant said that the fact is that in Ethiopia English language is become more influential and the killer language of other native languages of the country.

In order to decide whether English is a killer language or not, we have to look at language death in general. Whenever the language of a dominant nation is introduced into a less powerful society, the indigenous population may regard the new language as more prestigious than their native tongue (i.e. people who speak the former fluently have more access to authority) and therefore gradually turn bilingual. The country's indigenous language is in time abandoned or incorporated into the foreign one that is English language. Further, 'the minority language then, becomes appropriate for use in fewer and fewer contexts, until it is entirely supplanted by the incoming language and the minority language then shift or the act of dying will be happen in the future.

3.2 Food Style

When the key informants asked about the negative impact of globalization on food style, they said that the eating styles of Ethiopian societies are changing due to globalization. Traditionally, most Ethiopians ate more organic foods than inorganic ones which are expensive,genetically modified and imported. On the other hand, eating more cultural diets instead of expensive and genetically modified foods that are imported is healthier. In addition, an increase in the consumption of Ethiopian cultural foods will catalyze and increase international trade in such commodities, and thus help to economically empower more Ethiopian people.

Other interviewees said that many Ethiopians are impressed by western foods such as pizzas and burgers which were not known in the culture. Now a day's Ethiopian people prefer to eat Pizza than Injera and drink different alcohol and soft drinks rather than water. Generally, the most popular and cultured food habits had been changing to western foods because of globalization.

3.3 Religion and History

It is true that globalization has also negative impacts on religion and history. When the key informants asked about the negative impact of globalization on religion, they said that in Ethiopia, currently due to negative impact of globalization many people become disappointment and regressed from their original beliefs. But in Ethiopian religion and culture was stand for a better chance to offer alternatives to address rising corruption, crime and other violence. For instances, the Oromo Gada system was the Oromo traditional institution involving political process, economic, cultural, ritual, spiritual, social and administrational system based on holistic ideas of participatory and representative democracy. It has its own principles in which power is both vertically and horizontally distributed, balanced, checked, controlled and limited. Such mechanism of power distribution and limitation was crucial to prevent or to solve conflict, to maintain political, economic, cultural, social and institutional stability like that of modern democracy.

The interviewees add that sometimes due to the negative impact of globalization, knowingly or unknowingly, people are seemed to have forgotten past history and religion which signifies that Ethiopian cultures and history has been destroyed and diluted. But the past is very important, that is the major reason why history is being studied as a subject. The past can never be considered as a burden towards solving present day issues and as such should not be ignored. For instances, there was traditional conflict prevention and resolution such as the Oromo Gada system which is much recommended even among civilized society. Sometimes there are cases the modern court cannot solve, but that can be solved easily through society's beliefs and norms only and this showed that society's beliefs can make a great contribution toward ensuring peace and stability in a modern society. However, due to impact of globalization, society's beliefs and histories are changing, weakening and losing their power to solving society's problems.

Other key informant adds that due to the impact of globalization, the multicultural nature of Ethiopian society has been ignored. Most individuals fail to recognize the enriching value of cultural diversity. It is tempting to deny this diversity consciously or unconsciously. Cultural shift is a common effect of globalization and Ethiopia is no exception. The major Christian ,rthodox and protestants prohibit

consuming alcohol, smoking and free sex in Ethiopia. But due to globalization, people perceive them as fashion and following all those ills such as consuming alcohol, smoking and unlimited and unwanted sexual intercourse.

3.4 Dressing style

When the key informants asked about the negative impact of globalization on the culture of dressing, they said that looking good generally is an area of great interest to many people especially the youth. Over the years, the youth have tried to be fashionable and have exhibited clothing which is influenced to a large extent by foreign fashion in the wake of globalization. The extent of this influence affects the youth and the local (domestic) fashion industry negatively. They add, the Ethiopian clothing style has become an adaptation of western fashion trends. European and American influence has become so widespread and so invasive across almost every activity; from education, religion, politics, social change, and fashion is no exception.

Another key informant explained the negative impact of globalization on dressing style by saying that fashion, which is the result of globalization, can expose individual to have unwanted sexual intercourse. One interviewee said that most of the time young people focus on the dressing style of an individual to decide about their personal quality rather than their actual skill and knowledge. Many people said that somebody is attractive, good, smart, etc. simply by looking at their dressing style without considering their knowledge and skill which may have its own negative implication. In addition, the dress of many Ethiopians has transformed to resemble a more western style; traditional clothes can be seen only during festivals, especially those living in urban areas of the country who are completely taken with western way of dressing compared to the rural areas.

When the researcher asked a female interviewee about her dressing style, they said that most of the times, she liked to wear very trousers rather than other cultural dress. In addition, she said, sometimes they forced themselves to get new fashion to dress and to wear makeup . When they asked the reason for using makeup it was used t to attract men because currently, looks have become more important than personality and skills. Thus, girls who are

impacted by the globalization of fashion might find themselves engaging in sexual activities much earlier than the previous generations.

In addition another key informants said that girls who start wearing makeup at an early age are also at increased risk of developing different health problems and they are vulnerable to the toxic ingredients used in cosmetic products. The fashion and makeup industries are working hard to keep us blind to the dangers they pose. Most cosmetic products contain different dangerous ingredients which can pose health risks. Therefore, individuals have to give priority to their cultural clothes than foreign dressing style.

When the interviewees were asked about the solution for such problems they said that society should be taught the value of culture, the value of self-respect, love for themselves and their natural selves, before they start hiding behind makeup. If we are not careful, the innocence of our children will dissolve due to the overwhelming pressures of the makeup and fashion industries to look a certain way. People also need to be more aware of the toxic ingredients lurking in most cosmetic products we use; everything from toothpaste to hair color. Lastly, there should be laws as to what ingredients can be put in cosmetics and they should be treated as strictly as food and drug laws.

Other key informants add that now a day dressing style of Ethiopian society is changing especially people in urban areas are shifting towards Western wearing style. Some girls wear fewer clothes and dress more provocatively than in the past when modest clothes were valued. This is extremely tempting for young men in a society where a certain style of dress was associated with the sex industry. The hairstyles are also changing. Boys and girls can now kiss each other in the taxi, on the bus, on the roadside and so on. It was not like this in times past. If pressing measures are not taken, perhaps indigenous Ethiopian dressing style will soon run into extinction in the future.

3.5 Marriage

The data obtained through interview showed that in the past, Ethiopian culture was not allowed free sex (unlimited sexual intercourse) and even looking pornographic film by itself was not culturally acceptable c. The cultures of societies were highly

encouraged only one to one marriage. However, today pornography and having unlimited sexual partners has expanded weakening the original norms and values of society. For instances, when the researcher asked a key informants about why they watch pornographic movies from their mobile device they have responded that young Ethiopians are living in the same global village with the other countries in the world and need to know all things. Thus, the growth in information and communication technologies contributes to the propagation of the western values and discourages the indigenous culture of marriage.

The researcher's fear is that the pornographic movies that come to Ethiopia via internet are very dangerous for the wellbeing of the youth. It further introduces homosexuality, gay marriage and lesbianism. From the abovementioned testimonies, therefore, it can be argued that most of the informants believe that pornography contradicts the moral, cultural, ethical, and religious values of Ethiopia, besides putting the physical health of the people at risk. Especially, for those young people at the *'fire age'* pornography might have a direct influence because it urges them to practice sex without planning. As a result, young generations are capturing some of the alien cultures, at least some of the sexual acts perceived in the pornography, as well as rushing to unplanned and early sexual practices [sex before marriage] activities that obviously disgrace the traditional value of virginity.

The key informants said that several young Ethiopians who are employed, educated, men and women, married and unmarried have seen pornographic video and downloaded it. Many people end up becoming regular customers of looking pornographic movies in secret due to it is not allowed by Ethiopian culture. However, many young people are become attracted to such western values and norms. The supporters of pornography argued in Ethiopia where sex is not liberated, sexuality issue is taboo, and where there is no formal sexual education is provided at schools, watching pornographic media help them to find answers for their questions and curiosities. It also helps them "to break the silence" about sexuality at least in their own minds and among their peer groups.

The researcher asked key informants about their feelings after they view pornography, and also how it influences their daily life activities and their interaction with people; especially of opposite

sexes. One of the key informants said, "I hate to see women the next day I watch pornography because women appear for me as an animals, but not as humans. Sometimes, very fat and ugly women appear on the porn. It makes me dislike women."

One informant described the new sexual practices he had seen. He said that "there are a lot of new things I saw in pornography. I have come to know about different sex position. Culturally, it is not common and acceptable thing. Once I have also seen sex between the same sexes. I do not like when I see sexual activity between similar sexes. This is not totally in line with Ethiopian culture. It is unacceptable thing. It is ugly. I cannot tolerate such kind of movies. I remember once when I switched my mobile device because I was not comfortable with it."

Finally, such kind of western norms may negatively affect the good culture of marriage and resulted in dehumanization of women as sexual objects or commodities; or women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in being raped or women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated. Therefore, if important measures are not taken in this regard, indigenous Ethiopian cultures of marriage will change in the future.

5. Conclusion

Ethiopia has to maintain and encourage a value in its culture because of its goodness and richness since ancient times. For instances, the negative aspect of sex in Ethiopian culture is the silence surrounding it. Traditional values include: women should be faithful to their husbands, only members of the opposite sex should marry each other, women should not have sex with many people and young girls should remain virgins until they marry. These days, it is risky to engage in sex with many people. Girls are victim in this regard. They may get pregnant, infected with HIV and other sexual transmitted disease. They need to be cautious about this. It is better to value virginity and stick to the old tradition of our society.

Finally, with regard to the nature and extent of the impact of globalization on cultures, the researcher argues that the negative effects of globalization have been much more than its positive effects on Ethiopian cultures. Personal assessment reveals here that,

if pressing measures are not taken, perhaps Ethiopian cultures such as language, food style, religion and history, dressing style, monogamy, etc. will soon rapidly decline. Therefore, it can be argued that some of the 'old' and 'good' culture of the nations is threatened by western values and norms.

Thus, there should be parental explanation, transparent discussion about sexuality and reproductive health issues with children and youth so that they do not seek information about sexuality from the wrong places like pornographic media. In order to prevent the attraction of the youth to Western pornographic media products, sex education must be encouraged in high schools or secondary schools and also needs to be included in the curricula.

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Ethiopian Nationalism, Oromo Exclusion and the Rise of Abiy Ahmed (2018-2020): The Uses and Abuses of being First

Zakia Posey

Introduction

The 2014-2018 non-violent Oromo youth protest movement led to unprecedented changes to Ethiopia's political landscape. This movement advocated equality, economic opportunity, respect for the nation's diversity and democratization. Interestingly, it facilitated the first non-violent regime change in Ethiopian history and led to the appointment of Ethiopia's first "Oromo" Prime Minister.[1] During the early days of his tenure, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed promised to be an agent of change. In addition, he received a great deal of national and international attention because of the optimism he initially evoked and the reforms he enacted from 2018-2019. He was so respected that he won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to broker peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Ahmed was hailed as a hero and even a magical figure in the national and international press during the early days of his term.

In 2018 and in to 2019, he was initially accepted by the Oromo youth because of the reforms he enacted and his promise to lead the country toward democracy. In addition, the seemingly major changes he made early on helped him shore up support from the international community and as a trusted partner. However, once his position was solidified, he introduced a policy agenda that directly challenged country's multinational federalism political framework and the pro-democracy movement that led to his appointment. Starting in 2019, his administration began a brutal crackdown on dissent, violated human rights, jailed political opponents who challenged his steps to centralize, circumscribed press freedoms and postponed the elections. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's actions, when considered collectively, lean toward authoritarianism,

Ethiopia's norm, rather than democracy.[2] Instead of being reformist, his policy agenda is reactionary. His political machinations signify that he seeks to eventually dismantle the constitutional mandate that undergirds multinational federalism and to replace it with a centralized version of Ethiopian nationalism that harkens back to Ethiopia's pre-1974 past. In this version of Ethiopia, the nation is narrowly imaged and any recognition of and respect for diversity is pushed to the margins. He has become an Oromo leader that does not advance the interests of the masses of everyday Oromo people.

Abiy Ahmed has been interpellated in a number of ways within and outside Ethiopia. How he and others characterize his personal identity and aspirations is significant to the future of Ethiopia because whatever discourse becomes dominant has the potential to support and fix a certain policy agenda and narrative about what Ethiopia is and how it should be imagined and understood in the future: Ethiopia as a modern multinational nation on the path to democracy or Ethiopia as an ancient kingdom characterized by a hierarchical Christian and Semitic culture. This paper seeks to explore the challenges and opportunities associated with being the first member of a minority group to lead a multicultural nation-state. More specifically, it is an article that seeks to explore the significance and use of the identity discourses and/ the signifying practices surrounding Abiy Ahmed, his rise and first-ness/exceptionalism by contextualizing the various ways he positions himself and how he has been positioned within the context of the nation's tenuous history of Oromo-Ethiopia relations. First, I will highlight the narrow ways the Oromo have been discussed within Ethiopian Studies. Next, the Oromo protests will be briefly discussed to provide the reader an understanding of the climate out of which Abiy Ahmed's appointment was made in order to situate it within Oromo nationalism and political activism more broadly. Finally, the importance of Abiy Ahmed as an Oromo first and the uses and abuses of his "first-ness" will be compared with other political firsts in order to highlight how being a minority first informs the political agenda of these individuals.

The Oromo within Ethiopian Studies and Politics: Foreigners, Scourge and Invaders

In order to understand how Abiy Ahmed is positioned within Ethiopian politics today, it is imperative that we briefly review the history of ethnicity within Ethiopian studies from a historical perspective. Academic discourses reflect the prevailing perspectives of the day and also influence them. Ethiopia is a contested discursive and territorial space embroiled in intense debates about its history, borders and administrative polices. Disagreements about origins, descent, and classification are at the heart of conflicts over meaning and space that characterized Oromo-Ethiopian relations. The roots of these conflicts lie in pre-modern Abyssinia's understanding of itself and neighboring peoples and its conceptualization of difference. These ideologies shaped the nature of Ethiopia's state formation and maintenance processes and its treatment of incorporated minorities like the Oromo. Country names like Ethiopia have attached genealogies and histories and play a role in informing how the nation is articulated (Slack 1996), who has the legitimacy to control the state, its resources and who belongs within its boundaries.

The origin and date of the Oromo presence within Ethiopia can be used to highlight the complexity of the intersections and divergences associated with ethnicity and nationalism in Ethiopia. Debates about the origin of the Oromo and their presence within Ethiopia were influenced by an account called the *History of the Galla* written by an Ethiopian priest named Abba Bahrey during the 16th century. In it Bahrey claimed that the Oromo attacked Bale (an area in southeastern modern Ethiopia) in 1522 and this date was taken by academics as the date the Oromo entered Ethiopian history. This text has been very influential in Ethiopian studies in part because it was one of the first documents to provide some details about the Oromo. Though the text was mostly concerned with Oromo history and some aspects of Oromo culture, it depicted the Oromos as barbaric, foreign invaders of Abyssinia. *The History of the Galla* was the seminal text that helped to constitute the Oromo negatively. Bahrey asserts the followings, "I have begun to write the history of the Galla in order to make known the numbers of their tribe, their readiness to kill people, and the brutality of their manners" (Huntingford &Beckingham 1993: 44). Another early commentator on the Oromo was Manoel de Almeida, a Portuguese

monk who visited Ethiopia and catalogued the sights and people he encountered during his stay in the country from 1622 to 1633 (Shinn et al. 2004: 287). Almeida represented the Oromo as a "scourge" and a ruin to the empire. He claimed the Oromo were like brutal lions and tigers, ever ready to expand into Abyssinian and to consume the nation.

Starting in the 17th century a subset of Oromos began to enter the annals of Ethiopian court history. They entered the record initially as solider in the employ of king Susenyos (1607 -1632) as he was one of the first Abyssinian monarchs to use the Oromo in the service of the empire (Pankhurst 2001:125). In time, Oromos began to integrate into northern Abyssinian towns and the military.

The marriage of Gondarine kings and princes to Oromo women, or the recruitment of Oromo fighters to Gondar armies did not lead to Oromo integration into Abyssinian state. In general the Kings brought Oromo fighters to Gondar during a period when they were desperately in need of Oromo assistance for their own survival and not as a programme of Oromo integration into Amhara-Tigrayan societies. As Abir has pointed out, the consequence of Oromo presence in Gondar was increased ethnic hatred and hostility against them (Bulcha 2011: 124).

The period that roughly corresponded to Oromo control of the throne, from the 1770s to 1855, came to be known as the Era of Princes or the Zamana Masafent (Zewde 2002). This period was viewed as a dark period of Ethiopian history because the Zamana Masafent was associated with the control of Abyssinia by outsiders, disorder and regionalism. The Oromo presence was blamed for this disorder. Even well into the 20th century, the Oromo were depicted negatively in academic accounts. In 1960, Edward Ullendorff published The Ethiopians: An Introduction to its Country and People. The book was not as holistic as its title suggested in that Ullendorff dedicated the bulk of its attention to the Semitic speaking ethnic groups. He had this to say about the Oromo:

The Gallas had little to contribute to the Semitized civilization of Ethiopia; they possessed no significant material or intellectual culture, and their social organization differed considerably from that of the population among whom they settled. They were not the only the cause of the depressed state into which the country now sank, but they helped to prolong a situation from which even a physically and

spiritually exhausted Ethiopia might otherwise have been able to recover far more quickly (1965: 73).

Thus, Ullendorff conceived of the Oromo as a drain on Ethiopia and viewed them as partly responsible for the country's stagnation and lack of development.

The Greater Ethiopia thesis, first presented by Donald Levin in his seminal work Greater Ethiopia the Evolution of a Multiethnic Society (1974), has been a very powerful force within Ethiopian studies and politics used to justify Ethiopia's current geographical configuration. Levine claims that Greater Ethiopia corresponds with modern Ethiopia's national boundaries. His notion of Greater Ethiopia as an enduring and long standing almost naturally existing regional entity has been at the root of many conflicts between Ethiopia and her neighbors. This thesis helped to justify modern Ethiopia's purported 3000 history and at the same time it helped to discredit conquered minority claims of colonization. Levine's inclusion of formerly excluded groups was claimed by the author to be an improvement upon the Semitic-centered scholarship. It is my contention that though he dedicated more space in his account to the Oromo compared to his predecessors, he systematically constructed the Oromo as an uncivilized other and described the Oromo in ways that reinforce and justify their subordination. For example,

> The warfare between the Amhara and the Afar and Somali tribesmen under Gran [in the 16th century] was in some respects a clash between similar antagonists. Both were groups of Semitized Ethiopians, and adherents of Semitic religions and followers of political leaders who saw legitimacy through identification with Semitic ancestors. By contrast, the expansion of the Oromo represents a novel element in the politics of the empire –the assertion of the pagan, purely African [emphasis mine] (78).

Levine need not explicitly call the Oromo primitive, but by juxtaposing the Semitic Amhara, Somali, and Afar with the purely African Oromo, his texts casts them as outsiders. The Oromo of the region are represented as raw (Strauss 1969) and unadulterated Africans, not tempered by the Semitic influences of civilization.

The Oromo as Other

Within Ethiopian studies, the Oromo were misrepresented as foreign, violent, non-Christian heathens, and as a kind of pernicious force wedded to destruction. In other instances, they were characterized as a human plague that infected Abyssinia or as an infestation or swarm of insects bent on devouring the empire. The marking of social distance in these accounts appears to be at the heart of these representations. "Ethnic discriminations are elements of more general classifications which identify relations of similarity and difference within the social universe" (Fardon 1990: 171). The aforementioned accounts illustrate an ethnic classificatory scheme which ranked the country's different ethnic groups on a continuum between civilization and barbarism.

The depictions of the Oromo as the binary opposite of the Abyssinian were a practice through which the nation could more positively imagine itself and onto which it could cast its fears. The representations of Ethiopian exceptionalism (Jalata 2009) within Ethiopian studies became an order of discourse which served to legitimize Ethiopia, its associated nationalism and the exploitation of peripheral groups. There is a connection here between ethnicity and nationalism. In many cases, nationalism has an ethnic component because the dominant ethnic groups' practices, religion, and language often become the substance out of which a nation's nationalism is derived. Thus, national identity becomes an un-marked and natural category for those in power, whiles those remote or with few connections to the dominant ethnic group are depicted as deviant.

According to many within Oromo studies (Baxter 1978; Holcomb and Ibsaa1990; Jalata 1993; Hultin 1996; Bulcha 1997; Hassen 2002) one cannot understand Ethiopian nationalism and the reactions it evoked from its periphery without looking at the history of the role ethnicity played in informing the relationship(s) between majority and minority populations in the country. Ethnicity is constructed through social contact and practice (Eriksen 2002) and what I call the taxonomic valuations of the other. Implicit within Ethiopian representations about the nation and its various ethnic groups was a system of classification and ranking where the nation's major ethnic groups were hierarchically ordered based on their closeness to some fictive national ideal (Semitic speaking Orthodox Christian/ Habasha). Oromo-Ethiopian conflicts are associated with

the control of land and free political and cultural expression and association. Abyssinia's southern and western marches, her subsequent conquest of the Oromo, the creation of the neftengna – gabbar system of land tenancy and the creation of the territory that became modern Ethiopia are all associated with the political inscription and demarcation of space to the territory that became Ethiopia.

Ethiopian Nation Building and the Construction of Oromo Marginality

During the modern era, the Ethiopian state, like many other national territories, was often described using container metaphors that marked off Ethiopian uniqueness and distinguished it from other African territories (Bennet et. Al 2003: 1). Though the nation state, as a political territory, is often viewed as an enduring, natural, and distinct container of people and cultures, they are better understood as constructed spatial formations based social relations. The state "should be examined not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist" (Painter 2010: 1116). Boundedness and continuity do not exist naturally they are formed through action and discourse.

Ethiopia's control of the conquered areas during the early days of expansion was maintained by way of force. In time, the exploitation and forced assimilation of conquered groups was supported by a set of discourses about difference that justified Ethiopia's practices toward incorporated minorities like the Oromo. Prior to the Ethiopian revolution of 1974, Ethiopia sought to reduce the ethnic diversity that characterized the nation by pursuing an official and unofficial policy of assimilation that privileged the Semitic speaking culture of the Amhara and Tigray core. The discourse then emerges to reinforce and justify marginal status.

Oromo Resistance

Though Ethiopia currently espouses a policy of ethnic federalism, the public articulation of ethnicity was initially received with hostility by many Ethiopian politicians and academics. Ethiopian nationalists often claimed that ethnicity either did not exist or was not deeply felt by the nation's various groups until the 1960s and 1970s where its introduction was viewed as a foreign import or as a

tactic used by ethnic elites to capture state power. However, ethnicity and cultural difference have been at the forefront of how Abyssinia (and later Ethiopia) defined itself vis-à-vis other groups in the area (Baxter 1978). Prior to 1991, to be an Ethiopian effectively meant to practice an identity that was connected to old Abyssinia, it was to either be or act as a Habesha (to speak Amharic, practice Orthodox Christianity, and adhere to Abyssinian cultural norms). Oromo culture was attacked by the state. Ethiopian nationalism developed as an ideology that forbade and demeaned the public expression of the culture of the conquered groups.

As a result of the nature of their uneven incorporation, many Oromos experienced cultural, economic and political marginalization. Starting in the 1960s, key segments of the Oromo population began to challenge their minority status. By the 1970s, Oromo dissent was met with government persecution. As a result, the politicization of Oromo nationalism developed as a reaction to marginalization. Since the 1960s, Ethiopia's various leaders have attempted to circumscribe Oromo aspirations for respect, democracy, and representation. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) has been at the forefront of the struggle against Oromo exploitation since the mid-1970s. Though this was the case, OLF was banned in the country and any affiliation with the organization was severely punished by the state. Periodic protests broke out in the country since the Bale rebellion in the 1960s, but they were either regional or not sustained. Oromo exploitation was built on force and legitimized by discourses that deemed Abyssinians as the rightful leaders of the nation and their traditions as best suited in the empire for emulation; until recently, the Oromo had been depicted as lacking traditions sophisticated enough to be used to guide the nation.

The Oromo Protests and Abiy Ahmed

The Oromo protests of 2014-2018 altered the pattern of protest and represented an overflow of the longstanding dissatisfaction that the Oromo had with Ethiopia and their incorporation. In April of 2014, it was revealed that the Ethiopian government designed and launched the Addis Ababa Integrated Development Master Plan (AAIDMP) which aimed to expand the boundaries of the capital city by incorporating parts of the Oromia region into Addis Ababa in the name of development. The AAIDMP became an instant controversy.

Protests soon ensued because the proposed plan would displace hundreds of thousands of Oromo farming households. The Ethiopian government temporarily shelved the plan due to these demonstrations. However, starting in late 2015, Ethiopia expressed renewed interest in moving forward with the AAIDMP which ignited massive countrywide protests across the Oromia region of Ethiopia. Grievances now extend beyond the AAIDMP and expressed widespread and longstanding Oromo dissatisfaction with perceived ethnic discrimination, lack of proportional economic investment in Oromia and the government's inability to allow the legitimate expression of democratic freedoms in the country.

From November 2015 to 2018, the Ethiopian government killed thousands of protesters and detained tens of thousands of others in its attempts to quell dissent. Ethiopian issued a six-month State of Emergency which severely curtailed mobile phone and internet use, led to mass arrests, and limited free movement within the country to stymie the Oromo Protest Movement. The Oromo Protest Movement was wide-spread, sustained and pro-democracy. The sacrifices made by the Oromo youth of Ethiopia brought unprecedented attention to the Oromo cause and represented the next generation of Oromo nationalism. It is out of the history of Oromo misrepresentation and Oromo resistance that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed emerged.

His appointment was largely the result of the Oromo Protest Movement and can be considered one of the first times in Ethiopian history that non-violent resistance brought about regime change. The swearing in of Ahmed was seen as an attempt to calm divisions. Initially, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed selection halted the years of protests and caused a spirit of optimism to circulate throughout the county concerning the prospects for democracy, the respect of human rights and increased prosperity for all of Ethiopia's citizenry. He freed political prisoners, selected women to participate in the cabinet at historic levels, dealt with the Eritrea question and promised democratization and increased economic development. The liberal changes that he made were so noteworthy that they caused Abiy-mania for the first 6 months of his term.[4] The international press was won over by Africa's youngest leader. Among Ethiopians, his picture was plastered around the country, he was likened to Moses and called a prophet. Many non-Oromos initially hoped Abiy Ahmed signaled a new day in Ethiopian politics.

For the Oromo, Abiy represented the dream of inclusion realized, at least symbolically. With Abiy Ahmed, like Barack Obama and Mandela, statecraft and stagecraft merged. On his US tour he at times dressed in Oromo traditional clothes, which was unheard and astonishing to many in Ethiopia. Though some sectors of the Oromo population were skeptical of Abiy Ahmed's true intentions and unsure if he could resolve the contradictions associated with Ethiopia's imbalanced distribution of resources, power and symbolic value, they were initially optimistic.

Abiy's promise to support free and fair elections in 2020, the welcoming of opposition groups into Ethiopia (both Oromo and Amhara) and gestures of peace with Eritrea were such profound changes that many members of the diaspora were won over by his actions and even some of those that had been staunch opponents of Ethiopia did an about face and returned to Ethiopia with the desire to be a part of this new Oromo-led Ethiopia that appeared qualitatively different from the authoritarian Ethiopia that had characterized the county many had fled. Members of the diaspora did not want to be left out of Ethiopia's transformation. For the first time in decades, some in the diaspora hoped that the Oromo diaspora's capacity could finally be used inside of Ethiopia for the benefit of the Oromo.

Will this new Ethiopia that Abiy frequently speaks of benefit the Oromo or will they be used again as catalyst only to be left behind after their legitimacy has been rendered? What benefits have the *qerroo* and farmers, who helped bring Abiy to power, reaped now that they have an Oromo prime minister? Oromo nationalism had been banned and any expression of a politicized form of Oromo nationalism had been barred and associated with terrorists activity. However, Abiy Ahmed initially opened the space for diverse political discussions. The Oromo were finally able to come out of the shadows and speak freely about their political and economic interests. For a brief period, they had freedom of expression and political assembly. In addition, in the lead up to the Oromo Liberation Front's return to Ethiopia, the ODA tree became not just a symbol of Oromo liberation, it proliferated throughout the country and was seen throughout Addis Ababa in ways that would have been unthinkable before. This conflation of Oromo liberation, democracy and freedom has not been easy for other groups to accept. Seeing the

first family in Oromo attire and engaging in Oromo traditions elevated Oromo culture, according to some.

An Oromo First and the Magical Negro Trope

On the surface it appeared that Ethiopia experienced a whirlwind of change under the leadership of Abiy Ahmed. Many of the "reforms" he enacted were symbolic and often done to elevate Ethiopia's reputation in the eyes of western governments; it is my contention that the appearance of change for Abiy Ahmed holds a certain currency in national and international circles. Abiy Ahmed has not addressed the needs of the youth or famers. It is these groups that were at the center of the pro-democracy movement that brought him to power. If this is the case, then why was Abiy Ahmed so well received initially? I argue here that it was his firstness that garnered him so much attention and caused Ethiopians and foreigners alike to believe that he was markedly different from other Ethiopians leaders of the modern era. In multicultural nations where there has been a long history of discrimination and conflict between dominant and minority groups over issues of belonging and who has the right to the legitimate access to the nation's resources and opportunities, there is often a great deal of hope, excitement and anxiety concerning the first leader from a disenfranchised group. There is something about being first that imbues these figures with an aura of exceptionalism and even magic.

A brief exploration of the magical negro trope can be instructive for our discussion here. In western popular culture, Black people that are not cast as comedic, criminal, hypersexual, ignorant, or lazy have been have at times been depicted as magical negros. A magical negro is a liminal supporting black character in film that often displays altruism, selfishness, high intelligence and some even have magical powers (examples can be found in the Matrix, The Legend of Bagger Vance, the Blindside, Bruce Almighty, Ghost, the curious case of Benjamin Button and many others). These magical Negroes were often wise and morally upright Blacks who served as the moral conscience of White characters (Kempley 2003). In these portrayals, they either 1) help members of the dominant group achieve their goals 2) they help the main character make use of his or her spirituality, and 3) offer "folk wisdom" that can be used to resolve a character's problems. Black presidents deserve special attention

here because they are often associated with the end of the world, chaos or an alien invasion.[3] They are magical in that they are able to accomplish unusually difficult tasks like saving the world or defeating aliens (foreign elements) both of which parallels what is often expected of minority firsts.

I situate Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed among similarly positioned leaders, namely Barack Obama and Nelson Mandela in order to highlight the similar political context out of which Ahmed, Obama and Mandela emerged. In Ethiopia, South Africa and the United States, the significance of being the first minority to take on the mantle of national leadership cannot be understood without looking at the history of de facto and de jure forms of racial and ethnic marginalization in the three nations. It is exclusion that makes Mandela, Obama and Ahmed's first-ness appear noteworthy. All three nations have long histories of minority resistance to oppression; as a result, these figures cannot be understood outside of discussions of resistance movements against racism and ethnic discrimination that made their rise possible. African Americans and Black South Africans experienced legalized racial discrimination in the form of Jim Crow and Apartheid respectively. Oromo marginalization, on the other hand, was both explicit as illustrated by a loss of political power and land that followed conquest, the neftenga gabbar system of land tenancy and the former ban on the public use of the Oromo language etc. Further, more subtle forms of ethnic disparagement compelled many Oromos to eliminate or reduce their Orommumma (Oromo Culture) and assimilate in order to achieve upward mobility. Their marginalization led to the rise of Oromo nationalism in the 1960s with different sectors of the population advocating for reform while other Oromo nationalists sought self-determination. The fact that it took more than 50 years of protracted Oromo activism for Ethiopia to select an Oromo prime minister highlights the degree of political exclusion experienced by Ethiopia's largest ethnic minority.

Nelson Mandela, Barack Obama and Abiy Ahmed are real life figures that are often as depicted magical in international and national news outlets during their first(s) year in office. They are often deemed exceptional and thus not like normal more flawed members of their discriminated group. These three figures are often discussed as having the potential to heal national divides and build

bridges between disparate groups by either their vision, exceptional charisma or personal qualities. In comparing their firstness, I am by no means comparing the merits of their political activities or resumes. Mandela was by far was the most accomplished and endured the most for the nation (he served as guerilla fighter, had years of political experience, and was imprisoned for decades) he is exceptional because of his dedication and resolve; he was seen as the father of the nation. Obama was exceptional as an orator and he had the uncommon ability to act as a mirror to those he captivated, he was able to reflect the wishes of those enamored with him back to them without giving them much else in return. It is said that Abiy Ahmed too has a star-like quality and in news stories he is heralded as "the magic man" and has even been called a talisman.[5] He is exceptional due to his vision and the reforms he enacted.

> A black person in a hegemonic White world necessitates a knowing management and negotiation of one's identity. Indeed, these skills become second nature to any person who becomes a racial "cross-over" success--one learns early to manage and negotiate one's identity especially in integrated professional spaces. As W.E. B. DuBois early recognized, people of color who live, work or play in predominantly white settings acquire "double-consciousness.' (Parker 2016: 752).

For Abiy and Obama in particular, their dual heritage makes them even more desirable to the dominant groups. Their liminality is appealing.

These leaders are often given credibility not because they are a typical representative of their race or ethnic group, but because they are different from the mass in some way. Like with the magical negro trope, it is only through the excision of their identity or selflessness that these firsts gain respect from the dominant groups. Political movements, ideas and changes are often personified by key representatives. Mandela represented both anti- apartheid struggle and the post-apartheid South Africa and Obama was characterized as the post-racial president. "Media constructed personalities begin to hide the complex political processes they personify" (Thomaselli and Shepperson 2018). All three figures articulated a message of unity and forgiveness of past wrongs by the dominant society, or

they attempted to diminish the impact altogether. The first can never truly privilege his own group, he must cater to the majority. They must sacrifice aspects of their identity and the interests of the minorities that helped them rise to power in the first place, if they want legitimacy among the very groups that had marginalized them. They are allowed to rule by dominant groups in order to mitigate the negative consequences of inequality and to manage the invasion of the alien/native. Magical negros fix other people's problems. It was through Obama and Mandela that the United States and South Africa hoped to deal with the race issue. Abiy was selected to contend with and smooth over ethnic issues by advancing a very conservation notion of Ethiopia free of ethnic divisions. "The magic of the master signifier in the ideological field is that it is able to knit together different constituencies, appealing equally, albeit in very different ways, to a variety of classes who are otherwise opposed in their political agendas" (Hook and Van Heule 2016:4). Though these firsts seem revolutionary, they are not; in fact, these leaders are privileged by the dominant society because they often help stave off change.

Conclusion

Abiy Ahmed is not just an Oromo prime minister, he is Ethiopia's leader. Ethiopian nationalists and the international community push a narrative associated with inclusivity and a singular notion of Ethiopia. As was discussed above, Abiy Ahmed has had to balance being Oromo and Ethiopian to appease non-Oromo members of Ethiopia and international donors that have a disdain for the negative consequences of too much of a focus on ethnicity. Ethiopian nationalism has been oppositional to the full inclusion of Oromo elements for centuries. In addition, his recent attempt to politically unify the country under one umbrella party to create a more singular vision of Ethiopia is problematic. Many groups see this as an attempt to reverse federalism and the modest strides that have been made by Ethiopia's minorities. Invasions is a favorite trope that Ethiopia and even the United States utilizes to whip up patriotic fervor and to strengthen nationalism. The term Oromo represents a master signifier within Ethiopian political and academic discourse. Oromo visibility and overt identity expression often evoked /signified fears of foreign engulfment and invasion. These

fears have been used to justify Oromo exclusion. Ethiopian nationalism has been constructed in ways that either vilified or ignored explicit Oromo elements, so when Abiy was accepted by traditional Amhara and Tigray elites early in his tenure, this was quite surprising because it belied the traditional pattern, at least initially. The idea of Abiy Ahmed vs. the reality of Abiy Ahmed are two different things.

Through the rise of Abiy Ahmed and the Oromo signifier split into two: the good Oromo and the bad Oromo; the assimilationist acceptable Oromo and the radical Oromo. He has only been accepted because he advances traditional interests. Abiy is not revolutionary, and he may not even end up being a reformer; in fact, he repackages a reactionary and traditional version of Ethiopian nationalism for a new era and advertises it with an Oromo face. He is more dangerous because critiques about his policies will be brushed aside by traditional elites and the international community because he is a minority. He is read as a minority, but his actions do not align with their interests. His actual political activities are overshadowed by the symbolic victory he represents for the marginalized group.

In the United States and in Ethiopia, minority inclusion is often followed by reactionary policies and the development of an extremely exclusionary state apparatus. If we look back to the era of princes, Abyssinians attempted to purge Oromo elements that became too powerful. This purge was followed by colonialism and the ouster of the formal recognition of an Oromo presence until 2018. In the United States during the reconstruction period after the Civil War, African American participation in government caused so much anxiety that it was eliminated and replaced by Jim Crow and formal segregation. In addition, Obama was followed by Trump. Abiy Ahmed has symbolic import, but the lives of the Oromo have not changed markedly under his rule; in fact, he may end up being more oppressive than previous non-Oromo leaders

Endnotes

1. Abiy Ahmed is not technically, Ethiopia's first Oromo leader. Haile Selassie and a number of others had Oromo heritage. What makes Abiy unique is his public acknowledgement of his Oromo identity.
2. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr25/2358/2020/en/

3. Movies that deal with the end of the world and alien invasions often have a Black president or leading character for example 2012, The Fifth Element, Deep Impact, 24, Left Behind, The Event and the movie The Big Game.
4. Abiymania: How Abiy Ahmed brought Ethiopia back from the brink | CNN Alfred Nobel catches 'Abiy-mania' (brookings.edu)
5. Pilling, D., & Barber, L. (2019). Ethiopia's Abiy Ahmed: Africa's new talisman'. *Financial Times*, *20*.

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